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ABSTRACT
The oil and gas industry has developed a handful of implied
covenants that regulate royaltyowners' rights. Yet the courts have
not formally recognized any new covenants in recent years. In
practice, however, courts frequently enforce a covenant that is
perhaps more fundamental than the recognized covenants: the
mutual benefit covenant that operatorsare to share benefits they
receive with royalty owners and are not to take separatebenefits
from the revenue stream. This covenant can befound in application
in areasas diverse as division order cases, affiliate pricing cases,
and some drainage and interest-suspense cases. It is expressly
recognizedby theone code state, Louisiana.Adopting this principle
formally should have prevented the current rule that royalty
owners do not share in take-or-pay payments and might have
prevented the oil posted-priceproblems and similar problems now
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coming to light in natural gas royalty payments. The mutual
benefit covenant meets requirementsfor formal articulation; it
tracks the parties'true understandingand is necessary to effectuate
the purposes of the lease.
One of the best-settled rules in oil and gas law is that courts give
royalty owners extra contract protection in order to equalize the balance of
power between the royalty owner and the lessee, which usually is an
operating oil and gas company.' These protections are called implied
covenants. Academics can dispute whether courts imply these extra
protections as a matter of law because of the imbalance of power in most
leases, or instead imply them "in fact" to round out the parties' subjective
intent! But there is no disagreement that courts will imply a series of
specific duties in every lease,3 even though the duties are not in writing,
and give these duties equal weight to the written terms.'
Courts traditionally imply one general standard of reasonable
prudence and five particular covenants. They also, however, routinely
enforce but fail to formally recognize a substantive principle that goes more
directly to the heart of the lease: the lessee cannot take separate benefits
from or otherwise reduce the royalty interest, and it must share all benefits
it derives from the lease with royalty owners.
The process of common-law iteration has not yet added this
mutual benefit covenant to the canon of oil and gas law. The wisdom of the
common law supposedly lies in its process of deciding only concrete cases
and building principles outward from particulars. Over time, small steps
build the larger body of law. In the classical view, this evolutionary process
1. Royalty owners (often called lessors) and lessees are two of the main actors in the
development of oil and gas law under the standard American legal structure. The royalty
owner is a landowner who executes a deed (the lease) that transfers its mineral interest to a
lessee, but ordinarily retains a share of production free of expenses. See HOWARD WILLIAMS
& CHARLES MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS [MANUAL) 1087-90 (8th ed. 1991). The
lessee is the party that receives the royalty owner's mineral interest. See id. at 651. Ordinarily
it is an operating oil company.
2. See infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
3. Courts imply these covenants in every lease, but at least some of them can be
disclaimed if the lease addresses the issue with an express clause. For the problem of
disclaimers and implied covenants, see generallyJacqueline Weaver, When Express ClausesBar
Implied Covenants, Especially in Natural Gas Marketing Scenarios, 37 NAT. RESOURcES J.491
(1997); see also Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co., 6 S.W.2d 1039,1043
(Tex. 1928) (no implied covenant of general development where contract specified
development via one plant); Stoddard v. Emery, 18 A. 339,442 (Pa. 1889) (when number of
wells is expressed, "there is no room for any implication that there should be some other
number").
4. See Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 812 (8th Cir. 1905) (It is a "wellestablished rule that a covenant arising by necessary implication is as much a part of the
contract-is as effectually one of its terms-as if it had been plainly expressed.").
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served to unveil a legal corpus that was fixed and external; it was law that
courts claimed to discover, reveal, expose, or find. Yet even for those with
more Realist leanings, the revelation of principles embedded in a growing
mass of cases is a part of the elaboration and articulation of the law."
Indeed, it can be more important for Realists to extract the principles hidden
in the pattern of cases. The more law is a series of social choices, the more
important it is to make those choices apparent. Transparency of legal
thinking is the foundation for legitimacy in a just system of law.
The oilfield's mutual benefit covenant presents one of these
subterranean principles that courts routinely apply, but have yet to bring
to full consciousness. Courts do not honor this covenant as openly as the
other implied covenants, yet it is closer to the essence of the lease than, say,
the covenants to protect the lease, to explore, or to develop. Bringing the
mutual benefit covenant to the fore will improve the quality of oilfield
jurisprudence and refine a basic principle courts already enforce.
Parts I and II show that this mutual benefit covenant, though not
yet formalized, is central to oil and gas law. Part I analyzes Amoco
ProductionCompanyv. First Baptistof Pyote,6 a case that crops up repeatedly
for the principle that a lessee cannot gain a special benefit at the expense of
its royalty owners. Practicing oil and gas lawyers are used to seeing First
Baptistcited as a separate, substantive principle. Moreover, the FirstBaptist
principle is the same principle that courts honor when they refuse to let
division orders amend the lease if the change unjustly enriches the lessee,
and when they refuse to let lessees use affiliates as an excuse to levy added
charges against the royalty interest. Part II discusses the mutual benefit
principle in division order and affiliate cases, in three prominent oilfield
cases, and in Louisiana's Mineral Code.
Part III explains why courts should acknowledge the mutual
benefit covenant formally. If the principle is as clear as part II suggests, it
is natural to ask why formal recognition matters. The last decade has
produced at least three perfect illustrations of the answer to this question:
the take-or-pay royalty cases, the practices unearthed in the oil posted price
cases, and the efforts of natural gas producers to use deregulation to reduce
their royalty obligations.
In perhaps the worst exploitation, traditional royalty law proved
impotent when a majority of courts let lessees pocket royalty-related
proceeds from take-or-pay prepayments and settlements. In contrast, the
5. Even Benjamin Cardozo, though writing to expand the range of legitimate commonlaw reasoning, would claim that "adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than
the exception," and described a precedential system as one in which "the sordid controversies
of litigants are the stuff out of which great and shining truths will be shaped." BENJAMIN
CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 34-35 (Yale Univ. Press 1971) (1921).
6. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. App. 1979), writ refd n.r.e., 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
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two jurisdictions that do require lessees to share these payments have done
so on the substantive principle proposed here, namely, that the lessee
cannot take a separate benefit or advantage at the expense of its lessors. In
a second problem area, the oil posted price cases unearthed the unsavory
fact that oil companies for years underpaid their royalty owners as an
ordinary business practice. The industry's most-recognized names engaged
in sham trades with each other to make the posted price appear legitimate,
all while collecting a better price when they sold their own production in
true, third-party sales. A series of pending gas price and cost cases
concerning the marketing practices of gas buyers in the deregulated gas
market are raising similar challenges to natural gas and natural gas liquids
(NGL) prices and costs.
Part l pulls this discussion together to show that a mutual benefit
covenant satisfies the standard framework for implying an implied
covenant's extra-contract protection and will improve oilfield
jurisprudence from several perspectives. Oil and gas law will be much
clearer, and the legitimate rights of royalty owners much better protected,
when courts finally acknowledge the mutual benefit covenant that they
already extend, but too often sub sitentio.Given the link between oil and gas
law and the larger law of mining from which oil and gas principles spring,
this clarification will benefit many other areas in natural resources law as
well.
I. THE FIRST BAPTIST RULE: LESSEES CANNOT APPROPRIATE
BENEFITS AT THE EXPENSE OF ROYALTY OWNERS
FirstBaptist is an unusual case, a sleeper whose significance was
not obvious when it was decided. It is one of the most influential oil and
gas cases, yet unlike most lead cases, the key opinion comes from an
intermediate appellate court.7
The dispute arose from leases Amoco pooled in Ward County,
Texas. Amoco committed these leases to a very low-priced, long-term (20-

7. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, but in only a half-page of
hurried thought that discussions of FirstBaptist generally ignore. The text of the per curiam
opinion was little more than half a column long. The separate benefit issue got all of one
paragraph, but the Court did have the good sense to hone in quickly on that issue:
It is implicit in the court's reasoning that there was evidence of a breach of
the covenant to market in good faith in Amoco's marketing of the lessors'
gas at a rate substantially lower than market value, where by doing so
Amoco was able to obtain for itself the collateral benefit of increasing the
price for gas from its other previously dedicated leases from third parties.
579 S.W.2d at 280. We agree.
First Baptist, 611 S.W.2d at 610.
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year) contract in 1969, only to see market prices rise. The 1969 gas purchase
agreement paid only 17 cents per thousand cubic feet (mcf) for five years,
and then increased the price haltingly by one cent every five years. In 1970,
Amoco committed more leases to the contract. By 1975, however, when
Amoco and its lessees were getting just 18 cents an mcf, the market price
had climbed to over a dollar and was heading north to two dollars.'
Ignoring the high and rising market, in June 1975 Amoco added
the plaintiffs' leases to the underpriced gas sales contract. Amoco took this
seemingly irrational step only because it received a payoff; the buyer
agreed to raise the price for all gas under the 1969 contract to 70 cents per
mcf, effective August 1, 1974, and promised to raise this price one cent a
year, not just once every five years.
With this amendment, Amoco and its old lessors won a substantial
increase in their gas price. That bounty, however, came at the expense of
royalty owners in the new leases, who could have sold their gas for more
than twice as much. And this was only the beginning of the last oil boom,
so we now know that the loss was even greater. In essence, Amoco
discounted the new royalty gas in order to improve its old, below-market
gas contract.
Amoco's leases were "amount realized" leases, and the case was
postured as a dispute over Amoco's duty to market under such leases. The
standard lessee defense under amount-realized terms is that the lease is
satisfied as long as the lessee pays royalty on whatever it gets. The lessors
argued, in contrast, that Amoco had a duty to get them the best price
possible, which it indisputably did not do. The trial court agreed and found
that Amoco had breached its duty to market.'
The court of appeals affirmed in a discussion whose structure
somewhat obscured the future significance of the holding. This is partly
because the court pigeonholed the legal issue under the heading
"Marketing Duty." Thus the mutual-benefit covenant came dressed in a
traditional implied covenant, the duty to market.'( In retrospect, though,

8. See First Baptist, 579 S.W.2d at 282.
9. See id. at 284. The court in this bench trial found no duty-to-market violation for the
gas committed in 1970, presumably because Amoco had gotten the best price it could at that
time, and this finding was not appealed. See id.
10. Further confusing the issue, the opinion began with a technical discussion of
executive rights cases and the general question of implied contract rights. Id. at 284-85. This
beside-the-point diversion into executive rights cases addressed why courts can imply rights
in a contract at all. The court then spent several pages establishing that an implied covenant
to market does indeed exist. Id. at 285-87. The decision's future impact probably also was
clouded because the court had to deal with the appropriate measure of market value, an issue
on which the court held that prices others paid for gas from the same wells were appropriate
evidence of market value, see id. at 287, and with whether division orders can amend a lease's
price terms; see id. at 288, the latter a then-contentious issue under Texas law.
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readers easily can extract the principle for which FirstBaptist has become
best known. The opinion cited Williams and Meyers for the proposition
that "where the interests of the [lessor and lessee] diverge and the lessee
lacks incentive to market gas, closer supervision of his business judgment
will be necessary.""1 Under such circumstances, "where the interestsof the2
lessee and lessor do not coincide, the lessee must be held to a stricterstandard."
When it explained what Amoco actually did wrong, the court focused on
Amoco's taking a separate benefit for itself. The 1975 increase in price for
Amoco's gas under the old contract "was obviously a substantial benefit
for Amoco and its royalty owners under the previously dedicated leases."13
That gain came, however, at plaintiffs' expense because they sacrificed a
higher gas price: "But it also meant that as to twelve of the leases involved
in this case, the royalty owners would receive a payment for gas which was
approximately one-half of the amount soon to be paid
by Lone Star and
14
This was not a substantial benefit to them....
Delhi ....
FirstBaptist can be read as a duty to market case with bad facts. Its
issue can be stated in a narrow, technical way: Does a lessee under an
amount-realized lease satisfy its duty to get the best price possible as long
as it pays its royalty owners exactly what it receives?"5 Yet the case more
frequently gets cited for the broader principle that a lessee cannot
appropriate a benefit at the expense of its lessors.' 6 In the way in which the
11. Id.at 286 (quoting5 HOWARDWILUAMS&CHARLFSMEYERSOILANDGASLAW, § 856.3
(1977 ed.); see Garman v. Conoco, 886 P.2d 652, 661 n.28 (Colo. 1994) (citing with approval
FirstBaptist for standard of higher scrutiny when lessee owns processing plant).
12. FirstBaptist, 579 S.W.2d at 286 (emphasis added).
13. Id.at 287.
14. Id. One aspect of this holding is the principle the Texas Supreme Court later
enunciated in Amoco v.Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563,569 (Tex. 1981), namely, that the lessee has
a duty to each lessor, not just to its lessors as a group. See generally infra notes 79-87 and
accompanying text.
15. FirstBaptistsometimes gets cited for this narrow point or for its division order issue,
rather than its no-separate-benefit rule. See, e.g., Cabot Corp. v. Brown, 754 S.W.2d 104,106-07
(Tex. 1987).
16. See, e.g., Freyv. Amoco Prod. Co., 943 F.2d 578,585 (5th Cir. 1991) (summarizing First
Baptist principle as follows: "lessee who compromises volume gas price for benefits that did
not accrue to lessors is accountable to lessors," and then enforcing Louisiana rule that lessee
must share take-or-pay settlement with royalty owners); Hurd Enters. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d
101, 108, 112 (Tex. App. 1992) (describing as operative fact of First Baptist that "Amoco
obtained for itself extra benefits in respect to other properties in which the appellees had no
interest," in a case largely ignoring that principle when it held that lessee did not have to
share take-or-pay settlement); El Paso Nat Gas v. American Petrofina, 733 S.W.2d 541, 550
(Tex. App.1986) (FirstBaptist'sduty to market is "based on the assumption that the operator
is marketing something that belongs to the royalty owners, and retaining some benefit for
itself that should rightfully be included in the benefit obtained for the royalty owners..."; but
the court held that the duty did not extend to requiring the operator to get a high enough
price to keep wells profitable); cf.Condra v. Quinco Petroleum, Inc., 954 S.W.2d 68, 73, 76
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steady stream of disputes can separate an earlier decision from the
(Tex. App. 1997) (Rickhoff, J., dissenting) (citing FirstBaptist as a covenant to market case but
explaining its outcome as one where Amoco, by dedicating plaintiffs' leases to the old
contract, "thereby obtain[ed] extra benefits for itself" through an increase in its price for old
gas "to the detriment of the appellees").
Although it did not describe First Baptist as a separate-benefit case, the court relied
on it in that way in the affiliate case of Parker v. TXO Production Corp., 716 S.W.2d 644, 646
(Tex. App. 1986); see also infra notes 70-71.
Some have questioned First Baptist's vitality since the withdrawn supreme court
opinion in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140, No. C-3768,1987 WL 47847
(Tex. Dec. 16,1987), opinion withdrawn, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988). The Hagen court of appeals
had cited FirstBaptist as imposing a duty of the highest good faith on facts where the lessee
was selling production to its affiliate and paying royalties on a below-market price. See
generally infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text. When the supreme court affirmed, but
reversed the punitive damages part of the judgment, it tossed in a short sentence stating that
a later opinion, Amoco v. Alexander,622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981), was "dispositive" of the goodfaith issue. Hagen, 1987 WL 47847 at *3 n.2. This language has been cited as meaning that the
supreme court "disapproved" of FirstBaptist. See Hurd Enters. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101,109
(Tex.App. 1992) (citing a footnote in the withdrawn Hagen, 1987 WL 47847 at*3 n.2.); see also
Mark Cotham, Royalty and Related Pricing Mechanism Disputes: Learning the Three "E'S,"
J-2 to J-3 (Aug. 6-7, 1998) (unpublished paper, on file with author) (asking if Hagen had any
effect on FirstBaptist). But First Baptist only came up in Hagen in a discussion of whether the
lessee owed a fiduciary or "highest good faith" duty, as opposed to a reasonable prudent
operator duty. When the Hagen supreme court added its footnote that Amoco Production Co.
v. Alexander was "dispositive" as the "latest pronouncement by this court on the question of
the duty of lessees to their lessors," 1987 WL 47847 at *3n.2, the court seems to have
disapproved the suggestion that First Baptist might have raised the lessee's general duty to
one of good faith and accordingly avoided the confusion over whether that duty was a "tort"
good-faith duty. See id. The supreme court was not rejecting FirstBaptist'sno-separate-benefits
principle. Indeed, in the recent decision of Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources,Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex.
2001), the Texas Supreme Court discussed with approval First Baptist as a rule that a lessee
should not pay royalty based on a below-market rate under a proceeds royalty in bad faith.
See id. at 373-74. It held that the duty to market would not apply to a market-value lease on
the theory that the market imposed an objective measure of value, but cited First Baptist as
holding that the duty to market should prevent self-dealing and negligence, id. at 373; and
went to pains to point out that the royalty owners had not argued that the lessee choose its
off-premises sales in order to reduce the royalty payments, see id. at 373 n.3.
Though the traditional rule is that the lease relationship is not a fiduciary one, it may
be if there is a basis for finding trust and confidence. For a recent case affirming a jury's
finding of a "confidential" relationship but also seemingly putting the producer in a fiduciary
relationship to the royalty owner, see Seeco v. Hales, 22 S.W.3d 157,172-73 (Ark. 2000). Even
the traditional rule may not be a foregone conclusion everywhere. See e.g. Roberts Ranch Co.
v. Exxon, 43 F. Supp.2d 1252, 1263-66 (W.D. Okla. 1997) (surveying Oklahoma law and
concluding that "the prevailing...view in Oklahoma is that an operator occupies a fiduciary
relationship or position of trust with respect to the lessors to whom royalties are paid,"
though agreeing that this duty should be measured by the prudent operator standard and
carries less than the "highest level of trust"); Goodall v. Trigg Drilling Co., 944 P.2d 292,29596 (Okla. 1997) (Summers, Vice ChiefJustice, concurring) (concluding thatOklahoma "oil and
gas cases spanning decades" had used fiduciary language for royalty owners, and urging the
court to define the precise duty; urging a standard of quasi-fiduciary).
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inconspicuous flow of legal disputes like an unwashed gem and extract a
sparkling new principle, so the separate-benefit portion of FirstBaptist has
become its enduring legacy.
II. MUTUAL SHARING OF LEASE BENEFITS IS KEY TO A
VARIETY OF ROYALTY CASES
FirstBaptist does not stand alone for the principle that the lessee
cannot manage the lease at the expense of the lessors. A line of Texas
division order cases used such a rule to find that division orders cannot
amend the lease if the change increases the lessee's share of the revenue
stream. A series of affiliate cases stand for the same principle: lessees
cannot erect affiliates to collect benefits not shared with the lessors. Other
prominent cases like Amoco v. Alexander17 and Phillipsv. Shutts"5 represent
the same principle that lessees must share all benefits they derive from the
lease. And Louisiana, the one state to codify its royalty law, has put the
mutual benefit principle at the heart of its Code.
A. The Division Order Cases Enforce an Unjust Enrichment Rule
Against Profiting off Lessors
Although courts thus far have not acknowledged that there is
another implied covenant, they routinely enforce the FirstBaptistprinciple.
The division order cases are a prime example. Parties sign a division order
to provide a clear record of the legal rights to a well's proceeds.19 The
division order confirms title," but it is not a contract in the ordinary sense;
it is not represented, negotiated, or understood as a new, bargained-for
deal.
Nonetheless, division orders often describe the price upon which
payment will be made. Not infrequently, their pricing description differs
from the lease. Lessees have not been shy about claiming that the division

17. 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
18. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 567 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1977).
19. The division order is to protect the purchaser from competing claims to the stream
of oil or gas revenues. See First Baptist,579 S.W.2d at 288 (citing EARL BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL
&GASLEksEs §316.02, at 16-86 (2d ed. 1973));seegenerallyErnest Smith, Royalty Issues: Take-orPay Claimsand Division Orders,24TULSAL.J. 509,535 (1989). The buyer knows who to pay and
is assured that it is not stepping into the middle of an ownership dispute.
20. As Louisiana defines a division order in its Mineral Code, for instance, a division
order "is an instrument setting forth the proportional ownership in oil or gas, or the value
thereof, which division order is prepared after examination of title and by the owners of the
production..... LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:138.1.A (West 2000).
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order amends the lease and imposes more favorable pricing terms.. .for
them.
From the beginning, even courts that let division orders modify
leases acknowledged the transient and slightly disreputable nature of this
power. They agreed that royalty owners could unilaterally revoke the
change at any time by any objection.21 But courts ultimately have drawn the
line on division orders' supplanting the lease when the change benefits the
lessee at the lessor's expense. A division order cannot override the lease, or
seemingly "amend" it, if doing so increases the lessee's share relative to the
royalty share. In other words, the division order cases apply the principle
this Article urges courts to recognize formally. A lease is for the parties'
mutual benefit; the lessee cannot take a separate benefit at the lessors'
expense.
Texas courts have most fully addressed the effect of division
orders. First Baptist itself harbored a division order issue. The leases had
provided royalty payments based on the "amount realized" by Amoco,
while the division orders said that payment should be based on the "net
proceeds at the wells."' Assuming that this small verbal difference was
legally significant," the court of appeals found that the order did not
change Amoco's duties. The division order "was never intended to afford
a lessee the opportunity to amend the lease, relieve himself of lease
obligations, and secure advantages over the lessor which he could not have
asserted under the provisions of the lease."' The division order could not
relieve Amoco of its duty to market,' s a duty it had breached.'
In subsequent cases, the Texas Supreme Court slowly fleshed out
the rule that division orders can amend the lease, but not if the lessee
thereby extracts an added benefit or value from the lessor. Progress

21. One sign of the slightly illegitimate status of the division order as a lease amendment
is that the lessor can unilaterally revoke the amendment at any time by suing or otherwise
giving notice that it does not accept changes in the division order. See infra note 31 and
accompanying text. In contrast, merely filing suit would not revoke the lease itself or an
ordinary contract.
22. First Baptist, 579 S.W.2d at 288.
23. In most pricing contexts, "amount realized" and "proceeds" leases dictate the same
price, so it is not clear that the verbal difference really should matter in the First Baptist
context.
24. First Baptist, 579 S.W.2d at 288 (citing BROWN, supranote 19) (emphasis in original).
25. Id. ("division order does not purport to relieve the lessee from its duty to exercise
good faith in obtaining market value....").
26. The FirstBaptist court cited a much earlier court of appeals opinion, Le Cuno Oil Co.
v. T.P. Smith, 306 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App. 1957). Le Cuno does stand for the proposition that
division orders using a price-received basis require good faith marketing, see id. at 192, but
the parties apparently agreed that the division orders set the controlling price, id. at 194, so
the question whether division orders could amend the lease terms was not presented.
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through these cases, however, was slow and sporadic in the absence of a
mutual benefit covenant. For example, the court carelessly stepped astray
right after FirstBaptist. In Exxon v. Middletonv the court had to apply the
Texas "Vela" rule that under a market value lease a lessee may have to pay
its royalty owners more than it receives under its gas sales contract 2s The

27. 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). It is telling, given the general imbalance of wealth,
experience, and power between royalty owners and the operating oil and gas companies that
tend to acquire leases, that the Middleton plaintiffs had very large royalty interests. Their
combined claims, just for the difference between what they had been paid and a truer market
value, amounted to millions of dollars. In the irritatingly fact-averse manner of many
appellate opinions and of judicial pretensions to focus on pure issues of law, the supreme
court did not hint at how much was at stake, but the court of appeals listed the trial awards;
for the plaintiffs as a whole, actual damages amounted to over two million dollars. See Exxon
v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349,355 (Tex. App. 1978), rev'd in part, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
This explains why they had the wealth to tee up one of the State's major oil and gas lawfirms,
Bracewell and Patterson, to fight Exxon's Baker & Botts.
This imbalance of power operates differently in the formal development of the law
than in its day-to-day enforcement. For formal development, one hopes that the differences
in wealth may be largely neutralized as long as some representative royalty owners have
enough money to wage an aggressive legal battle over the proper standards for royalty law.
Of course, if only a minority of royalty owners have these resources, industry companies have
an incentive to settle with them and let only weak, underfunded royalty cases come to trial.
By contrast, in the day-to-day enforcement of contracts, including the dissemination of
misleading information that may prevent royalty owners from understanding differences
between their legal entitlement and what they are paid, wealth may be more important
because it may be possible to prevent most royalty owners from even seeing that they are
being cheated. In this instance, only the class action device may be effective at balancing the
two sides' powers.
A third field of battle is the legislature. Here royalty owners in theory might prevail
by their greater numbers and the fact that their battles often will be with out-of-state
companies. But royalty owners traditionally have not been well organized, while large
companies are and can hire the mostexpensive legal and lobbying expertise to represent them
in Austin, Oklahoma City, Baton Rouge, Santa Fe, and the other energy state capitals. One
economic theory about legislation is that smaller but more concentrated interests have the
incentive to organize and dominate diffuse stakeholders, even if the latter have more at risk
in aggregate. For lead articles, see George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MANAGEMENT SO. 3 (1971); Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q. J.ECON. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976). There is an older tradition in political science
that tends to the same conclusion, namely, that concentrated interests subject to regulation
are likely to dominate their regulatory agencies. Cf, e.g., MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC
USES OF POLITICS 24 nn.1-5, 56 (Univ. of Illinois Press 1985) (1964) (citing five major post-War
studies of administrative behavior that support an "instrumental" theory of agencies "as
economic and political instruments of the parties they regulate and benefit....").
28. For the underlying opinion, see Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.
1968); for discussion, see infra notes 242-48.
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lease seemed to require market pricing.29 Some lessors, however, had
division orders with Exxon and Sun Oil Company that provided for
payment on a proceeds basis and Exxon and Sun had paid the "proceeds"
they actually received, though this was less than market value.' The
supreme court agreed with the trial court that while these division orders
"did not amend the leases to provide for royalties payable on proceeds,"
Sun and Exxon nonetheless had a defense under the division orders, which
the court treated as effective until the respective royalty owners revoked
them by suing.3
The Exxon v. Middleton opinion, coming just three months after the
Texas Supreme Court affirmed FirstBaptist,32might seem to contradict the
mutual benefit rule. Even worse, the poor craftsmanship that left this
appearance of conflict came in a unanimous opinion. But the cases can be
reconciled because Exxon v. Middleton's facts were so different than First
Baptist's. Neither Exxon nor Sun received any separate benefit from the
royalty owners; all along they only received the same price on which they
had paid royalties. It was only the odd Vela rule that might entitle the
royalty owners to even more than the production earned for the lessee.
Read in this light, Exxon v. Middleton did not pose a threat of separate
benefits. Unfortunately, the Texas Supreme Court did not explain this
difference.
Five years later, in Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc.,' the court made
very clear that Exxon v. Middleton did not change First Baptist's mutual
benefit rule. The Gavendalessee, Strata Energy, erroneously paid its lessors
a one-sixteenth royalty, when they were entitled to a full one-half, and kept
at least part of the underpayment.' The trial court and court of appeals had

29.

The parties had a two-prong lease: if sales occurred at the well, Exxon could pay on

a proceeds basis (a share of what it received), but if sales occurred "off the premises," the basis
was market value (some measure of what willing buyers and sellers would accept as the going
price). Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 241-42. The royalty owners persuaded the court that the sales
were off the premises and thus they should be paid market value. See id. at 241-43.
30. See id. at 249-51.
31. Id. at 250-52.
32. The interrelationship between Middleton and FirstBaptist is even more complex than

these dates make it appear. The supreme court issued its first opinion in Middleton on October
1, 1980, before its FirstBaptist opinion. It issued its FirstBaptist affirmance on November 5,

1980. The final, binding Middleton opinion that made it into the books came out on February
4, 1981. The connection is even closer yet because the Court denied rehearing in FirstBaptist
after its final Middleton opinion, on March 4, 1981, and then denied final rehearing in
Middleton just one week later, on March 11th. The Court had to have these two cases in mind
at the same time. Its failure to devote any intellectual rigor to the differences between First
Baptist and Middleton, or even to acknowledge the simmering conflict between two opinions
issued so close in time, is a sign of poor or hurried craftsmanship.
33, 705 S.W.2d 690 (rex. 1986).
34. See id. at 691.
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found that this was proper, applying Exxon v.Middleton as if all "division
orders were binding until revoked. " ' They felt free to do so because the
supreme court had not explained the significance of the fact that Exxon and
Sun had not themselves received any special benefit. This time the supreme
court distinguished Exxon v. Middleton and said what it should have said
in that opinion: the overall purpose of the division order rule was
protecting the lessee's reliance on the division order when the lessees "have
not personally benefited from the errors."' Exxon v. Middleton was different
because "Exxon and Sun did not benefit from the discrepancy between the
leases and the division orders. They paid out [one-eighth] of what they
received from the purchaser-[one-eighth] of the contract proceeds."37
Exxon and Sun "had not profited....""
In Gavenda, in contrast, Strata Energy's royalty error transferred a
seven-sixteenths royalty from the lessors to the company. As a result, "it

35. Id. This misreading perhaps was not too surprising. Middleton seemed to stand for the
principle that a division order could "amend" the lease until revoked. The trial court had
denied that the division orders could "amend" the lease, seeMiddleton, 613 S.W.2d at 250, and
it was affirmed in its treatment of the division orders, see id., but as a practical matter the effect
of letting division orders set prices until revoked was the same as an amendment as long as
the division order continued unchallenged.
For misleading language, see the supreme court's statement that the Middleton
division orders "were binding for the time the parties acted under them," and its casual
citation to another case which held that the orders are binding "whether called a contract or
not...." Id. at 250 (citing Pan American Petroleum Corp. v.Long, 340 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1964)).
This approach gives division orders contract status, even if only a temporary status that could
be revoked unilaterally by the royalty owner. The Court inexplicably (and conspicuously)
failed to cite its recent First Baptist opinion on division orders in Exxon v. Middleton.
36. Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 692 (rex. 1986) (emphasis added).
When the lessee did not personally benefit, it could be unfair to allow suit because if an error
gave some other party too high a royalty, the lessee might have double liability-once in its
initial payment to the overpaid royalty owner under the division order, once to the underpaid
royalty owner who sued. See id. This supposedly would not be fair when purchasers and
operators relied on the division order and "have not personallybenefited"-again the mutual
benefit principle. Id. Presumably the underpaid royalty owner would sue the overpaid royalty
owner directly. See id.
The Court's division of responsibility is a bit too glib. After all, in the Court's
hypothetical, it still would most likely be the operator who provided the information to
determine the payouts and intentionally or negligently gave the wrong information. The
operator certainly was more likely to have the resources to sue and correct any errors than any
other party. The operator has a common-law duty to manage and administer the lease. If the
operator relied on the incorrect division order, it almost certainly relied on its own mistake,
either in preparing the order or in furnishing the information to do so. It is in the best position
to correct this problem economically because the ordinary lessee is in the oil and gas business
and well equipped with a professional staff.
37. 705 S.W.2d at 692.
38. Id.
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profited.. .at the royalty owners expense. " " Strata was able to "[retain] for
itself.. .part of the proceeds owed to the royalty owners."'
Gavenda highlighted the substantive principle upon which the
division order cases turn: whether or not the operator appropriates a
separate benefit for itself from its royalty owners. The rule that division
orders "are binding until revoked does not apply when there is unjust
enrichment .... .. 1A number of states have held more simply that a division

39. Id.
40. Id. at 693.
41. Id. at 691. The clarity of Gavenda dimmed temporarily with the following year's
decision in Cabot Corp. v. Brown, 754 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1987). Cabotwas a factually involved
case in which the lease had market value pricing, but the division order described royalties
as based on federally regulated prices "if such sale be subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Power Commission...." id. at 105,107. Cabot began paying federal prices at a time when they
were higher than the alternative, intrastate prices, so its pricing was "beneficial and profitable
to [royalty owner] Brown." Id. at 107. By the time of the suit, however, Cabot had received an
exemption allowing it to sell the majority of the gas at higher intrastate prices. See id. at 105-06.
The federally regulated price the royalty owner received had grown from 38 cents per mcf in
March 1977 to 80 cents in October 1980, but Cabot was receiving a $1.35 intrastate price for
the gas. Id. at 106.
The result in Cabotseems to have depended upon the way the court characterized the
conduct. The trial court and court of appeals understandably held Cabot to the lease's market
value price. The lessor, Brown, argued that the division orders were unenforceable under First
Baptistand Le Cuno, with their duty to market in good faith. See id. at 107. To pay the royalty
owners 80 cents when Cabot could get $1.35 seemed an easy example of Gavenda's unjust
enrichment. When the supreme court reversed, it ignored Gavenda, which the majority did not
even cite. This studied avoidance of precedential conflict is reminiscent of the Court's failure
to discuss First Baptist in Middleton.
The supreme court, though noting that the division orders did not relieve the lessee
of its duty to market, held that the FirstBaptistopinion "did not preclude the modification of
express or implied lease terms by subsequent division orders executed and binding upon the
parties." Id. at 107. Because Cabot's initial royalty price under the long-term Transwestern
contract was above intrastate prices when entered, the court found no question of bad faith.
See id. ("there is no dispute with Cabot's conduct in entering the 1967 contract").
On the surface, the Supreme Court left FirstBaptist intact but simply did not apply
it to Cabot. It was able to reach this result, however, only by shutting its eyes to what was
really going on in Cabot. It is telling that the majority never cited Gavenda, which the Court
had decided just a year before. The opinion seems designed to disguise the separate benefit
that Cabot collected and did not share with its royalty owners. Rather than just sell the gas,
Cabot had entered an exchange agreement with an interstate pipeline, Transwestem Pipeline
Company. Thus Cabot felt that the highest market value could be achieved through an
exchange and putting the exchange gas to its optimal use. This did not produce a seeming
difference between its benefit and the royalty owners' in the early years of the contract
because Cabot used its exchange gas in a plant at Skelly Town, Texas. See id. at 105. When the
plant closed, however, Cabot re-routed the gas into a gas stream it sold at the higher intrastate
price. Id. at 105-06. Cabot applied for and received an exemption from federal jurisdiction that
let it get this higher price. Id. at 106. Thus it was trading gas exchanged for gas from the
royalty owners' well at the much higher price than it paid them. Cabot collected that higher
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order cannot amend a lease (even before being revoked). 2
In 1996, the Texas Supreme Court again confirmed the division
order rule against unjust enrichment in HeritageResources, Inc. v. Nations
Bank.' This time the dispute was over the deductibility of post-production
costs. The supreme court had reversed the courts below and held that the
deductions were proper. But the court repeated the underlying Gavenda
rule that an operator cannot use division orders to improperly allocate
royalty payments and keep the benefits." The operator is liable for any

price on all gas, including volumes that should have been allocated to the royalty owners'
share.
In dissent, Justice Kilgarlin, who cited Gavenda right away, argued that he "can
envision no case that would depict as well the inequity of the result reached by the court
today." Id. at 108,111 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting). "Cabot reaped the benefit of FPC jurisdiction
over the exchange with Transwestern, paying out royalties based on the lower interstate
market rate. Yet Cabot sold the gas on the higher intrastate market." Id. at 111. Justice
Kilgarlin surely was right that under Gavenda, when Cabot was able to "market" gas via the
exchange at a higher intrastate price, it had a duty to market its royalty owners' gas in the
same way. When it did not, it did not get the best price possible for the royalty owners.
42. Kansas courts rejected lessee efforts to hide behind their division orders, to in essence
slip a mickey to the royalty owners via this pro forma title confirmation, in the interestsuspense royalty cases. The lead suspense-royalty case on division orders was Maddox v. Gulf
Oil Corp.,567 P.2d 1326 (Kan. 1977), in which the Kansas Supreme Court turned down Gulf's
"unilateral" effort to deprive the royalty owners of interest on suspensed funds. The division
orders were "procured primarily to protect the purchaser in the matter of payment for the oil
or gas" and were without consideration as far as amendments to the lease. See id. at 1327;
accord Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 567 P.2d 1292, 1303 (Kan. 1977) (reciting the trial
court's refusal to let division order, which it called an instrument to reflect interests in
proceeds from production, modify the lease) (subsequent history omitted); Holmes v.
Kewanee Oil Co., 664 P.2d 1335,1341 (Kan. 1983) (following Maddox).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court cited Gavenda with approval, as well as Maddox and
other cases, holding that the division order cannot "alter lease provisions," in Hull v.Sun
Refining and Marketing Co., 789 P.2d 1272, 1279 & nn.18-20 (Okla. 1990).
Louisiana has reached the same outcome by statute. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
31:138.1.B (West 2000) ("A division order may not alter or amend the terms of the oil and gas
lease. A division order that varies the terms of the oil and gas lease is invalid to the extent of
the variance...."). Texas now treats the issue statutorily, too. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE. ANN. §§

91.402(c)(2)-91.402(d) (1991 statute providing that "division order does not amend any lease
or operating agreement" and including form division order with capitalized warning "THIS
AGREEMENT DOES NOT AMEND ANY LEASE OR OPERATING AGREEMENT....-)
(Vernon 1993 & Supp. 2000). This language should be clear enough to surmount any
misreadings, be they innocent or mischievous, that might arise from the statute's provision
that the division order is binding "for the time and to the extent that they have been acted on
and made the basis of settlements" until revoked, see id. § 91.402(g), and can "clarify royalty
settlement terms .....
id. § 91.402(i).
43. 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996).
44. See id. at 123 (division order binding until revoked, but not if it "allocates payments
among the interest owners in a manner that differs from the lease provisions and the operator
retains the benefits").
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improper withholding that it retains.' Following this principle, operator
Heritage was responsible only for the unpaid royalties (royalties underpaid
because of excessive deductions) that it actually retained.46
If the lessee takes a separate benefit at the expense of its lessor, it
is prohibited from doing so and no language in the division order will
protect it. This is the law of unjust enrichment, translated into implied oil
and gas protection, even if the Texas Supreme Court did not formally
in
describe it as a distinct implied covenant. The supreme court reiterated
47
enrichment."
unjust
is
rule
this
of
basis
"the
that
Resources
Heritage
B. The Affiliate Cases Embody the Same Rule that Lessees Cannot Treat
Royalty Interests as Profit Centers
The affiliate cases are another set of cases holding that the lessee is
not to appropriate any part of the lease value from the royalty share. It
must distribute all benefits it pulls from the lease proportionately. Because
of the overlap between express lease terms and the duty to market, as well
as the implied covenant's strong dictate that the lessee must get the best
price possible for its royalty owners, affiliate disputes often come up as
duty-to-market cases. But the marketing covenant frequently is not
necessary to their disposition. The lessors generally are not arguing that the
operator failed to get the "best" price in an absolute sense. Nor should the
cases usually need evidence of prices in unrelated, third-party sales, the
kind of evidence common in a market value case.' Instead, the governing
problem in most affiliate cases is that a lessee has a separate profit-making
arrangement that it is not sharing. Courts will not let lessees use company-

45. See id.
46. See id. at 123-24.
47. Id. at 123 (citingGavenda, 705 S.W.2d at 692). There can be haggling over when there
is a separate benefit, and even mischaracterization (or plain error) on that issue, as Cabot
shows, but the core principle should not be diminished.
48. For market value tests, see Exxon v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1981)
(market value is "the price property would bring when it is offered for sale by one who
desires, but is not obligatedto sell, and is bought by one who is under no necessity of buying
.Market value may be calculated by using comparable sales. Comparable sales of gas are
it...
those comparable in time, quality, quantity, and availability of marketing outlets." (citing
Texas Oil &Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968)); see generally Heritage Res., Inc. v.
Nationsbank, 939 S.W.2d 118,122 (1996); Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 245-49. Not that long ago,
the Texas Supreme Court called nearby comparable sales-those comparable in "availability
of marketing outlets" as well as "time, quality, quantity"-the "most desirable method,"
Heritage Resources, 939 S.W.2d at 122, but the market-value test is not really this mechanical.
It is a factual test that should be reasonably applied and, as gas marketing shifts beyond the
wellhead, the test should shift with it, too. In Middleton, for instance, the plaintiff's expert
considered gas prices in over 30,000 reports covering three railroad districts, "in effect... the
entire Texas Gulf Coast." 613 S.W.2d at 245 & n.3.
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provided services to shrink the royalty share of production or to exclude
lessors from values they realized from the lease.
Perhaps the single most influential affiliate price case is, ironically,
one in which the highest court ultimately withdrew its opinion (because the
parties settled). Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen'9 was a Texas royalty class
action involving three units operated by Texas Oil and Gas Corporation
(TXO). TXO sold its production to a wholly owned subsidiary, Delhi
Pipeline Company. TXO delivered the gas to Delhi on the lease; Delhi
dehydrated it and sent it seven and a half miles to remove hydrogen
sulfide and carbon dioxide, another 50 miles where Delhi sold half the gas
to an electric company, and a final 50 miles before selling the remainder to
International Paper Company at one of its plants. Delhi earned an extra
fifteen cents per mcf when it sold the gas. In addition, TXO did not pay
royalties on the sulfur.' The leases were "two-prong" leases with amountrealized pricing for gas sold at the well, a market price for off-premises
sales."1
In a non-jury trial, the judge found that TXO's sales to Delhi were
a "sham" and "that TXO used that arrangement and its relationship with
its wholly owned subsidiary to create an unfair device to deprive plaintiffs
of their rightful royalties."' The evidence persuaded the judge that TXO
and Delhi were alter egos, making it appropriate to treat the two companies
as one and define the true sale as the later, higher-priced sales off the
premises.' The court of appeals did not use duty-to-market language, so

49. See 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. 1984), ajffd in part, rev'd in part,31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.140,
No. C-3768,1987 WL 47847 (Tex. Dec. 16,1987) (affirming relevant opinion that lessee TXO
had to disgorge profits made by reselling through affiliated company), opinion withdrawn, 760
S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988).
50. See id, at 27.

51. See id. at 27 n.1.
52. Id. at 28.
53. Hagen technically leaves open the possibility that an independently runaffiliate might
be entitled to collect reasonable fees, including market-level profits for those service 3.Under
the separate benefit principal, however, extra profits would violate the joint nature of the
lease. The royalty owners were entitled to the market value that TXO, acting through Delhi,
received, minus the reasonable cost of the transportation and processing, as well as their share
of the sulfur. See id. at 28-29. For a holding under Louisiana law that a lessee can only deduct
actual, reasonable processing costs, not the market value of those costs or costs plus profit, see
Babin v. First Energy Corp., 693 So. 2d 813, 815-16 (La. Ct. App. 1997); see also Harding v.
Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466,468-71 (W.D. Okla. 1963) (ordering lessee that paid royalty on gas
at substantially less than price it received in nonaffiliate case to account on basis of higher
price, minus actual compression cost; when "defendant acted in a dual capacity, as both buyer
and seller [the problem in affiliate cases],...[it] should not be permitted to so deal and thus
make a profit....").
For a discussion of the Hagen standard and some of the questions about the affiliate
issue, see John Lowe, Developments in NonregulatoryOil and Gas Law, 27 INST. ONOIL & GAS L
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it did not rely expressly on the "best price" and diligence standards of that
implied covenant. Presumably because the mutual benefit principle has not
been fully articulated as a separate principle, however, the court did
consider other sales in the vicinity-typical market value evidences-even
though this would not be necessary to a mutual benefit holding, nor
relevant to TXO's failure to pay at all for the sulfur it removed from the
gas.s The Supreme Court had published an opinion affirming this part of
the court of appeal's decision when the case settled.'
The mutual benefit principle has been strongly acknowledged in
other affiliate cases." The Oklahoma Supreme Court endorsed the principle

& TAX'N 1-1, § 103121, at 1-15 to -21 (1988).

54. See Hagen, 683 S.W.2d at 29.
55. Hagen quickly became notorious because of the trial judge and court of appeals' other
holding that TXO had violated a duty of "highest good faith" and that breach of this
confidential relationship entitled the class to punitive damages, which the judge set at
$300,000, a little less than a third of the actual damages. See id.at 27, 29-30. The Supreme
Court was ready to overrule this part of the opinion when the case settled. See Hagen, 1987
W.L. 47847, at 6.
The court of appeals also overruled TXO's claims that the division orders somehow
prevented the plaintiffs from recovering added royalties; the division orders merely provided
that the price would be set by the leases. See Hagen, 683 S.W.2d at 30.
56. See Hagen, 1987 W.L. 47847, at 3. Instead of discussing why TXO could not lift extra
profit from the royalty, the Court simply held that the evidence supported a finding that a
reasonably prudent operator would have paid more than TXO paid its royalty owner. See id.
57. In addition to Hagen and Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981),
discussed next in the text, see Wegman v. Central Transmission, Inc., 499 So. 2d 436,439,441,
443, 448 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming jury verdict awarding higher contract price where
defendant assigned leases to limited partnerships that bought royalty gas at a low price, then
resold for a profit, rejecting effort to limit lessee's duty to "first sale" where that sale occurred
in bad faith, and rejecting claim that defendant's price on resale was "merely a transportation
charge" where its rate for a $30,000 pipeline was more than the charge for a major, milliondollar pipeline in same area.).
In Craigv.Champlin Petroleum Co., the trial court found that the lessee, Champlin
Petroleum Company, breached its duty to find a market for the royalty owners' gas (the court
not indicating what the lease terms were or whether this duty arose from the express price
terms or from an implied covenant) when it sold the gas to a plant in which it held a 51
percent interest instead of selling to a nearby plant that offered a higher price. 435 F.2d 933,
935-36 (10th Cir. 1971). Though the Tenth Circuit agreed that the fact that the lessee "was to
a large extent dealing with itself requires us to examine carefully the fairness of the contract,"
there was no evidence that the nearby plant ever could have taken the gas and other nearby
plants were paying the same price the royalty owners received, so the court of appeals
reversed. See id. at 936-39. In essence, it did not believe that the evidence showed any other
available market. See id. at 936 ("Before a market can be said to exist, there must be an available
buyer for the product.").
There is an interesting possibility that even the market-value long-term contract
cases that fall under the heading of the Vela cases may have begun their long journey because
of the separate benefit problem. In the court of appeal's decision in Exxon v. Middleton, Chief
Justice Curtiss Brown claimed that "it appears" that in Vela, TXO sold gas to a wholly owned
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in Tara Petroleum Corp, v. Hughey.s The Tara royalty owners complained
that after their lessee signed its gas sales contract, a related company resold
the gas to El Paso Natural Gas for a much higher price." Tara is an affiliate
case because the royalty owners claimed that the lessee and the first buyer
were controlled by the same men and argued that the royalty interest
should benefit from the higher price received by this "middleman" first
purchaserW The court rejected this claim because the allegations of

subsidiary, which of course would have been free to resell at a higher price. See 571 S.W.2d
349, 358 (Tex. App. 1978), affid, rev'd in part on other grounds, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
Apparently TXO's subsidiary would not even reveal the "ultimate proceeds" it got for Vela's
gas. See id. Justice Brown found this fact "significant...in light of the obvious injustice of
allowing payment of royalties based upon a low price and the subsequent receipt by the
affiliate of a higher price upon the resale of the gas." See id.
Exxon v. Middleton itself had the same potential for self-dealing. Exxon processed
the lease gas at its own plant and then sold some of it to "the Exxon Gas System," Exxon's
intrastate marketing system. See id. at 355-56. The court of appeals approved an expert's
exclusion of those affiliate sales from his market value calculations. There was no sign these
were arms-length sales and "[i]t would be manifestly unjust for a lessee to sell gas to a
subsidiary or to an affiliated firm, person or corporation for a low price and allow that
company to extract a larger price in the resale of such product." Id, at 358. The Supreme Court
did not discuss the affiliate issue; it approved the expert's exclusion of Exxon's field price on
the different ground that interstate sales under then-existing price regulations were "not
comparable in quality," but instead were "conceptually and legally different" from the market
for this intrastate gas. See Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 248.
58. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981). The Tara Petroleum opinion is better known for
Oklahoma's rejecting the Texas Vela rule and deciding instead that a long-term contract price
can satisfy "market value" leases if the lessee entered the contract in good faith and secured
the "best price and term available to the producer at the time." Id. at 1273. All this occurred
without a suggestion that the lessee had not acted in good faith. Had the lessee been required
to pay royalties using market prices, its royalty burden would have quadrupled in a year and
amounted to half of its revenues. See id. Tara is a poster child for the unfairness of the
contrary Vela rule. It shows how the rule can let royalty owners get a separate benefit not
earned by their production and can put them in proportionately a much better position than
the lessee.
59. See id. at 1271,1275. For the years in dispute, the contract had the low price of 32 cents
per mcf the first year and 33 cents the second. See id. at 1271.
Apparently there was no evidence to suggest that the lessee could have received a
better price when it entered the contract. It may be hard to believe the lessee could not have
secured a better price, given how rapidly the El Paso contract price surged beyond Tara's
contract price. El Paso's price was roughly four times the middleman contract within two
years. See id. at 1271. This difference apparently occurred, however, only because the FPC
substantially raised the regulated, interstate price that applied to the El Paso contract. See id.
Thus the lawsuit in essence faulted Tara for not foreseeing that a federal agency would
sharply increase interstate gas prices. This issue is not well developed in the opinion, but
presumably there was no evidence that a reasonable lessee acting in good faith would or
should have foreseen this regulatory development.
60. See id. at 1275.
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common control were not supported.61 But its dictum perfectly captures the
no-separate-benefit ban that applies to lessee affiliates:
Courts should take care not to allow lessors to be deprived or
defrauded of their royalties by their lessees entering into
delusory or collusive assignments or gas purchase contracts.
Whenever a lessee or assignee is paying royalty on one price,
but on resale a related entity is obtaining a higher price, the
lessors are entitled to their royalty share of the higher price.62

61. See id.
62. Id.at 1275. Another way to describe the duty is that the responsibility to negotiate the
sales contract at arm's length "becomes an explicit duty" when affiliate contracts are at stake.
See Roger Williams, Lessee Duties and Lessor Rights in Gas Contracting Under the Implied
Marketing Covenant ofOil, Gas, and Mineral Leases, 26 TULSA L.J. 547,556 (1991). Lessee dealings
with related companies "[warrant] stricter scrutiny of marketing activities." Id. at 569.
Another very influential Oklahoma case that supports a strong stand against operator
profiteering, albeit under somewhat different reasoning, is Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime
Unit, 275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 1954). The Young lawsuit was brought by unit royalty owners
against an operator who was paying $2.65 per barrel of oil in an area where the posted price
was $3.00. See id. at 307. Presumably the operator resold at the higher price. The court held
that the operator had to pay royalty owners the higher price. Its basis for the decision,
however, was that the unit operator is a trustee to those with either working or royalty
interests in the unit and cannot profit on this trust. See id. at 309-10.
Because part of the decision was based on the lessors' losing their right to sell their
production because of the unitization, see id. at 308, Young can be read as standing for a
separate involuntary unitization principle. This is a somewhat careless reading, however,
because Young's unit agreement seems to have left the lessors with the right to keep taking
their production in kind, and so to sell it, exactly contrary to the court's suggestion. See id. at
309 (the unit "plan," the contractual agreement implementing the unit statute's dictates,
letting at least some interest owners take their production in kind; part of it began, "[t]o the
extent that any person entitled to take and receive in kind any portion of the Unit
Production..." (emphasis added)). Given the court's announcement that Young should apply
to working interest and royalty owners alike, a unit-based loss of control cannot have been
a sufficient basis for its decision, even if royalty owners did not have a right to take-in-kind.
For the general proposition, the Oklahoma Supreme Court was very clear in its
endorsement of the principle that an operator cannot profit if it chooses to be both buyer and
seller, the classic affiliate situation. The court cited Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106,120 (1914),
for the proposition that a trustee "is not allowed to unite the two opposite characters of buyer
and seller.. .because his interests, when he is the seller or buyer on his own account, are
directly conflicting with those of the person on whose account he buys or sells." Young, 275
P.2d at309;accord Beadle v. Daniels, 362 P.2d 128,130 (Wyo. 1961) (citing Young for principle
that fiduciary cannot unite opposite characters of buyer and seller). In the oilfield, the lessee
is allowed to be buyer and seller if this is the best way to market its and its royalty owners
production; but, as Young dictates, it cannot use that controlling position to profit from their
share of the revenue stream
In Hillard v. Stephens, 637 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Ark. 1982), the Arkansas Supreme Court
adopted Tara's reasoning and held that a good-faith long-term contract that lessee Stephens
Production Company had entered with Arkla set the market value, when there was no sign
that the contract was not "fair and representative of other contracts negotiated at the time in
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A class action affiliate case, Altheide v. Meridian,involved a national
class action suing Meridian Oil Company on pricing and cost issues. A
Texas state court certified a class of all royalty owners whose properties
were "dependent upon sales of gas by the producing affiliates" of Meridian
at any time from January 1985 forward." The class alleged that Meridian
resold gas from its wells to a trading affiliate, Meridian Oil Trading, Inc.
(MOTI), at a phice based on regional price indices, but that MOTI routinely
same gas at a profit.' The core dispute focused on this
re-sold the
66
problem.
Meridian is another example of what really is at stake in many
affiliate cases. The class did not need to canvas the surrounding area to see
if Meridian could have found even higher prices than the ones MOTI
received. It was content to say that the class deserved the price Meridian
got using its best efforts in truly independent sales-via the sales Meridian
made through MOTI. The class was not second-guessing the reasoned
business judgment of the Meridian family of companies on gas marketing.

the field...." There apparently was an affiliate allegation centering on Stephens' interest in
Arkla, but plaintiffs did not seriously pursue the issue. Id. at 584 ("Although there was no
testimony introduced, questions were raised in the interrogatories to establish the percentage
of interest of Stephens in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company.").
The court gratuitously added that it "cannot conceive of businessmen of the caliber
of the Stephens accepting a lesser amount for the sale of gas, the total of which would come
directly to them than they would receive as stockholders in a large gas distribution company
which they would have to share with other stockholders...." See id. at 584-85. If the Stephens
did have an interest in Arkla, the court merely would have been stating the general intent in
a lease that a lessee's seven-eighths or other large interest in production give it enough
incentive to get the best price for production, a price that should protect the royalty owners'
smaller one-eighth or so, too. But if the Stephens did have an interest in the buyer, other
incentives could come into play. For instance, the buyer might want Stephens to accept a
lower price because it could cite this supposedly arms-length precedent to press for price
concessions in other contracts. The gains from those concessions might benefit the Stephens
more in the long run than their direct stake in the Hillard property's production.
63. See generallyPlaintiff's Second Amended Original Petition, Altheide v. Meridian Oil,
Inc., (No. 92-026182) (113rd Dist. Ct. Harris County, Texas, filed Sept. 23, 1994).
64. ld. at 39.
65. See id. at 118,28-29. The class argued that Meridian used "broad geographic 'pricing
pools,' and sets the same price for each lease and each well within each pool." See Plaintiffs'
Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Class Certification at 19, Altheide v. Meridian Oil, Inc.,
(No. 92-026182) (113rd Dist. Ct. Harris County, Texas, filed Nov. 22,1994).
66. In their effort to certify a class, plaintiffs stressed the fact that regardless of the lease
terms, Meridian had promised to pay royalties "on the same terms and conditions under
which its gas is sold or disposed of" and under the "same terms and conditions it is currently
marketing its own gas." Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification at 17-21, Altheide v.
Meridian Oil, Inc., (No. 92-026182) (113rd Dist. Ct.Harris County, Texas, fied Sept. 23,1994).
Thus, the case also had an underlying current of fraud. In addition, the class alleged that
Meridian was deducting transportation costs greater than its actual costs and paying less for
liquids than it received. See Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition, supranote 63, at §§ 29, 31.
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What it was saying, instead, was that Meridian had to share the value its
work generated. After all, that was why landowners leased property to
Meridian.
Large interstate pipelines have been shifting gas marketing to
subsidiaries because the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
"unbundled" their "merchant function" from their traditional role as gas
transporters.' Deregulation led interstate pipelines, traditionally the major
natural gas buyers in the United States, to create separate corporate entities
for each distinct service (gathering, processing, etc.). As pipelines did so,
many tried to move their profit-taking "downstream" from the well and
then claim that any profit made after an affiliate resold the gas was just a
return to the independent risk and activity of the trading affiliate.'s They
used this corporate reconstitution to segregate profits they did not want to

67. The author has discussed some ramifications of these changes in John Burritt
McArthur, Antitrust in the [DeiRegulatedNaturalGas Industry, 18 ENERGY L.J. 1 (1997).
68. A Texas state court not long ago certified a Texas-wide class against the largest gas
producer in Texas, UPRC, where this issue appeared. The class said that UPRC breached its
duty to market by paying royalty owners on index prices that systematically understated
market value pursuant to a policy to move its "value chain" downstream and reap profits on
affiliate sales. See generally Plaintiffs' Third Amended Petition, Neinast v. Union Pacific
Resources, Inc., (No. 32,040) (31st Judicial District, Washington County, Texas, filed Sept. 20,
1999). The gas market has become much more complex because gas is often sold at a price set
at its final destination, minus intervening transportation charges, so that the price "at the
well" has to be "netbacked" by subtracting those charges. If the royalty owner is entitled only
to the price at the well, lessees will try to claim that all of the difference between the final price
and a wellhead price is a return to downstream services. Interstate pipelines that restructure
their gas trading through an affiliate will claim that most of their profit is earned between the
well and the final market. Yet the profit is profit on the gas and the gas in a netback contract
may be delivered to the buyer at or near the wellhead.
Pipelines will say that value-adding aggregation occurs between the wellhead sale
and the delivery to the LDC customer. They may claim that their new trading affiliates are
providing a service formerly submerged in their old role as transporters, not as producers. In
their eyes, their trading profits may appear unrelated to their job as lessees, but integral to
their former role as pipelines, an unbundled and supposedly competitive activity to which,
they will say, the returns should be entirely theirs. For a thoughtful observer with no pipeline
affiliation who seems to suggest that there should be compensation for the actual cost of
services like marketing, see COTHAM, supra note 16, at J-8; see also Owen L. Andersen,
CalculatingRoyalty: "Costs" Subsequent to Production-"FiguresDon'tLie, But...," 33 WASHBURN
L.J. 591 (1994) (reviewing cases and proposing that lessee should be allowed to deduct actual,
reasonable post-production costs, but not profit). For an article questioning how far lessors
should share benefits downstream from the wellhead and deciding not much after analyzing
such factors as returns to lessees' "entrepreneurial" effort (including in marketing and
processing), see David Pierce, Incorporatinga Century of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence into the
"Modern" Oil and Gas Lease, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 786,795-99 (1994); for another argument that
lessors should not share the benefits of such activity, see John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty
Obligation,49 SMU L. REV. 223,259-64 (1996) (arguing that post-production profits should be
treated as returns to lessees' downstream entrepreneurial activity).
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share with royalty owners.
Yet part of the lessee's promise is that it will make its expertise
available to the royalty owners. The obligation to share fully should not be
lessened if the lessee's efforts can produce a better than average return. If
the lessee is a large, experienced marketer, its expertise will be precisely
why landowners want to sign up with it. It cannot avoid this obligation just
by donning a new set of corporate colors.
Another set of cases that often raised affiliate claims are the oil
posted price cases. There again, a class of royalty owners (as well as
working interest owners) sued because many of the largest integrated oil
companies paid royalties using a price that understated market prices.
When these companies finally sold their oil in arm's-length, third-party
sales, they received a higher price. They routed many of these sales
through affiliates. The trades could be more complex and difficult to
unravel because the companies traded oil to each other at posted prices,
thus fabricating the appearance of objective, market-based prices. But the
companies had comprehensive balancing agreements so that ultimately
these trades had no economic effect.'9 They were wash transactions.
The lessee does have to get a separate benefit to violate this duty.
In a case involving TXO and Delhi decided just two years after TXO v.
Hagen, the court of appeals found no breach of the duty to market. TXO
sold gas to its affiliate Delhi and paid royalties at a price below that paid by
other companies in the area because TXO deducted five percent for compression.7 The plaintiffs apparently could not rebut TXO's claim that it did
not consider Delhi's profit or loss in entering the gas sale contract, but just
whether compression would let the gas flow quickly to market. 1 Unlike
TXO v. Hagen, here the facts did not suggest that TXO and its affiliate were
pocketing the difference between the royalty price and a higher resale
price. There was no suggestion, for instance, that the deduction was more
than actual compression costs or that TXO did not bear the same charges
on its gas.'

69. For an earlier, contrary posted price decision, see Garfield v. True Oil Co., 667 F.2d
942, 945-46 (10th Cir. 1982), discussed in infra note 204; see also generallyinfra part II.B.
70. See Parker v. TXO Prod. Corp., 716 S.W.2d 644, 645-46, 648 (Tex. App. 1986). The
court noted that other pipelines were paying the maximum lawful rate, without deductions,
so others were paying 100 percent of that price, while TXO's royalty owners only got 95
percent. See id. at 646.
71. The court believed evidence showing that TXO had installed compression to get the
gas connected quickly and to avoid drainage, that it sold its gas to subsidiary Delhi because
of Delhi's ability to move large volumes, that other sellers had been accepting terms like these
at the same time, and that the compression might increase production. See id. at 647.
72. Although it is not developed in Hagen, presumably TXO could have argued that it
was entitled to deduct the cost of transportation under the market value lease. This contention
would have been resolved under the separate body of Texas law addressing the costs
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Confirmation for the rule against affiliate-profiteering comes by
analogy from working interest cases. Working interest owners often are
more sophisticated than royalty owners and may have a larger share of
production, but they too depend on the operator's management, including
its care in marketing.
Working interest owners generally have a more detailed contract
than royalty owners, but no implied covenants. The standard for marketing
production traditionally was about the same, however, because the Joint
Operating Agreement (JOA) applying to most joint oilfield investments had
a "best price" term that was tantamount to the duty-to-market's "best price
possible."73 A few courts even have found that the operator's gas sales
under the JOA create a fiduciary "special agency" to the working interest
74
owners.

deductible from the royalty interest.
In theory, it should not change the principle of recovery whether the lessee receives
a separate benefit by not paying royalties at all, or not paying in a timely manner. But not all
courts have seen it that way. In Coosewoon v. Meridian Oil Co., royalty owners on Indian land
sued to cancel their lease because the Mineral Management Services failed to secure timely
royalty payments. Their claims were rejected because, among other things, they failed to
exhaust administrative remedies and there was a comprehensive federal scheme to protect
Indian interests. See 25 F.3d 920,924-29 (10th Cir. 1994). Although the opinion flowed from
the court's sense that the plaintiffs already had adequate means of redress, the court did reject
a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Meridian brought on the Young unit-trust theory
because, it opined, a failure to pay in a timely manner was not "evidence of a failure to
market." Id.at 931. Given the economic reality that the lost time value of money can be as true
an economic loss as an unpaid royalty, this conclusion makes very little sense. It honors form
with no regard to substance.
73. A majority of joint oilfield investments are covered by the American Association of
Petroleum Landmen's Joint Operating Agreement (JOA). The pre-1989 JOA provided that if
a non-operator did not take its production in kind, the operator could sell the oil or gas but
had to do so at the "best price obtainable in the area of such production." 1977 JOA, Article
VI,§ C. (The nonoperator is the owner of the working interest "without operating rights by
reason of an operating agreement." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, at 787). It should not
matter whether the operator used an affiliate to get this price. A 1989 amendment somewhat
moderated this language to require sales "in the manner commercially reasonable under the
circumstances." 1989 JOA, art. VI, § G.
Courts have been eroding traditional JOA marketing duties by stepped-up
enforcement of the JOA's disclaimer and exculpatory clauses. See generally infra note 270. In
jurisdictions where these clauses are turning into near immunity for operators, working
interest owners' protection has severely diminished.
74. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Long Trusts, 860 S.W.2d 439,44445 (Tex. App. 1993). The
Long Trusts court relied on another working interest case, Johnston v. American Cometra, Inc.,
837 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App. 1992), and an article by Ernest E. Smith, Gas Marketing by CoOwners: DisproportionateSales, Gas Imbalances andLessor's Claims to Royalty, 39 BAYLOR L. REV.
365 (1987), both of which support a special agency in the operator's marketing. In Johnstonv.
American Cometra, the court of appeals reversed summary judgment dismissing interest
owners' claims that the operator had failed to enforce a take-or-pay contract under which
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Though most royalty affiliate cases have been about prices, the
mutual benefit rule applies to costs, too. The paucity of royalty cost
litigation presumably reflects the fact that the royalty interest does not bear
the costs of production. When royalty owners do raise a cost issue, it has
been more often about that magic point where "production" ends and
whether the lessee can deduct certain allegedly post-production costs,75 not
about the measure of those costs or whether the operating company is
padding them.
Nonetheless, the principle that bars a lessee from making extra
profits by shaving the royalty owner's price should just as surely prevent

their gas had been dedicated; the operator had a fiduciary duty "if [it) acted as agent of the
non-operators in entering into the gas purchase contract," an issue on which fact issues
existed. 837 S.W.2d at 716.
Under the special agency, an operator could not sell gas to its wholly-owned pipeline
that resold the same gas for as much as double that price, but not cut the interest owners in
on the deal. See Long Trusts, 860 S.W.2d at 444-45. The operator had to account for the gas,
avoid conflicts of interest, and not act "as an adverse party." See id. at 445. It failed this test
when it made as much as a million dollars by reselling the gas through its pipeline. See id.
Somewhat peculiarly, the Long Trusts headnote described the case as one between the
operator and royalty owners. See id. at 439. But Long Trusts is a working interest case. The
court relied on the specific language in the JOA governing interest owners, and it even
expressly stated that "the present case does not concern royalty owners..... Id. at 445.
Moreover, the court noted that it would not extend the marketing agency to royalty owners
because they have no gas to sell; a lease transfers title for all gas to the lessee. See id. at 444-45.
In fact, the royalty still flows out of a measurable share of the total gas produced, and the duty
to market itself indicates that the lessee operator has a similar, if not always technically
fiduciary, responsibility via the duty to market to the royalty owners.
The affiliate issue was not the "primary" issue in Long Trusts. This case was more
focused on whether an operator and its affiliate can amend their contract to insert a lower
price in settlement of take-or-pay claims. The court held for Arco because, in large part, the
interest owners' gas was not committed to those contracts. They could have resold their gas
under higher, long-term contracts had one become available-unlike royalty owners, whose
gas is committed and disposed of by the lessee. See id. at 443-44.
One later court tried to limit Long Trusts by holding that the agency does not arise if
the nonoperators do not dedicate their reserves to the operator's contract. See Holloway v.
Arco, 970 S.W.2d 641,643 (Tex. App. 1998). Because the gas was not dedicated, Arco only had
a duty to "account for the monies received for selling his gas, to avoid conflicts of interest, and
not to act as an adverse party in its capacity as the seller of this gas." See id. (citation omitted).
This emphasis on formal dedication is unrealistic when operators so routinely sell royalty and
working interest production without asking the owners whether it should be dedicated to the
purchaser.
There is a catch on the agency duty to market for working interest owners that has
yet to be fleshed out in the caselaw; the duty would have to elude the disclaimers that courts
increasingly apply to the overall operator's duty, see infra note 270 and accompanying text.
75. For two recent summaries of cost deduction issues and the caselaw on postproduction costs, see COTHAM, supra note 16, at J-18 to J-24; Mark Christiansen, Recent
Royalty Litigation and Industry Response 430-37 (Oct.6-9,1999) (unpublished paper, on file
with author); see also supra note 68.
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it from cutting the royalty by using an affiliate (or acting directly) to inflate
the costs it is entitled to charge against the royalty.76 With deregulation,
cost issues may become more common. The Altheide v. Meridian class, for
instance, alleged that Meridian had cut their royalty by deducting a greater
transportation cost than it paid.' And pricing disputes can turn into cost
disputes when a lessee's defense to not sharing the price its affiliate
receives is that a higher affiliate resale price reflects the costs of
aggregating, storing, "trading," or otherwise handling production.'
Both leases and JOAs presume that the operator's dependence
upon the production stream will give it the right incentive to act in its
partners' best interests. When the lessee agrees to develop a lease, it is
promising that its share of the proceeds is motivation enough for its
undertaking. It cannot defeat that obligation by tinkering with its corporate
structure.

76. See e.g., Le Cuno Oil Co. v. Smith, 306 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App. 1957). Le Cuno as
operator contracted with its own gathering system to bring gas to a pipeline buyer and
deducted almost twice what the jury found to be its actual gathering cost. Id. at 192. Le Cuno
had to account for the difference between this deduction and its actual cost. See id. at 193. Le
Cuno was decidedly not a pricing case; the court even noted that under the division order
(which provided for royalties at the price Le Cuno received at the well), Le Cuno was free to
buy the gas itself at the well, but "no sale of that nature is under examination here," see id. at
192. The court did not address how the affiliate link would constrain the price in that
circumstance.
77. See supra note 66.
78. In the posted price cases, for instance, the defendants argued that using a price off the
lease (and subtracting transportation costs) overstated the amount due to the royalty owners
because it "fail[edl to recognize the role of downstream value-adding functions." See In re
Lease Oil Antitrust Litig.,186 F.R.D. 403,410 (S.D. Tex. 1999); see generally infra part 11B.
Cost issues have been more litigated in working interest cases because nonoperators
pay the lion's share of well costs. The industry has a complex set of working interest
accounting standards, so that most major groups of costs (charges for overhead, equipment,
and material, for instance) have their own formulas and standards. These accounting
provisions are documented in the Copas accounting form, which ordinarily is appendix C to
the JOA. But underlying these terms is the basic principle that the operator can only bill its
actual cost and "shall neither gain nor lose" from handling the joint account. See JOHN JOLLY
& JIM BUcM, JOINT INTERMS ACCOUNING 203 (1988). For details on the way this general
standard has and has not been translated successfully into particular areas, see John Burritt
McArthur, A Twelve-Step Programfor Copas to Strengthen Oiland Gas Accounting Protections,49
SMU L. REv. 1447 (1996). For a sample of cases holding that the operator is not to make an
extra profit on the various things it buys for the joint account, see John Burritt McArthur, The
Class Action Tool in Oilfteld Litigation, 45 KANSS L. REV. 113,220-23 & nn.589-95 (1996).
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C. Three Other Examples of the Mutual Benefit Rule: Amoco v.
Alexander, Phillips v. Shutts, Seeco v. Hales

FirstBaptist and its unusual facts, division order cases, and affiliate
cases are not the only examples of the mutual benefit rule. Three other
oilfield cases additionally illustrate the principle. A familiar example is
Amoco v. Alexandern a Texas Supreme Court drainage case. The Alexanders
were "downdip" royalty owners in a water-drive oil reservoir. They
alleged that Amoco, which operated both parts of the reservoir, was
producing the updip wells more quickly and, as a result, watering out their
reserves.' Amoco was not hurt because it would recover through the
updip property, but the downdip owners would get less than if Amoco

drilled their properties aggressively.81
The jury found that Amoco breached its duty as a reasonably
prudent operator by slighting the Alexanders. Amoco tried to "maximiz[ej
its profits" by diverting production from the Alexanders.12 After the court
of appeals affirmed, Amoco complained to the Texas Supreme Court that
it was between a rock and a hard place; if it pushed downdip production,
updip royalty owners would sue.' What Amoco wanted, of course, was a
free hand to favor whichever lease made it the most money. Indeed, a
logical extension of Amoco's position would have been that it could

79. 622 S.W.2d 563 (rex. 1981). Amoco v. Alexander is not the only drainage case that
imposes a higher duty on the lessee who drains onto its own adjoining property. Although
not all courts agree, a number of courts have held that drainage by the lessee, or what they
sometimes call "fraudulent drainage," will lighten the plaintiff's burden of proof. See generally
5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supranote 11, § 824. Because of the obvious conflict of interest when
the lessee owns the draining property as well as its next-door victim, Williams and Meyers
recommend that courts shift the burden of proof to the lessee to show that a protective well
would not have been profitable. See id. § 824.3. For an early influential argument that there
really are two drainage covenants, one when a third party is draining the acreage (in which
event the lessor and lessee's interests are aligned); another higher duty when the lessee drains
the acreage, see Verle R. Seed, The Implied Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases to Refrain from
Depletory Acts, 3 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 508 (1956).
80. See Amoco, 622 S.W.2d 565-66.
81. Id. at 566. Amoco had three incentives for favoring updip property. First, while the
Alexanders had a one-sixth royalty, the updip owners had a smaller one-eighth royalty.
Amoco thus kept more of the revenue stream if it shifted production to less-burdened updip
properties. Id.at 569. Second, Amoco's "chief competitor in the field," Exxon, owned interests
between the Alexanders and the updip properties, so rapid updip drilling would cause
Exxon's and the Alexanders' interests to water out quickly. Id. at 566,569. Third, wells drilled
updip would have a longer life (if Amoco could divert reserves into them), so presumably
Amoco's costs would be reduced. See id. at 569.
82. Id. at 566.
83. Id. at 569. Amoco argued that it was being subjected to "contrary obligations from
which there is no escape" and that the "fulfilling of one obligation necessarily causes the
breach of the other."
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produce everything updip if this maximized its profits." As in FirstBaptist,
Amoco wanted to raise its return at certain lessors' expense.
The supreme court affirmed Amoco v. Alexander using traditional
language of reasonable prudence in the drainage context, but what really
troubled the court was Amoco's taking benefits separately from the
downdip royalty owners. The "conflicts of interest of Amoco, as a common
lessee" were what "cause us concern. " ss If Amoco had no updip acreage,
it would have tried to "capture the most oil possible from the Alexander
leases before they watered out. " s Given the various separate benefits to
Amoco from updip production, however, Amoco had "no economic
incentive" to increase production on the Alexanders' property. 7 Amoco
could not reduce the Alexanders' recovery just because it was better off. It
could not manipulate its leases to increase its recovery versus its royalty
owners' recovery.
Another prominent example of the mutual benefit rule in action is
Phillipsv. Shutts.ssThis case is better known for its class action aspects." But
84. If production fell to nothing, presumably the lease would terminate and Amoco
would be at risk that a more aggressive operator would take over the Alexander property.
Amoco's incentive was to produce enough downdip to keep that property from an industry
competitor, but no more, and produce everything else from the more lucrative (to it) updip
properties.
85. See Amoco v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d at 569.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The case began as Shutts v.Phillips,567 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1970) [hereinafter Shutts I].
Litigation continued in Phillipsv. Shutts, 679 P.2d 1159 (Kan. 1984) [hereinafter Shutts llaffd
in pertinentpart, rev'd in part,472 U.S. 797 (1985) [hereinafter Shutts 1111, on reh'g,732 P.2d 1286
(Kan. 1987) [hereinafter Shutts IV].
89. The Kansas Supreme Court's class certification opinion went to the United States
Supreme Court and resulted in a major pronouncement on the relationship between class
claims and the forum-state's jurisdiction, as well as on choice of law. The supreme court held
that Kansas had substantive jurisdiction over a national class of 28,100 royalty owners even
though only 22 of the 19,700 leases were in Kansas, and not more than 1500 of the over 28,000
class members lived there. See Shutts II,679 P.2d at 1165-66. The case had more connection
with Kansas than this recital might make it seem, though, because the FPC rate increase that
spawned the dispute applied to the Hugoton-Anadarko area, an area that covered all of
567 P.2d at 1298. Thus
Kansas and parts of the Texas and Oklahoma panhandles. See Shutts 1,
Kansas courts had an intimate concern with the questions posed. Nonetheless, the relation of
many class members to Kansas was attenuated if measured by certain conventional tests.
On choice of law, the United States Supreme Court decided that Kansas could apply
its law only to claims with which it had a "significant contact or aggregation of contacts"; on
other claims, it would have to apply the substantive law of states that did have such contacts.
See Shutts Ill,
472 U.S. at 814-23. In a later opinion spawned by the interest-suspense issue, the
Supreme Court held that the forum state, here once again Kansas, could apply its statute of
limitations to all claims, even if the claims had lapsed under the class member's home state
limitations and even though only 2.1 percent of one set of properties and 0.3 percent of the
other were in Kansas. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 690 P.2d 385,388 (Kan. 1984), vacated, 474
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its underlying holding was based on an unwillingness to let an operator
make extra money off its royalty owners.
Phillips Petroleum had been the catalyst for the Supreme Court's
1954 decision extending federal jurisdiction and rate regulation to the
wellhead price of interstate gas.' Phillipsv. Shutts was one offshoot of that
historic decision. Ill prepared to set gas prices, the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) quickly developed an extraordinary backlog of rate
cases.9"' Producers like Phillips raised their prices each time they applied for
a rate increase, but they had to refund their interim collections if the FPC
denied their requests years, or even decades, later.92 From 1954 until 1961,
Phillips raised its royalties whenever it increased interim rates, but in 1961
it changed its policy. It decided to withhold, or, euphemistically, to
"suspense" the increase until the FPC approved the rates." If the FPC did
so, Phillips would pay royalties on the increased rate but not back
interest." Instead, Phillips mixed the suspensed funds with its other funds
and used the money in its ordinary business." The Phillips v. Shutts class
sought to recover the time value of suspensed royalty funds. It was one of

U.S. 806 (1985), appeal after remand, 755 P.2d 488 (Kan. 1987), affd, 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
90. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). The Court's statutory
interpretation that Congress intended to regulate wellhead prices, as well as interstate gas
transmission, seemed implausible, to say the least, because Congress had expressly excluded
"production and gathering" from the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1994), the statute
that provided the basis for federal rate regulation. However, this was one of those occasions
(in contrast to the over-devotion to words in the take-or-pay royalty cases discussed in part
1.A.2) when the courts decided to ignore the statutory plain language, no matter how
obvious.
91. Asonesignofthe Commission's incapacity to handlerate issues, itwasnotuntil 1970
that it issued Order 586, which addressed rate increases going all the way back to 1956! See
Shutts , 567 P.2d at 1300. This was hardly the kind of flexible pricing one hopes for in a free
market, even a regulated free market. In Order 586, the Commission allowed roughly
$153,000,000 in rate requests, and denied over $29,000,000. See id.
92. Lest rate increases sound like a rare occurrence, at various times between 1961 and
1970, Phillips had nineteen rate applications pending before the FPC in the geographic area
involved in Shutts. See id. at 1300.
93. After changing its policy, Phillips would not pass on the increase unless royalty
owners indemnified it for the possible refund. The Kansas Supreme Court understood that
the indemnity was more than a minor formality. It was a "burdensome condition." Id. at 1320.
The fact that only 17 royalty owners complied (it is a good bet that these 17 were large,
corporate royalty owners or wealthy individuals), while roughly 6400 did not, shows that the
indemnity was not just a little bump in the road for royalty owners. See id. at 1300.
94. See id. at 1300, 1311.
95. See id. at 1300, 1311, 1316.
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a series of Kansas class actions filed on this issue against major oil
companies.'
The Kansas Supreme Court held that Phillips had to pay interest
on the royalty share of suspensed funds because the money really belonged
to the royalty owners.' Phillips had "no entitlement" to the suspensed
funds. It could collect all of the increased rate, but "under no condition was
the one-eighth (1/8) of the increase attributable to the royalty owners ever
to go to Phillips."

96. The Kansas Supreme Court denied Phillips the right to keep the extra interest under
Kansas law and listed Texas authority that required sharing interest on suspensed royalties,
including a recent case involving the Hugoton-Anadarko area rate. See id. at 1317 (citing
Fuller v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 408 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Tex. 1976)). The court also cited
Oklahoma authority that it believed would require the same holding in that state, see id.
(citing Smith v. Owens, 397 P.2d 673 (Okla. 1963); First Nat'l Bank &Title Co. v. Exchange
Nat'l Bank & Title Co., 517 P.2d 805 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973)). In a later Phillips decision, the
court discussed the interest-suspense issue and reached the same result under the laws of
Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Wyoming. See Shutts IV, 732 P.2d 1286,1293311 (Kan. 1987). The interest-suspense issue seems to have been mainly addressed by Kansas
courts because they certified a series of large class actions against major producers to resolve
the issue. In another opinion in the Phillipsv. Shutts line, the Kansas Supreme Court rejected
Phillips' argument that it did not have to pay interest if it used the gas in its own operations
rather than sold it, and so did not actually receive funds that it could deposit to earn interest.
See Shutts 11, 679 P.2d 1159,1176-78 (Kan. 1984). The court looked to the economic substance
of the benefits Phillips received from the increased rates, not just their form.
97. See Shutts 1,567 P.2d 1292, 1300 (Kan. 1970).
98. Id.; see also id. at 1316 (stating that "[w]hat is significant is these gas royalty suspense
monies never did or could belong to Phillips.").As Thomas Harrell has pointed out, technically
the Kansas Supreme Court got that wrong; title to the gas and therefore the initial right to
payments belonged to Phillips, not its royalty owners. See Thomas A. Harrell, Developments
in Non-Regulatory Oil & Gas Law, 30 INST. OIL &GAS L & TAX'N 311, 337 (1979). At a deeper
level, the court was merely honoring the true economic workings of the royalty relationship,
one shown by the commonplace references to the royalty owner's "share" of production. See
id. at 338. Even if "technically the lessors did not own or have any claim to the actual
proceeds, the court still viewed it as 'their' money." Id.
It may seem odd that if Phillips had no entitlement to the royalty owners' share, it
could suspense their funds at all. But Phillips' interim control over royalties was an artifact
of federal law that royalty owners had no "legally enforceable right" to the incremental
royalties until the FPC approved the new rates. See Shutts 1,567 P.2d at 1299. The Kansas
Supreme Court agreed with Phillips that it could retain the suspense royalties until the FPC
acted. See id. at 1315. It found Phillips' use of the suspensed funds "dearly a sound and
profitable business practice" that the court could not "condemn," given that the FPC scheme
did not require it to pay out unapproved rates. Id. at 1316. The court also did not blame
Phillips for the FPC's delay. Id.at 1316-17. It would not,however, let Phillips "enrich itself in
the absence of any contractual sanction or seize upon the procedural complexities of the FPC
to avoid responsibility for an appropriate measure of damages, expressed in terms of
interest." Id. at 1317.
This decision to let Phillips keep the suspensed funds pending a final FPC rate
ruling still seems at odds with the rest of the Kansas Supreme Court decision. The court noted
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This rarely discussed substantive holding in Phillips v. Shutts is a
strong statement of the rule that the lease dictates a balanced and mutual
sharing from the same revenue stream. A lessee cannot invade the royalty
owner's share for its own gain." Even if an artifice of federal pricing
temporarily blocks the royalty owner from immediately receiving all
royalties, the lessee has to hold the funds in trust and preserve every
resulting benefit for the royalty owners.' °° In a mature reading, Phillips v.
Shutts is a key case for the proposition that "there is a mutuality of
objectives and sharing of benefits in the ordinary mining lease.""'1

that the FPC did not have jurisdiction to decide whether Phillips had to pay interest to royalty
owners. See id. at 1319. Yet, if this is so, and if Phillips never owned and could not own the
suspensed funds, exactly what right was it exercising when it held onto the funds and used
them in its business, even if it ultimately paid interest on them? Did Phillips pay a higher
amount right away to working interest owners? If Phillips made a higher rate of return on
these funds than the statutory interest awarded by the courts, could the royalty owners
recover that profit on a constructive trust theory?
When the court affirmed the trial judge's determination that letting Phillips keep
interest on the royalty share of the price increase would constitute unjust enrichment, it
reprinted the trial court's findings in its opinion. Id. at 1302-04.
99. Phillips v. Shutts received this reading in an article that, though it has received a lot
of attention, is too often pigeon-holed as applying to Louisiana law only. See Harrell, supra
note 98.
100. In the final opinion in the Phillipsv. Shutts line, as mentioned in note 96, the Kansas
Supreme Court decided that the laws of Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Kansas, New Mexico,
and Wyoming all compelled payment to the royalty owners. See Shutts IV, 732 P.2d at 12931311.
Phillipsv. Shutts' interest suspense rule may have been somewhat buried for another
reason besides the prominence of the class-action questions: the way the Court explained the
source of the duty. The Kansas Supreme Court suggested that Phillips' duty to pay interest
on suspensed funds could be found in the lease language, as if the leases expressly required
Phillips to do so. To avoid rules that provided low statutory interest rates when the parties
did not agree on interest, the court held that "[h]ere, of course, an agreement for the payment
of interest on the part of Phillips is clearly present." Shutts 1,567 P.2d at 1319. The court never
cited any language showing the leases required interest on suspensed funds or mentioned
suspensed royalties at all. The court seems to have meant that Phillips "expressly contracted
to pay a percentage of the price received," and that this "price" had to include the suspensed
funds. Id. at 1320.
Unfortunately, the pretense that the lease language told the parties what to do
detracts attention from the real basis for decision, which is the mutuality inherent in the lease.
Thus, in some ways Phillipsv. Shutts is as oversimplified on this point as the treatment of
contract language in the take-or-pay cases discussed in part III.A.2, with the critical
distinction that here the ambitious reading bolstered a correct analysis of intent, rather than
thwarting it.
101. Harrell, supranote 98, at 338. For other cases that should be listed among important,
well-known examples of the rule against separate benefits, see Henry v. Ballard & Cordell
Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334,1339 (La. 1982), discussed as part of the take-or-pay/royalty analysis
below. See infra notes 247.48 and accompanying text. Ballard is an interesting example of this
rule because it protected the lessee rather than the lessor. See also Kansas Baptist Convention
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Finally, a recent Arkansas Supreme Court opinion, Seeco v. Hales,"°2
applies the mutual benefit principle to an unfortunate take-or-pay problem
that faced a 7000-member class of royalty owners. The facts established a
stark abuse of royalty owners. The lessee, Seeco, was the exploration and
production affiliate of Arkansas Western Gas (AWG), which owned the
intrastate gas distribution system in northwestern Arkansas. Seeco sold

v. Mesa Operating Co., 864 P.2d 204 (Kan. 1993), in which Mesa drilled an infill well that its
own analysis showed would render the church's interest worthless. See id. at 208.
Another well-known case turning on the mutual benefit principle that was set to
add to this legal corpus until the Fifth Circuit finally held that all claims were covered by a
prior settlement was Shelton v. Exxon, 719 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Tex. 1989), rev'd, 921 F.2d 595 (5th
Cir. 1991). Exxon sold gas from the King Ranch to satisfy long-term corporate guarantees to
certain gas buyers, even though Exxon could have sold the gas for more by dedicating it to
a federal price category. See id. at 545-56. Shelton presented a funny separate benefit problem
because Exxon did half the right thing. It classified the gas as section 109 gas under the
Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1994), and based its royalty
settlements on that regulated price, even though the price Exxon actually received for the gas
was lower. See id. Exxon could have sought a higher section 105 price classification but did
not because it would have lost more on its guarantees. See id. at 546. Exxon did pay royalties
above the price it received, but Exxon wasn't willing to pay too much more than the belowmarket price its uneconomic corporate guarantees thrust upon it.
Exxon tried to argue that no reasonably prudent operator would have satisfied
corporate guarantees like its guarantees with "high-priced" gas bought on the open market
just to free the King Ranch gas and sell its gas at better prices. See id. at 548. Exxon essentially
argued that it should be able to use the Ranch as a patsy for its corporate priorities. The
plaintiffs responded that Exxon could not consider "outside costs" to decide what to do with
the ranch's gas. See id. The court agreed, holding that the interest owners could not be
"penalized" for Exxon's costly corporate guarantees. See id. at 549. Exxon could not defend
its failure to get the highest price when it "can only be attributed to its interest in fulfilling its
corporate warranties without having to purchase gas on the open market." Id.at 549. Exxon
violated the mutuality of the lease: "Exxon's method of marketing the King Ranch gas
completely subordinated the rights of the mineral interest owners to Exxon's financial gain."
Id. The court left no doubt that such violations of the mutual benefit principle cannot stand.
All of this became moot when the Fifth Circuit held that the lessor's "imprudent marketing"
claim was covered by a prior settlement. See 921 F.2d at 601-03.
First Baptist and Amoco v. Alexander were two of the three cases the court cited in
rejecting such self-directed operations. See Shelton, 719 F. Supp. at 54849. The third case,
FreeportSulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co., 6 S.W.2d 1039 (Tex. 1928), is another case
that bars lessees from pursuing their separate interests rather than mutual goals that would
benefit royalty owners equally. The defendant leased a large sulphur-producing property,
paying $450,000 for the lease and promising a seventy-five cent per ton royalty, plus a dollar
per ton for the first 200,000 tons mined. Id. at 1040. It later stopped producing from the plant
on plaintiff's property, complaining that it had stockpiled as much sulphur as it could sell,
even though it kept another plant 15 miles away running, and even though bigger companies
kept their plants in operation. See id. at 1044. The supreme court agreed that the case had to
be remanded for a jury to decide the diligence of the defendant's plant shutdown.
102. 22 S.W.3d 157 (Ark. 2000).
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virtually all of its gas to AWG under a single gas purchase agreement,
known as Contract 59.
Like so many producers who wound up mired in take-or-pay
disputes, Seeco entered this long-term take-or-pay contract in the late
seventies. Contract 59 contained typical industry terms: a price clause
promising to pay Seeco the maximum lawful regulated price and an
average of highest prices upon deregulation (with a price floor), and a takeor-pay promise that AWG would pay for much of this gas even if it did not
103
want to take it.
Almost from the beginning of Contract 59, Seeco allowed AWG to
ignore its promises. AWG never took full contract quantities, yet Seeco
never asked it to pay the resulting take-or-pay deficiency, and starting just
a few months into the twenty-year contract, AWG paid less than the
contract price. AWG underpaid the contract price right through the boom
years of the late seventies and early eighties, when reserve commitments
drew premium prices.' 4
In a rate proceeding before the Arkansas Public Service Commission (APSC) in the early nineties, Seeco and AWG admitted how badly

103. See July 24, 1978 Gas Purchase Agreement & May 21, 1979 Amendment, 6§ 6,90)
[hereinafter Contract 59] (on file with author).
Defendants' primary defense rested on another contract clause, the regulatory-out
clause. But the supreme court agreed with the plaintiffs that defendants had no viable defense
based on actual or prospective acts of the Arkansas Public Service Commission. See Seeco, 22
S.W.3d at 166-67.
Contract 59 did not have a market-out clause that would have let AWG lower the
contract price if the market price for gas fell. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, at 694
(market out clause lets "a pipeline purchaser ...lower its price if market conditions dictate").
104. As the Arkansas Supreme Court succinctly summarized the allegations, they were
that "SEECO never requested nor required AWG to pay the market price or take the volumes
of gas set out under the express terms of the contract." Seeco, 22 S.W.3d at 166-67. When the
gas became regulated in 1978, just two and a half months after the parties signed Contract 59,
its price was supposed to increase each month according to an inflation-indexed price
published by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. But Seeco phased in each monthly
increase over the next twelve months, rather than adding the full increase in: the month it
went into effect. So AWG never paid the right price after the first few months of the contract.
See id. at 168. When the gas was deregulated, Seeco and AWC should have redetermined the
price to the highest of any price in a five-county area in Northwest Arkansas. See Contract 59,
supranote 103, §§ 6(D),(F), & May 21,1979 Amendment§§ 1-2. Instead, AWG unilaterally sent
a letter announcing that it would freeze the price at its existing level. See Seeco, 22 S.W.3d at
161-61, 169. Seeco acquiesced; the evidence showed that "Seeco apparently did not play any
role in redetermining the price," even though this should have been an adversarial
negotiation between Seeco and AWG. See id. at 169. AWG "ignored the redetermination
formula and then froze the price." Id. at 171. The evidence supported the jury's finding that
AWG did not pay the right contract price during regulation or upon deregulation. See id. at
168. Seeco never complained about these underpayments, in contrast to the way an armslength producer would have protected its interest and its royalty owners'. See id.
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they had hurt Seeco's royalty owners. AWG thought that the Commission
would let AWG charge a higher rate for its gas if it could show that it had
diligently avoided paying Seeco $295 million of its price and quantity
obligations under Contract 59--one-eighth of which should have gone to
the royalty owners." The APSC made this testimony confidential after
AWG asked the Commission's help in keeping royalty owners from
learning of the contract violation. The jury found that this conduct violated
the lease and the duty to market, and in addition created several tort
violations.'" The damages, with interest, totaled $93,222,157.17
When the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, it agreed that Seeco
could not hurt its royalty owners just to advance its corporate interests, in
this case, AWG's desire for cheaper gas. The court traced Seeco's violation
directly to its succumbing to this separate interest: "There was a conflict of
interest in this case because of SEECO's affiliation with AWG. Had there
been no affiliate, the jury was free to conclude that SEECO would have
attempted
to get the best price possible, thus benefiting the royalty
, 10
owners. s
Seeco had a duty to act for itself and its royalty owners in their
shared interest. "We agree with the royalty owners' experts that SEECO's
duty was to obtain the best price for itself and the lessors." e°" As in Amoco
v. Alexander and Phillips v. Shutts, so the Seeco v. Hales court readily
understood that the lessee's core duty is to share the benefits it receives
with its royalty owners. It cannot use its position of trust to appropriate or
diminish the economic values attributable to their interest.

105. See Seeco, 22 S.W.3d. at 170 (citing testimony of Seeco's own expert to $295 million
underpayment by AWG).
106. The jury found for the 7000-person royalty owner class on civil conspiracy, tortious
interference by AWG with Seeco's royalty contracts, and on fraud-and-deceit and constructive
fraud claims that rested on Seeco and AWG's concealing their favorable, high-priced take-orpay contract that AWG was not honoring, even while Seeco was trying to buyback some of
the royalty interests. See id. at 163,171-72. The concealment went so far as keeping Contract
59 confidential inAPSC proceedings so that royalty owners would not have a "road map" for
a future lawsuit--so that they would not know that Seeco had violated their rights. See id. at
173,181. In addition, the companies destroyed documents after the lawsuit began. See id. at
181. The jury found that the two companies were alter egos, see id. at 163, a finding ensuring
that liability would extend to both but that was not a predicate for the violation of the duty
to market.
Seeco v. Hales contains a section on emotional appeals to the jury that is sure to be
cited with frequency in future cases. See id. at 175-78.
107. Id. at 163.
108. Id. at 171; see also id.
at 170 ("And, of course, the affiliated relationship between
SEECO and AWG raises additional questions about SEECO's lack of enforcement. Charles
Scharlau admitted at trial that the reason SEECO did not demand full performance from
AWG underContract59 was due to the affiliate relationship between the two corporations.").
109. Id.
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D. Louisiana Recognizes the Same Rule Under Its Mutual Benefit
Principle
One reason that courts may not have recognized the mutual benefit
principle as a separate covenant expressly is the lack of systemization in
common law reasoning. The state with the most codified law, our one civilcode state, Louisiana, has written the mutual benefit principle into its
Mineral Code.
It might be tempting to dismiss Louisiana because it is a code state,
but this would be a mistake. Louisiana draws its royalty law from the
common law. A Louisiana lessee's duty to act as a "good administrator"
imposes the same obligations as implied covenants in common-law
jurisdictions.11 Louisiana has put the mutual benefit principle, which
common-law courts already enforce de facto but should recognize de jure
as an independent implied covenant, at the heart of its Code. Article 122
provides that "while a lessee is not a fiduciary, it has to act in good faith,
develop the property as a reasonably prudent operator," and, critically,
"for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor.""'

See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:122, cmt. at 274 (West 2000). The Comment states,
In Louisiana there is available in the Civil Code a general principle which
can serve as a basis for achieving the result of the doctrine of implied
covenants in other jurisdictions. Article 2710 requires that the lessee enjoy
the thing leased as a "good administrator." This objective standard can aptly
be translated into the field of mineral law as the "reasonable, prudent
operator" standard which has been consistently applied by Louisiana courts
to oil, gas, and mineral leases.
Id. The Code describes in detail Louisiana's adoption of the common-law covenants of
reasonable development, of further exploration, of protection against drainage, and of diligent
marketing. Id. at 275-79.
111. Id. § 31:122 (emphasis added). The Mineral Code comments explain that the
"principal expectation of the parties to a mineral lease is that the property will be developed
for the mutual advantage and profit of both parties." Id., cmt. at 274. The comment confirms
that "this general principle is specified in the form of individual covenants" in other
jurisdictions, but cites HOWARD WILLIAMS & CHARLES MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW (1969), for
the proposition that the basis for all of these covenants is the "general principle of required
cooperation among parties to all contracts." Id. The source commonly cited in Louisiana cases
for this cooperative venture principle is Harrell, supra note 98.
For an article elaborating on Louisiana's mutual benefit principle, seegenerallyLarry
C. Hebert, Louisiana Mineral Code Article 122: The Concept of Mutuality (Nov. 19, 1998)
(unpublished paper, on file with author). Hebert discusses that the lessee must handle "all of
its operations...for the mutual benefit of both himself and his lessee." Id. at 13.
110.
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III. THE FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE A MUTUAL BENEFIT
COVENANT IN ITS OWN RIGHT HAS HURT ROYALTY OWNERS
Far from being a victimless error, the failure to formalize this
substantive mutual benefit covenant that would prohibit lessees from
taking separate benefits out of the lease has inflicted real damage on
royalty owners. The incompleteness of oil and gas law without such a
covenant is perhaps the only way to explain why so many courts
erroneously let lessees strip royalty owners of take-or-pay proceeds.
Another sign that current law remains too loose, and lessees too
unconstrained, is the widespread fraud by major industry companies
unearthed in posted price cases. Similar problems just now are emerging
in the natural gas industry.
A. Many Courts Have Cavalierly Let Lessees Appropriate Take-or-Pay
Payments Belonging to Royalty Owners
The cases that may best show the cost of not formally elevating the
mutual benefit duty to implied covenant status are the take-or-pay royalty
cases. In the boom years of the late seventies and early eighties, many
lessees entered very high-priced gas sale contracts like the one in Seeco v.
Hales. As mentioned in part II.C, these contracts usually made the buyers,
often interstate pipelines, pay the "maximum lawful price" while gas was
regulated under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and a redetermined
price based on an average of highest nearby prices upon deregulation." 2
The "take-or-pay" promise meant that, even if the buyer's market
deteriorated and it no longer needed reserves, it had to pay for the gas.
These very favorable terms for sellers reflected the high demand for natural
gas.
As long as the buyers kept taking gas under these lucrative
contracts, royalty owners enjoyed the same good price as other interest
owners. When natural gas prices fell sharply in the mid-80s, however, most
interstate pipelines stopped honoring their take-or-pay contracts. A
surprising number of producers were forced to accept less-than-contract
prices. Even though courts had held that the market downturn generally
was not a defense to take-or-pay contracts (because those contracts put the

112.

For a good basic picture of take-or-pay disputes, seegenerallyJ. Michael Medina et al.,

Take or Litigate: Enforcing the PlainMeaning of the Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts,
40 ARK. L. REV. 185 (1987). The Seeco v. Hales dispute was another fruit sown in this same
season.
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risk of market decline on the buyer), disputes settled for as little as 20 cents
on the dollar.113
It would seem an obvious application of the joint nature of the
lease, of this common undertaking to divide the proceeds of whatever
production the lessee finds on the lessor's property, that royalty owners
were entitled to share all take-or-pay payments and settlements. After all,
buyers entered take-or-pay contracts to buy gas from the royalty owners'
leases. Yet only the few courts applying a mutual benefit rationale have
taken this view. The contrary majority rule shows why this protection is so
badly needed.
1. A Few CourtsHave PreventedLessees from PurloiningRoyalty Owners' Takeor-Pay Benefits
Courts that approached take-or-pay cases through the mutual
benefit prism did make lessees share the payments with their royalty
owners. The lead case is a Louisiana Supreme Court case, Frey v. Amoco
ProductionCompany.'1 4 As the Frey lessee, Amoco had settled a take-or-pay
contract dispute with Columbia Gas Transmission Company for $66.5
million. 1 5 The royalty owners had a one-fifth royalty, so they should have
received a little more than $13 million, but Amoco would not pay them.
Frey took a tortured route to the Louisiana Supreme Court. A
federal district judge relied on Judge Brown's recent opinion in Diamond
Shamrock ExplorationCorp.v. Hodell16 to dismiss the royalty claim on partial
summary judgment. The Diamond Shamrock court had held that royalties
are not due on take-or-pay prepayments unless and until gas actually is
produced.117 When the Fifth Circuit reversed Frey in an opinion by Judge
Reavley, the case began its transformation into the principle it represents
today.

113. See Order 500-H, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead
Decontrol, 54 Fed. Reg. 52,344,52,356 (Dec. 21,1989).
114. 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992). The full history of Frey is Frey v.Amoco Prod. Co., 708 F.
rev'd, 943 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter
Supp. 783 (E.D. La. 1989) [hereinafter Frey 1],
Frey Iln,
opinion uithdrawn in part on reh'g by 951 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Frey II],
certified question answered by 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992) [hereinafter Frey IV], opinion reinstated
in part on reh'g by 976 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Frey V1.
115. See FreyIV, 603 So. 2d at 170. There were two payments, a $45.6 million "recoupable"
payment for gas that Columbia could make up and a $20.9 million nonrecoupable payment
that Columbia had to write off. These payments were just for volume disputes. In a good sign
of the vast amounts often at stakein take-or-pay litigation, Columbia already had paid Amoco
for having paid less than the contract price. Id.
$280.2 million for "price deficiencies," that is,
at 170. Amoco did pay royalties on the price damages.
116. 853 F.2d 1159 (SthCir. 1988).
117. Id. at 1161. See generally infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
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Judge Reavley methodically distinguished Diamond Shamrock."8
Though he was careful never to come out and simply say that Judge Brown
had made a (bad) mistake, Judge Reavley cut away the foundations of the
earlier Fifth Circuit decision. "9 Most fundamentally, Judge Reavley
understood that language alone does not answer the take-or-pay royalty
question-the parties "did not specifically address" the disputed

118. Judge Reavley mentioned three differences: (1) the Diamond Shamrock leases were
keyed to "production," while Frey focused on the "amount realized" from the "sale"; (2)
Diamond Shamrock interpreted federal leases and regulations, while Frey invoked Louisiana
law; and (3) the government wrote the Diamond Shamrock leases, while here the operator
Amoco did (i.e., so Amoco would come under the rule of construction that contracts are
construed against the drafter). See Frey I,943 F.2d at 581.
Differences in deference cannot explain the irreconcilable results in these two cases.
The Fifth Circuit in Diamond Shamrock should have deferred to the Minerals Management
Service (MMS), unless its interpretation was "irrational, arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." See Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1165. Thus, the
courts should have given the government at least as much deference in Diamond Shamrock as
they gave Amoco in Frey.
Turning to the lease itself, the court pointed out that royalties were due "on the
amount realized.., from such sales," not on "production" as in Diamond Shamrock, and held
that (it believed) Louisiana would find a sale even without production. Frey 11,943 F.2d at 581,
n.1. The court saw support for its reading in the clause that oil royalties were predicated on
"production," but the royalty on gas was to be on the "amount realized at the well from such
sales." See id. at 581 n.2.
119. Some of the points of disagreement were minor. For instance, Diamond Shamrock
worried that lessees might have to make a second royalty payment if the buyer later bought
the gas. With a little common sense, Judge Reavley dismissed this fantastically exaggerated
concern over a minor bookkeeping detail. Courts cannot diminish lease requirements "simply
because Amoco could have to send two checks to Frey instead of one if the market value of
gas rises when Columbia takes it." See Frey 11,943 F.2d at 582.
Amoco had grown enthusiastic about the two-check argument in the wake of
Diamond Shamrock, and argued that it would be an "absurd result[]" for it to have to make
"two royalty payments on one purchase of gas." Id.at 582. Of course, Amoco never tried to
quantify the cost of cutting these two checks, which it might well have to do for working
interest owners in any event. Say it took a clerk half an hour, or even an hour, to prepare the
paperwork. Maybe, giving Amoco every benefit of the doubt and assuming that it was
woefully inefficient and not computerized, it might cost a few hundred dollars per double
payment. Even assume a few thousand dollars in total. Why should that cost, which
presumably is part of post-production overhead for which Amoco will be billing the Freys,
derail payment of millions of dollars in royalties? Were Amoco even a little bit worried about
this cost, why didn't it build the charge into its overhead, and let the interest owners decide
whether to complain? We know the answer: Amoco did not want to lose the million-dollar
windfall it made by cutting the Freys out of their royalties.
The court gave short shrift to a different Diamond Shamrock refund problem. This
panel understood that the federal limitations statute, which Judge Brown suggested might bar
seeking a refund from the government, almost certainly would not have that effect. See id. at
583 n.4.
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issue-and that contract purpose required sharing.1 Applying Louisiana
law, he noted that the Louisiana Supreme Court had defined a lease as a
"cooperative venture: the lessor contributes the land and the lessee the
capital and expertise necessary to develop the mineralsfor the mutual benefit
of both parties.""' The lease was
set up to share the "economic benefits"
12
from developing the minerals: 2
The payments, like the market price paid for gas taken,
constitute economic benefits that Amoco received for
granting Columbia the right to take gas from the leased
premises, a right that Amoco got through the Lease. It would
be contrary to the nature of the lease as a cooperative venture
to allow a benefit by any name that is attributable to the gas
under the leased premises to inure exclusively to the lessee."is
Judge Reavley squarely rejected DiamondShamrock's argument that the sole
purpose of take-or-pay contracts is to repay producers for the risk of
production."M Diamond Shamrock is bad law and Judge Reavley knew it.

120. The language is more difficult than Judge Reavley suggested. The royalty clause
made payment "of the amount realized" depend on the "sale" "atthe well." Id.at 583. "At-thewell" could suggest that the parties meant gas had to be produced at the well-site. Or it could
just mean that prices had tobe netbacked to the well. Amoco's counsel had no position on this
language when asked about it at oral argument. See id. Judge Reavley pointed out that the
language serves to separate the net wellhead price from the price after transportation and processing have occurred. Id. He correctly let the larger purpose of the joint endeavor overcome
the linguistically possible reading that "at the well" required "production." Id. at 583-86.
121. Id. at 584 (citing Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So.2d 1334,1338 (La. 1982)).
122. See id.
123. Id. (citations omitted). It did help that Louisiana by statute required a lessee to
operate the property in good faith "for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor"; this duty
would be defeated if the operator could essentially deal the royalty owner out of the contract.
See id. at 585.
In a much earlier Louisiana case dealing with casinghead gas, a byproduct not
foreseen at the time of leasing, the Fifth Circuit required the lessee to share the revenue from
this new, unanticipated benefit because the lessor and lessee were to share the property's
benefits. See id.
at 585 (citing Wemple v. Producers' Oil Co., 83 So. 232 (La. 1919)).
Amoco owed royalties on Columbia's settlement both as part of the "amount
realized... from sale" and because the settlement was a joint benefit that Amoco could not
appropriate for itself. See id.
at 584.
124. For Judge Brown's argument on this point, see infra notes 152-53 and accompanying
text. Judge Reavley understood that the royalty embodies a sharing of benefits from the
mineral acreage. The risk-of-production doctrine is inconsistent with the rationale the Frey
court adopted. If a take-or-pay payment is compensation for the risk of production, then it is
a return to a unilateral risk (in this case, Amoco's), rather than a mutual risk. But if the lease
is a venture for mutual benefit, a conclusion both Judge Reavley and the Louisiana Supreme
Court reached from their reading of the structure and economics of the relationship, it makes
no sense to divert the royalty share to increase the operator's risk reimbursement.
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Only highly socialized comity among brother judges could have stopped
him from more directly criticizing this still fresh precedent."2s
Perhaps feeling pressured because of the obvious if unspoken
conflict with Diamond Shamrock, the Fifth Circuit then stepped back and
certified Frey's take-or-pay question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. 6
That court agreed with Judge Reavley's basic purpose analysis."z Holding
that neither Amoco nor the Freys would have contemplated the poor gas
market when entering their lease in 1975 (in a booming market), the court

125. Although Judge Reavely strained not to state flat out that Diamond Shamrock is
wrongly decided, he did not mince words when discussing issues on which Diamond Shamrock
erred. He understood that itis "wholly unrealistic to think that one would pay to not take gas
outside the context of a gas sales contract securing the right to certain reserves." Frey II,943
F.3d at 584 n.5.
126. This shift from the Fifth Circuit to the Louisiana Supreme Court has been
unfortunate. It de-emphasizes the conflict between Frey and Diamond Shamrock, because
certification encourages the false perception that Frey can be distinguished as a uniquelyLouisiana opinion. In fact, as the text argues, it is the rejection of Judge Brown's Diamond
Shamrock purpose analysis that explains both Frey opinions, and this rejection of the judicial
error symbolized by Diamond Shamrock could just as well be applied to any of the other cases
that unfortunately have swept along in Diamond Shamrock's wake.
127. The Court did begin by citing the Louisiana Mineral Code's definition of "royalty,"
which includes "any interest in production, or its valuefrom or attributableto land subject to the
mineral lease," including payments classified as "constructive production." Frey V,603 So.2d
166,171-72, 171 n.8 (La. 1992) (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213(5) (West 2000) (emphasis
added)).
This statutory discussion, however, was merely preface to the court's purpose
analysis. As the Oklahoma Supreme Court has noted, its Louisiana counterpart found the
Louisiana Code "not dispositive" and moved on to the purpose of the lease. See Roye Realty
& Developing, Inc. v. Watson, 2 P.3d 320 (Okla. 1996); see also Randy King, Note, Royalty
Owner Claims to Take-or-PayPayments underthe Implied Covenantto Marketand the Duty of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, 33 So.TEX. L. REv. 801, 814 (1992) (arguing that although Fifth Circuit
opinion on merits issued before certifying royalty issue to Louisiana Supreme Court was
"[olstensibly ... based on...factual distinctions" with Diamond Shamrock, a "close reading" of
the opinion shows it was tied to the court's analysis of lease purpose and implied covenants);
see generally Lowe, supra note 68, at 240-43, 254-55 (discussing both Frey and Klein as
"cooperative venture" cases). Others have tried to limit Frey to a Louisiana-only decision, as
if its challenge to Diamond Shamrockcouldbe contained bystate lines. See, e.g., Harvey E. Yates
Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1233 (10th Cir. 1996) (arguing that Frey and Klein were based on
"unique state statutes"); Alameda v. TransAmerican Natural Gas Co., 950 S.W.2d 93,99 (Tex.
App. 1997) ("cooperative venture" theory adopted in Frey based on "unique state statutes,"
following Yates' distinction of Frey); Beverly Barrett, Note, Oiland Gas:Roye Realty v. Watson:
Are Royalties Owed on All Take-or-Pay Settlements in Oklahoma?, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 745, 752
(1993). The problem is accentuated by the care with which the Frey court studiously kept its
distance from Diamond Shamrock in an effort to downplay the conflict. See infra note 180; see
also Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248,1259 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing
Frey's insistence upon its separate Louisiana law issue in an opinion that unimaginatively
followed Diamond Shamrock and rejected the government's effort to at least shield take-or-pay
settlements from the reach of Judge Brown's opinion).
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looked to their "general intent. "1"s "[Tihe lessor supplies the land and the
lessee the capital and expertise necessary to develop the land for the mutual
benefit of both parties."' The royalty owner enters the lease motivated by
expected royalty payments and "would not relinquish a valuable right
arising from the lease premises without receiving something in return." 30
Moreover, all benefits accruing to Amoco were "derivative of the rights
transferred to Amoco by Frey."13' The mutual benefit would be "rendered
meaningless" if the lessee could increase its percentage of revenues by
refusing to pass on take-or-pay settlements. 32 The court cited with

128. See Frey IV, 603 So. 2d 166,172 (La. 1992). It almost certainly is not true that Amoco
did not contemplate that the gas market might not decline. The fact that a producer wanted
take-or-pay protection shows that Amoco and Columbia provided for the risk of a falling
market, even if they did not "expect" it to occur. It is less likely that the royalty owners, with
their inexperience and their structured reliance on the lessee, gave much thought to the gas
market. One reason for entering a lease is to rely on the marketing expertise of the lessee,
which as in this case often is a very large operating company with decades of industry
experience.
When parties do not provide for a particular situation, courts have to imply terms
"necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose." Id. at 172 (citing LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
2054 (West 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:122 (West 2000)).
129. Frey IV, 603 So.2d at 173. The lease is a cooperative venture "in which the lessor
contributes the land and the lessee the capital and expertise necessary to develop." Id.
130. id.
131. Id. at 180. Amoco's right to develop the property was itself "conferred by and
dependent upon the Lease." See id. at 178.
132. Id. at 174. The take-or-pay proceeds were part of the "amount realized" by Amoco.
They were "economic benefits which are derivative of Amoco's right to develop and explore
the lease property," the right Amoco got from the Freys in the first place. Id. at 178. The
amount realized included any "economic benefits" Amoco got from the lease. Id. Requiring
pass-through of these payments was an easy decision. "[Flailure to characterize these
payments as part of the total price paid for gas sold under the contract is to disregard the
obvious economic considerations underlying the take-or-pay clause." Id. at 180. This
interpretation became obvious given any "appreciation of the cooperative nature of the lease
arrangement as well as an understanding of the economic and practical considerations
underlying the royalty clause." Id. at 181.
The supreme court dismissed some other objections to this holding. It would not
accept the "cramped characterization" that the take-or-pay payment is a payment for gas not
produced; the buyer never would have bargained for a right "not to take gas" if it did not have
the right to take gas. Id.at 178 (emphasis added). The vision that the payment was purely a
return to the risks of exploration had to emanate from [Judge Brown's) "myopic eye." Id. The
contract required royalty payments on the "sale" of gas, not just "production," so the court
was able to skirt cases that had based their opinions on "production" alone. Id. at 179.
The opinion contains a section on implied covenants and Louisiana's adoption of the
duty to market, but a close reading of the case does not indicate that this added anything to
the outcome. See id. at 174-76.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

approval the "cooperative venture" theory, known as the "Harrell Rule,"
after Professor Thomas Harrell.'33
The Freyopinion ended by casually dismissing competing common
law cases. Louisiana's law evolved "not from the common law, but from
the Civil Code, richly steeped in our civilian heritage."" In reality, though,
Louisiana interprets its Mineral Code, certainly its royalty provisions, in
parallel with the common law." Thus, Frey'sreasoning from Louisiana's
mutual benefit principle should be just as applicable in every other state as
it is in Louisiana. It is not only in Louisiana that all rights of the lessee
derive from the royalty owners' property. It is not only in Louisiana that
royalty owners depend entirely upon the lessee to develop, or secure
development of, their land. Nor is it only in Louisiana that a lease issues
only on the assumption that every act the lessee undertakes will accrue to
the benefit of its royalty owners, who provided the property in the first
place.
Freywas followed and its reasoning adopted under Arkansas law
just a few months later by the Eighth Circuit in Klein v. Jones."'6 Klein
graphically illustrates the unfairness of not requiring royalty pass-through.
The defendants were lease developers who had settled a variety of take-orpay disputes with a major pipeline company, Arkla. Among the payments
they pocketed were $24 million1for committing gas and $100 million for
"revaluation of gas reserves." " Not only did defendants keep for
themselves these payoffs derived from the lease, but they also concealed
the settlement at the Arkansas Public Service Commission, thus increasing
the odds that the royalty owners never would learn of their loss."
It no doubt helped the Eighth Circuit follow Frey that Arkansas,
like Louisiana, had a broad royalty statute. But as in Frey, the fulcrum of

133. See id. at 173 (citingHarrell, supranote 98, at 334). The court additionally cited a prior
supreme court opinion following Harrell, Henry v. Ballard&Cordell Corp.,418 So.2d 1334,1338
(La. 1982), the opinion using cooperative venture analysis to reject the Texas Vela rule. See
infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
134. Frey IV, 603 So.2d at 182.
135. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
136. Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Klein I], enforced, Klein v.
Arkoma Prod. Co., 73 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Klein Inl.
137. Klein II, 73 F.3d at 783 n.4; see also Klein I,980 F.2d at 524-25. Klein had its affiliate
aspects. For instance, one of the defendants, Jerry Jones (better known as the owner of the
Dallas Cowboys), had been on the board of Arkoma when the take-or-pay contract was
entered. See Klein 1,980 F.2d at 524. But the affiliate issue and any concerns about joint control
were not developed in the case.
138. Klein , 980 F.2d at 525.
139. Under Arkansas law, the lessee and any company buying oil or gas from it have a
duty to protect the royalty owner "by paying to the lessor or his assignees the same price
including premiums, steaming charges, and bonuses of whatever name for royalty, oil, or gas
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Klein was not statutory language. Instead, the Eighth Circuit relied on Frey
in claiming a "strong, developing recognition that a restrictive
interpretation of the royalty clause in a conventional lease can be
inconsistent with its basic purpose....""0 Letting the lessee appropriate
take-or-pay settlements would give it an artificial incentive to cut a deal
that excludes royalty owners. 41
If courts squarely recognized the mutual benefit covenant, the Frey
and Klein courts would not have needed to spend this much time juggling
statutory terms, implied covenants, and express lease terms. Because these
two cases reached the right result anyway-they did force lessees to treat
their royalty owners equally with other interest owners-the cost of not
articulating a mutual benefit covenant may seem slight. In contrast, the
majority take-or-pay royalty rule shows why courts must be clearer about
this implied protection. Most courts have stripped royalty owners of takeor-pay payments. This state of affairs almost certainly could not have
occurred under the mutual benefit principle.

that is paid the operator." Id. at 529 (citing ARK. CODE. ANN. § 15-74-705 (Michie 1987)).
140. Id. at 531; see generally id. at 529-31. The court cited with equal approval the Harrell
cooperative venture rule. See id. at 531-32.
141. See id.at 531. The Eighth Circuit additionally cited Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist
Church, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) and the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion in
Henry v. Ballard& CordellCorp., 418 So.2d 1334 (La. 1982) for the proposition that "all benefits
980
grounded on the existence of a lease must be shared in accordance with the lease." Klein 1,
F.2d at 532. The Court did not believe thata lessor would "relinquish a valuable right without
receiving something in return." Id. at 531. In this context, it would not give up its right to its
gas if it understood that the lessee could keep the benefit of high gas prices all to itself. Id.
On the legal claims, the Eighth Circuit agreed that allowing Amoco to keep the
royalty owners' money would be unjust enrichment. See id. at 527. Among the reasons that
unjust enrichment should apply were that the lessors were not represented when Congress
deregulated the gas market, and they did not have anyone representing their interests after
an Arkoma affiliate bought the lessee's operating company. "Thus the lessors no longer had
a representative dealing at arm's-length with the pipeline." Id. The court held that the claim
based on the duty to market was not time-barred. Id. at 532-33. The Eighth Circuit rejected
claims that the lessee was a fiduciary, that the lessors were third-party beneficiaries of the gas
purchase agreement, or that they could sue for tortious interference with that contract. See id.
at 526-27.
The Eighth Circuit reiterated its position when the district court on remand still
would not follow the command to share these lease benefits with the royalty owners. See Klein
II, 73 F.3d at 786. When the court affirmed again, it discussed two legal theories, unjust
enrichment and the duty to market. The unjust enrichment claim was not precluded by
express contract terms, which the court held did not fully address the subject in dispute. See
id. at 786. The duty to share take-or-pay proceeds arose by virtue of the leases and the court
seems to have envisioned them as part of the implied covenant to market. See id. at 787.
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2. Most Courts Have Rejected Take-or-Pay Sharing
The majority rule that lets lessees and their investors pocket the
royalty share of take-or-pay payments, both prepayments 42 and settlement
payments, began in 1988 with opinions by the Wyoming Supreme Court
and the Fifth Circuit. In the first, State v. Pennzoil," Pennzoil and Marathon
did not want to pay the State of Wyoming royalties on take-or-pay
prepayments under a state lease providing for a one-eighth royalty on the
"amount realized" on gas "produced from said land, saved and sold...."'"
Ignoring the purpose and the context of the amount-realized clause, the
Wyoming Supreme Court held that the word "produced" required actual
severance of the gas." It held that no production had occurred, so the
companies did not owe any royalty. The court would not look at other
contract clauses or consider whether "common sense and good faith"
required the companies to share prepayments with the State." 6
State v. Pennzoil Was a short, abrupt opinion. It gained substantive
support a few months later, however, when the Fifth Circuit decided
DiamondShamrock ExplorationCo. v. Hodel."' 7 The appeal stemmed from two
federal district court decisions interpreting federal leases. One required a
producer to share take-or-pay payments with the Minerals Management
Service (MMS), the Interior Department agency that administers federal

142. A prepayment is a payment for gas before it is produced. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 1,at 939 (defining prepayment as "interest-free loan or advance payment for gas
to be delivered at some future time"). This description of a prepayment as a loan is somewhat
misleading; it was this kind of thinking that encouraged pipelines to argue that at most they
should be liable for interest instead of the base prepayment in take-or-pay disputes. Under
many take-or-pay contracts, the pipeline was not entitled to a refund if it did not take the gas,
so the contract transferred much more than loaned funds. Even in contracts with a
recoupment provision, the bargained-for benefit was a cash flow equal to the full takequantity-times-contract-price, with the seller having the risk of some later refund if the
contract so provided.
143. 752 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1988).
144. Id. at 976.
145. Id. at 979. Bruce Kramer has reminded us that the court ignored a most favored
nations clause entitling Wyoming to at least the royalties received by the United States on its
leases in the field; the United States was demanding royalties but "apparently the state could
not show that the United States was actually receiving take-or-pay payments...." Bruce M.
Kramer, Royalty Obligationsunderthe Gun-The Effect of Take-or-PayClauseson the Duty to Make
Royalty Payments,39 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 5-1, 5-9 n.20 (1988).
146. See State v. Pennzoil, 752 P.2d at 981. The court's odd reference to "common sense and
good faith" can be taken as a Freudian slip suggesting that it knew its holding could not really
withstand substantive analysis.
147. 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
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leases; the other court held that the government was not due any royalty
on the payments.'
The federal royalty was sixteen and two-thirds percent of the
"amount or value of production saved, removed, or sold from the leased
area." 49 MMS had interpreted this language to include take-or-pay
prepayments. Though the Fifth Circuit only had authority to reverse this
interpretation if it was arbitrary or capricious, it purported to find that the
plain meaning of the royalty clause compelled reversal. The lease required
producers to share their gross proceeds; however, the gross proceeds were
on "the value of productionsaved, removed, or sold....," of funds from the sale
or disposition of "produced substances.""5 In addition, the court claimed to
be troubled by what might occur if the producer had to pay royalties before
it produced any gas. In that case, it would have to make a second payment
if the buyer later bought the gas at a higher price.'51
The fundamental reason for the Diamond Shamrock decision,
however, was the court's deus ex machina pronouncement that the purpose
of the take-or-pay clause is not to pay for gas. Instead, in an unfortunate
diversion into the realm of factfinder, the court treated take-or-pay clauses
as if their only goal is to pay producers for drilling risk. Even though all of
the disputed payments originated from government leases, the court pulled
out of its hat the conclusion that the take-or-pay payments were not
benefits "attributable, at least in part, to the government's interest."
Instead, it called them "intended to compensate primarily 2 the producer,
not the owner of the minerals, for the risks associated with development
production.""

148. The two cases are described in Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1162-63. Though
Diamond Shamrock reviewed two conflicting trial-level opinions, the case won by the royalty
owners appeared the more significant going into the appeal because it was a test case brought

by five major producers: Diamond Shamrock, Cities Service, Mobil, Exxon, and Texaco.
149. Id. at 1163.
150. Id. at 1163, 1165 (emphasis added).
151. See id.at 1166. The worried court said it had yet another fear. If the pipeline buyer did
not take the gas, and if it had a right to a refund, the seller's limitations period against the

government might have run and the producer might not be able to recover the government's
share of the overpaid royalties to give back to the buyer. See id. This reading is a cramped one
that assumes the cause of action against the government would arise before the refund was
due. For a dismissive view of this fear, see Judge Reavley's reaction to the idea, supranote 119.
152. Even Judge Brown's hedging with "primarily" begs for a different outcome. If Judge
Brown believed that the payments were intended "primarily" to repay the producer, why
wasn't the government's perhaps lesser, perhaps "secondary" interest enough to entitle it to
one-sixth of the payments?
153. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1167. The court also cited a FERC regulation treating

prepayments as payments for gas not taken and not allowing pipelines to recover their gas
costs until they actually took the gas. Id. at 1167 n.36. In doing so, Judge Brown ignored the
very different context of this issue, in which pipelines had argued unsuccessfully that
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With this unique purpose analysis in place, the court held that
production could only mean "the actual physical severance of minerals
from the formation."' On this assumption that royalties were not payable
without "production," it then held that the federal lessees could pocket all
of the take-or-pay prepayments attributable to the government's one-sixth
interest. In the next few years, over a dozen more cases adopted similar
simplistic reasoning and let producers and their investors appropriate the
royalty owners' share of take-or-pay prepayments and settlements.5 5

prepayments should be added to the price of gas actually taken, in an effort to claim that the
resulting sum would violate the Natural Gas Policy Act's maximum lawful price ceiling-all
in pipeline efforts to void their take-or-pay obligations.
The court's only authority on its risk-of-production argument was a recent Fifth
Circuit decision that addressed the very different question of whether a producer could
enforce its take-or-pay contract against the gas buyer. The case was UniversalResources Corp.
v. PanhandleEasternPipelineCo., 813 F.2d 77,80 (5th Cir. 1987), cited in DiamondShamrock, 853
F.2d at 1167 n.33. UniversalResources was one of the first major published decisions in a takeor-pay case and it rejected a representative smorgasbord of standard pipeline defenses. It
addressed solely whether the gas buyer had a legal defense against its take-or-pay obligations.
The case did not discuss the impact of a producer's high-priced gas contract on its royalty
obligations.
154. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1168.
155. Because so many of these cases seized upon the first few precedents and followed
them without serious analysis, the sequence of decisions is necessary to understanding the
take-or-pay royalty cases. This Article lists the cases in their order of appearance. See Killam
Oil Co. v. Bruni, 806 S.W.2d 264,266-68 (rex. App. 1991) (reversing and rendering summary
judgment for royalty trust seeking to share settlement proceeds where lease provided royalties
on gas "produced from said land and sold or used off the premises"; reasoning that
"production" required physical extraction; arguing that royalty trust could have included a
provision requiring sharing of take-or-pay provisions, but did not and so "unambiguously
limited its right to royalty payments only from gas actually extracted from the land"; and that
gas stayed in the ground anyway); Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Refining Co., 822 S.W.2d 153,
159-64 (Tex. App. 1991) (rejecting direct claims against gas purchaser to share settlement
because, inter alia, royalty owners were neither parties to the gas purchase contract nor third
party beneficiaries, and upholding jury findings supporting purchaser's affirmative defenses;
then affirming trial court's summary judgment for lessee rejecting duty to market claim
because lease only required royalty on "production"; following Killam's interpretation that
take-or-pay payment is for non-production, in a case where a lessee sold its interest and
settled take-or-pay claims but did not share funds with royalty owners); Hurd Enters. v.
Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101,103-09 (Tex. App. 1992) (rejecting claim to non-recoupable take-or-pay
settlement because royalties on gas "produced from said land and sold or used off the
premises" required actual production under Killam and rejecting application of duty to market
because producer did get the highest price it could in the contract; rejecting good faith duty
in lease relationship; and rejecting agency argument because "the lessor has no gas to sell";
leaving open possibility that royalty owners might have right to share non-recoupable
payments, but not addressing issue because it was "not submitted in the case before us," id.
at 106 n.8; also relying on Diamond Shamrock's view that take-or-pay provisions merely
allocate risks of production, seeid. at 110 n. 12.); TransAmerican Natural Gas Co. v. Finkelstein,
933 S.W.2d 591,596-600 (Tex. App. 1996) (reversing judgment injury trial for royalty owner,
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based on unjust enrichment and breach of duty to market, by following Bruniin holding that
language applying to gas "produced and sold" did not apply to take-or-pay payments;
rejecting Bruni's suggestion that royalty owners might have claim to non-recoupable
payments, and citing Texas Supreme Court's ultimate decision in Lenape Res. Corp. v. Tenn.
Gas Pipeline, 925 S.W.2d 565, 572 (Tex. 1996) (holding that a take-or-pay contract is not a
requirements contract that can be limited by the UCC's requirements provisions, as that
would "fundamentally alter the risk allocation" in the contract), as confirming that take-orpay payments were payments for an exclusive dedication of reserves, but not for "the sale of
gas"; worrying that Finkelstein would receive two royalties on the same gas if he did share
take-or-pay settlement; finding unjust enrichment claim barred because express contract
governed terms; and rejecting argument that damages should be passed through because they
were repudiation damages); Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248,1258-60
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting MMS effort to limit Diamond Shamrockrule to take-or-pay payments,
while having government share in take-or-pay settlements; reiterating Diamond Shamrock's
emphasis on requirement of "production saved, removed or sold" and finding take-or-pay
prepayments and settlements "functionally indistinguishable with respect to the calculation
of royalties"; all this in the face of long-standing MMS rules that "under no circumstances"
should royalty value be less than gross proceeds "accruing to the lessee from the sale
[therelof."); Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson, 2 P.3d 320, 328-29 (Okla. 1996)
(rejecting royalty owners' claim to take-or-pay settlement on gas "produced and sold" in case
where defendants had even refused to show royalty owners the take-or-pay settlement
agreement; treating requirement that royalty be on substances "produced, saved and sold"
as conclusive and rejecting third-party beneficiary claims; leaving open possibility that
"amount realized" rather than "gross proceeds" leases might lead to different outcome);
Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1229-37 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing state lease
language requiring one-eighth royalty on gas "produced and sold," as well as extensive
precedent including Diamond Shamrock and State v. Pennzoil Company, for three "guiding
principles": (1) royalty not due under "production" lease unless gas is produced; (2) nonrecoupable proceeds in settled contract do not bear royalties while settlement for reduced
price does bear royalty: and (3) rejecting Frey and Klein rules as based on "unique" state
statutes, as well as different lease language in Frey, and questioning viability of Harrell
"cooperative venture" rule; remanding for determination of which portions of settlement
were due to price deficiency claims and thus would be royalty bearing when production later
occurred); Alameda v. TransAmerican Natural Gas Co., 950 S.W.2d 93, 96-100 (Tex. App.
1997) (following Bruni and TransAmerican v. Finkelstein and holding royalty not due even on
nonrecoupable settlement buyout, noron repudiation damages; finding duty to market issues
not triggered without actual gas production); Watts v. Arco, 115 F.3d 785, 791-95 (10th Cir.
1997) (following Yates in holding that royalty was due at time gas was produced on any
portion of settlement due to pricing issues, in case where Arco had paid royalties when it
produced gas on $300 million settlement but not on other portions; remanding because of fact
dispute over whether additional settlement funds were payments for price dispute and
holding that they might be so even if pre-settlement price was not reduced; also reversing
because of fact issue on whether Arco's settlement satisfied its duty to get the best price in
marketing gas); Condra v. Quinoco Petroleum, Inc., 954 S.W.2d 68, 70-73 (Tex. App. 1997)
(following Brunirule that royalty owners do not share in take-or-pay settlements, even where
division orders required sharing of proceeds "from the sale of products produced" or
"attributable to said property," and straining to avoid obvious broad implication of
"attributable"; following TransAmericanv. Finkelsteinin holding that repudiation damages are
not royalty bearing; finding no breach of duty to market in absence of production);
Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc., 138 F.3d 546, 549-52 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting implied
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covenant claim under Mississippi law because contract terms controlled; interpreting royalty
on gas "produced from said land when sold by lessee" under amount realized lease to require
production; following TransAmerican v. Finkelstein and rejecting distinction between
recoupable and non-recoupable settlements); Westerman v. Rogers, 1 P.3d 228,233-34 (Colo.
App. 1999) (adopting Yates and Watts, but reversing summary judgment for lessees for
determination of whether proceeds were due "solely to non-production," or instead due at
least in part to a price adjustment); EEX Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 111 F. Supp.2d 24,3133 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding payments not due on nonrecoupable payments, even if settlor was
ultimate later purchaser, and thus rejecting Century Offshore limitation on Diamond Shamrock
discussed below).
In Diamond Shamrock, the Fifth Circuit held that royalty payments would only be
due when the gas was "produced and taken." Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1161. In In re
Century Offshore Management Corp., 111 F.3d 443,449-50 (6th Cir.1997), the Sixth Circuit held
that when the lessee accepted a $12.25 million payment to replace its fixed-price contract with
a floating-price contract, and the same buyer (Enron) actually took the gas, the "nexus" with
production missing in Diamond Shamrock was present and the lessee had to add one-eighth
of the $12.25 million to the royalty payments. The Sixth Circuit made a feeble effort at
distinguishing IPAA v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1996), which held that take-or-pay
settlements should get the same treatment as Diamond Shamrock's prepayments (ie., not be
shared), because Babbitt involved a buyout settlement and the old contract was replaced by
a new contract with an unrelated third party, while in Century Offshore the original buyer,
Enron, kept buying the gas under a new replacement contract. See Century Offshore, 111 F.3d
at 451-52. The Sixth Circuit said that the Babbitt sales therefore lacked a "nexus" with
production, while the later Century Offshore Enron sales did have such a nexus. Id. This seems
a valiant effort to breathe life into a lifeless principle. Can the Sixth Circuit really have
thought it fair that producers could pocket all of take-or-pay buyouts if they shift to a new gas
buyer but have to share if they are dumb enough to negotiate a replacement contract with the
same buyer? This is a weaker approach than the flawed, but at least comprehensible, idea that
if a producer enters a "buydown," the royalty owner should have to wait for the buyer to
make-up the production before getting royalties on the bounty, but that if the producer agrees
to a "buyout," so that the valuable take-or-pay contract disappears, royalty owners should
share immediately because the lessee has contracted away the rights that the royalty owners
otherwise could realize in the future. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (discussing
the early assumption that nonrecoupable payments would have to be passed through).
Perhaps the most surprising of the royalty-rejection cases was Roye Realty because
the Oklahoma Supreme Court earlier had adopted such a broad purpose analysis when it
rejected the Texas Supreme Court's Vela rule in Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269
(Okla. 1981). In general, courts sticking to literalist opinions were more likely to agree with
Diamond Shamrock; those taking a serious look at purpose tend to side with royalty owners.
See infra notes 166, 175 and accompanying text. Thus it seemed likely that Oklahoma would
join Frey and Kein. For a well-developed analysis of this likelihood, including what surely
was an unlikelybut sophisticated and ultimately correctprediction that Oklahoma would not
have to join the Frey line, see Lowe, supra note 68, at 240-43,254-64. Yet while the Oklahoma
Supreme Court got it right in Tara, its analysis deteriorated by Roye, where it opted for an
inappropriately simple literal interpretation.
John Lowe's correct prediction that Oklahoma's position in Tara would not
necessarily determine its take-or-pay rule is even more interesting because he provided a
thoughtful and seemingly supportive analysis of the cooperative venture theory. Lowe
pointed out that the uncertainty of any given oil and gas project made it hard to set a fixed
price for the lease and simpler to enter what really is an "economic partnership" to locate
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mineral wealth. See Lowesupranote 68, at 252. Second, because parties generally do not make
fine distinctions between the major lease pricing terms and certainly did not expect before the
mid-eighties the fallen gas market into which the industry stumbled, it makes less sense to
pretend that leases expressly deal with the take-or-pay situation (predicated as it is on the
failure of demand for gas). See id. Finally, Lowe argued that royalties payable in cash (as
opposed to production) can sustain a "broader concept of royalty." Id. at 253. Lowe then
backtracked, however, and argued that cooperative venture theory need not require sharing
take-or-pay payments because Klein and Frey may be read as unjust enrichment cases, upon
statutory language that may sustain such a theory, and other states may not follow this path,
id. at 255-57; and such an extension might extend the royalty obligation into entrepreneurial
areas that best be left to the lessee. Id. at 257-64. This ultimately narrow reading of Klein and
Frey underemphasizes how essential the logic of the cooperative venture theory is to their
result and is unfaithful to the nature of the take-or-pay exchange by pretending that take-orpay payments are returns to some specialized entrepreneurial skill when they are
fundamentally payments for the gas earned under the lease. Lowe deserves great credit,
though, for foreseeing the unlikely result that Oklahoma would not step straight from Tara
to Roye Realty and join Louisiana and Arkansas as a third state requiring royalty passthrough
of take-or-pay payments and settlements.
John Lowe has noted another irony in the Veia to take-or-pay transition. In the Vela
situation, lessees strained to argue that they "sold" their gas when they entered a gas purchase
agreement so the market value was fixed at that time (and if market prices later rose, the
"market value" or "market price" for a given well's production nonetheless had been set
when the contract was entered). See id. at 243. In the take-or-pay context, of course, lessees
argue that the "sale" or "production" occurs not when they enter a gas purchase agreement
but should wait until the day when a particular molecule emerges from the wellhead. Royalty
owners, in contrast, argued in the Vela context that market value had to be measured as the
gas flowed, butin take-or-pay disputes sought to fix production at the moment of contracting.
See id. The true guide in both instances should have been whether the parties envisioned a
separation in their share of production. Vela is wrong because it drives a wedge between
lessee and lessor. The take-or-pay majority is just as wrong because they also separate lessor
and lessee in ways neither had any reason to expect when the lease began.
It is interesting to contrast the judicial stampede to adopt Diamond Shamrock's
simplistic view with trends in academic commentary. In general, authors most seduced by the
plain meaning interpretation have tended to have less experience. See Angela Jeanne
Crowder, Note, Take-or-Pay Payments and Settlements-Does the Landowner Share?, 49 LA. L.
REV. 921 (1989); Barrett, supranote 127, at 755-56.
Those who paid their industry dues offered more temperate and reserved
judgments or at least were more skeptical of depriving lessees of all benefits shared by the
other interest owners. See generally Frank Douglass, Tort Liability Between Lessors and
Lessees-The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (If Any), Punitive Damages, Royalty Owner
Exposure, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW COURSE I-1, 1-9 to
-11 (1991) (surveying status of law and arguments available to both sides and predicting that
fight "is not quite over"); Kramer, supra note 145 (suggesting broad interpretation of
"production" and "sale" and that settlements should not deprive royalty owners of
nonrecoupable payments);John S. Lowe, CurrentLeaseandRoyalty Problems in the Gas Industry,
23 TULsA L.J. 548, 560-64 (1988) (reviewing arguments but not taking final position); Lowe,
supranote 68, at 266-67 (breaking cases into plain meaning and cooperative venture camps,
though arguing with what turned out to be uncanny prescience that even cooperative-venture
jurisdictions should not necessarily require sharing with royalty owners); William White, The
Right to Recover Royalties on Natural Gas Take-or-Pay Settlements, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 663 (1988)
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A Fifth Circuit opinion that followed within barely a year offers a
glaring example of the unfairness of Diamond Shamrock and its noproduction, no-royalty rule. GerardJ.W. Bos & Co., Inc. v. Harkins& Co. was
a forced integration case.Ss The gas from Bos's property was committed to
a long-term take-or-pay contract. Bos received royalty payments like
clockwork for eight years. As long as the buyer took the gas, Bos bathed
fully in the gas revenue stream, as did the operator and working interest
owners.
After eight years of production and royalty payments--eight years
of equal treatment among operator, working interest, and royalty
owners-the operator accepted the buyer's offer to cancel the contract. It
collected a $7.3 million buyout. With the contract termination went the high
gas price, so the operator shut the well down.
Neither the Fifth Circuit nor the trial court seems to have perceived
any unfairness in letting the operator redo its contract to extinguish the
royalty stream, as if having no duty to Bos. In spite of Diamond Shamrock,
Bos may have felt particularly confident going into the case because of
precedent that operators in unitized properties have a fiduciary duty to

(reviewing arguments on both sides, though seemingly finding some support for lessee's
position in federal energy policy); cf Smith, supra note 19, at 511-19 (in article that surveyed
both sides, finding immediate sharing of prepayments unlikely under standard lease terms,
but claims on settlements more viable).
One telling tea-leaf reading is the 1987 article by Richard Pierce, Lessor/Lessee
Relations in a Turbulent Gas Market, 38 OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 8-1 (1987). The article is
interesting because the royalty-exclusion trend in the cases was not yet apparent. Pierce
argued for broad deference to producers who agreed to lower prices in settling disputes, see
id. at 8-17 to 8-19, but that courts should treat lump sum payments as "proceeds of
production" and make producers pay royalties on them, thus avoiding the "potential injustice
and distortive effect of allowing producers to retain 100 percent of the lump sum payment,"
see id. at 8-19 to 8-20; that producers should have to share any benefit received on another
contract in return for a lower price, a la First Baptist, see id. at 8-19 to 8-20; and that damage
awards for failure to take gas would have to be shared while on those for failure to pay,
"probably the right answer" would be payment when production occurs (or immediately if
gas was not made up), see id. at 8-21 to 8-22. As with other mature observers' proposals, so
Pierce's ideas were his best effort to find a set of rules that would have royalty owners share
all true economic benefits earned by the lessee, while observing the traditional rule that
royalty only is paid when gas comes from the ground. He saw the unfairness of a rule under
which royalty owners never would get to share certain take-or-pay revenues. Unfortunately,
few courts have seen as dearly.
156. Gerard J.W. Bos & Co. v. Harkins & Co., 883 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1989). Bos's property
was "force-integrated" under Mississippi's conservation statutes, which provided that if the
owners did not voluntarily combine their acreage, "the [Oil and Gas Board] may, for the
prevention of waste or to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, require such persons to
integrate their interests and to develop their lands as a drilling unit." Id. at 381 (citing MISS.
CODE ANN. § 53-3-7 (1999)).
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working interest and even royalty owners." But the Fifth Circuit rejected
the unit-operator argumente- as well as those from trust and agency law."
Even if Bos had a directly enforceable claim against operator Harkins as
long as the contract was in place, at least if any production occurred, the
court nonchalantly said that Bos lost standing to complain when Harkins
cashed out the contract's net present value. Bos was a "mere incidental
beneficiary" of the take-or-pay contract.1" By the economically simple act
of capitalizing the contract's value into a single payment, Harkins
unilaterally ended Bos's royalty benefit. The court gave Harkins an
incentive to split the savings from not paying any royalty with the gas
purchaser or to try to keep it all. Just as surely, it removed the incentive for
Harkins to protect Bos.16
Gerard Bos illustrates Diamond Shamrock's extremism because the
contract termination seems to have ended the royalty stream. "Bos alleges
that as a result of this action the well on the unit was shut down, causing
Bos's royalty income to be permanently lost.""a Ruling on appeal from

157. Bos had relied on the lead unit-fiduciary case, Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime
Unit,275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 195), appeal dismissed, 349 U.S. 909 (1955). See GerardBos, 883 F.2d at
381.
158. The Fifth Circuit distinguished the argument that operators in forcibly pooled units
are fiduciaries to royalty owners by noting that Bos had not cited any authority under
Mississippi law and, in any event, Bos's duty to market had not been among the operator's
statutorily mandated duties. See GerardBos, 883 F.2d at 381. The problem with this dismissive
statutory reading is that the court made no effort to show that other royalty owners, say those
unitized in Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, had a more effective power than royalty
owners integrated under the Mississippi statute. Even royalty owners with rights set just
under their original royalty agreement do not have meaningfully greater powers than under
a unitization statute.
159. Gerard Bos is an unusual take-or-pay royalty case for its time because theplaintiff did
not raise or preserve on appeal arguments drawn from the lease language or the duty to
market. The reason might be that the Fifth Circuit had decided Diamond Shamrocklittle more
than a year before and the lawyers saw the writing on the wall.
160. GerardBos, 883 F.2d at 382.
161. The punitive unreality of GerardBos, and the head-in-the-sand quality of so many
similar take-or-pay royalty cases, is underlined by the Fifth Circuit's gratuitous dictum that
Dos having leased its acreage to another operator, "it is to that operator Bos should look in
such circumstances as these." Id. "That" operator, Bos's initial lessee, had lost its job when the
unit was formed. Forcible integration deprived "that" operator of any authority over the
acreage. It retained no control over the production and received no payment to act as
operator. Indeed, if "that" operator tried to sell Bos's gas, the Fifth Circuit should have held
that it had usurped the unit operator's powers under Mississippi's conservation statutes. os's
excluded lessee had no legal basis to determine in any way what the unit operator did with
the production, not in the contract the unit operator entered in 1978, nor in the settlement to
which it succumbed in 1986. Bos's lessee had every right to have forgotten all about the

property.
162. Id. at 381.
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summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit had to treat this allegation as true.
Rather than merely postponing the royalty owner revenues, the settlement
may have extinguished them. The royalty owners might get their nowuneconomic lease back under lease forfeiture provisions, but the operator
would not feel any pinch with the $7.3 million still warm in its pocket.
Gerard Bos provides yet another example of the unfairness of the
royalty-exclusion rule. At first, operator Harkins kept the full $7.3 million
and did not even share the money with its investing partners. But no one
had trouble spotting the indefensibility of that unjust enrichment. When the
working interest owners sued, Harkins cut them in on the deal."s Bos,
whose property after all was the original source of all this bounty, naturally
demanded a share. But the court denied Bos the right to intervene in the
working interest owners' lawsuit, and when Bos sued separately in federal
court, it lost there, too. 1" Bos had lost, entirely at its operator's whim, a
payment stream that had years more to run, without getting a penny for
this judicially-sanctioned sacrifice."
3. The Errorsof Diamond Shamrock's Royalty-Exclusion Rule
The fact that there now is a widespread majority rule in the take-orpay royalty-exclusion cases should not obscure how badly these cases
misinterpret the royalty relationship. Their plain meaning arguments gloss
over the difficulties of trying to fit language that assumes production onto
a payment that is made to delay or never produce. Their purpose analysis
ignores the primary purpose of the take-or-pay contract, which is to sell
gas, and of the lease, which is to share all basic lease benefits. Other
technical arguments present specious objections that could be raised
against working interest owners as well, but are not.
a. The PlainMeaningof Words Like "Produced"and "Sold" Cannot Resolve the
Take-or-Pay Royalty Cases
The first of the two foundation stones for courts that will not let
royalty owners share take-or-pay benefits is contract language keyed to
163. See id.
164. See id. at 380-81.
165. With the abstraction that can dog court opinions (as in DiamondShamrock's giving no
hint of the amounts at stake), the Fifth Circuit did not tell its readers the duration of the
terminated contract or total projected contract revenues, so they cannot determine the full
scope of the sacrifice the court imposed on the royalty owners. The court did state, however,
that the contract was a "long-term" contract that had run only eight years. Id. at 380. Longterm take-or-pay contracts in the late seventies and early eighties tended to last fifteen or
twenty years, so it is most likely that Bos lost as much as seven to twelve years of high-priced
royalty payments. When courts fail to list the amounts in dispute, a lawsuit might just as well
be over peanuts as real money; but the buyout price was $7.3 million and presumably the total
foregone income was significantly more than this.
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"production." For instance, the Wyoming leases in State v. Pennzoil
turned on gas "produced from said land, saved and sold or used off the
premises," with payment to follow in the month "succeeding the month of
production and removal and sale... ." lIn DiamondShamrock,royalties were
due on the "value of 'production saved, removed, or sold from the leased
area." s These leases, too, timed payment to the last day after the month
when "production is obtained.""
The question in the take-or-pay royalty cases is whether this
language covers the situation when a buyer pays for gas but it is not yet
produced, or pays the producer not to produce. When a buyer makes a
prepayment, gas is not actually "produced," but the payment still is "for"
gas intended to be produced and sold. All that has happened is that the
production has been delayed, while payment stayed on schedule.'" t 'None

166. See generally Smith, supra note 19, at 513 (issue "turns in large part upon a
construction of the royalty and related clauses in the oil and gas lease"). The "best argument"
for not sharing take-or-pay payments comes from contract language. See Lowe, supra note 155,
at 562; Lowe, supra note 68, at 236-40 (discussing the "plain-meaning" roots of the cases
denying royalty sharing); Roye Realty, Inc. v. Watson, 2 P.3d 320, 324 (Okla. 1996)
("jurisdictions favoring the producer rely primarily on a strict interpretation of the language
At least, it comes from
in the leases concerning what constitutes a 'sale' and 'production'.... ").
readings that oversimplify that language. See generally Crowder, supranote 155, at 935 (using
plain-meaning reading to argue that royalties are not due on prepayments or settlements); cf
King, supra note 127, at 807 (labeling the "production" argument based on lease language a
"losing argument" for royalty owners). It is true that the market value/market price term and
the proceeds/amount realized term both key payment to what sounds like physical
"production," to gas "produced and saved, sold, or used," or to the proceeds from the
"disposition of produced gas." See Kirk Bily, Comment, Royalty on Take-or-Pay Payments and
Related ConsiderationAccruing to Producers,27 HOUsTON L. REV. 105,129-30 (1990). Moreover,
leases for the federal government and some of the major producing states used production
in their definitional language, too. See id. at 122-29 (analyzing state leases in Wyoming, Texas,
and Louisiana); see also id. at 113-22 (discussing standard U.S. lease language and its
interpretation). That should be the beginning, not the end, of the discussion.
167. State v.Pennzoil, 752 P.2d at 976 (emphasis added).
168. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1161 (emphasis added). Underlying regulations did
require lessees to pay no less than the "gross proceeds accruing to the lease from the
disposition of the produced substances." Id. at 1163-65. The Fifth Circuit seems to have
ignored the broad definition of production in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in
addition to the MMS regulations. For criticism of the trial-level slighting of these regulatory
provisions, an analysis which the FifthCircuit's Diamond Shamrockopinionwould perpetuate,
see Kramer, supra note 145, at 5-16 to 5-18.
169. See Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1163-64 (emphasis added).
170. Ernest Smith is right that the logic of the lessees' position should have been merely
that paying royalty was deferred until production. See Smith, supranote 19, at 511, 517. This
position, however, overlooks the often heavy loss in the time value of money. Moreover, the
damage to royalty owners would be limited to the time value of money only if courts ordered
royalties paid on prepayments as soon as it became clear that the buyer would not take the
gas, and on nonrecoupable settlements when they were made. Yet the law has not required
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of the leases in published take-or-pay cases dealt specifically with this
situation. None said that "lessee and its partners can keep every penny of
all prepayments, buyouts, and buydowns and need not share them with
royalty owners if the lessee takes money without producing the gas." None
said that the royalty owner (but no one else) can be forced to ignore the
moment of payment and wait to see if production occurs before getting
paid.
Diamond Shamrock strained to achieve such a result-driven verbal
analysis. The Fifth Circuit ignored governing federal regulations that the
"value of production" shall "under no circumstances...be less than the gross
proceeds accruing to the lessee from the disposition of the produced
substances.... "171 It is hard to think of clearer words to indicate that
taxpayers are to share in all benefits derived from federal leases. Something
is wrong when a court cannot see that this blunt and broad language
entitled the federal government to share the lessee's proceeds on the
accrueddisposition of production (even if for gas not yet produced).1 7 That
is particularly so when "production" in oil and gas law does not invariably
require physical severance from the ground."

sharing in these circumstances, either. So, as GerardBos shows, royalty owners can lose their
entire right to any part of the take-or-pay revenue stream.
171. See DiamondShamrock, 853 F.2d at 1164-65 (emphasis added).
172. Judge Brown hardly could have been confused about the true meaning of the
deferential standard of review. See id. at 1164-65. Just three years later he wielded exactly this
deference as the proper justification for endorsing that agency's decision to include
reimbursed post-production costs as part of the royalty "amount" or "value" and affirm
summary judgment for MMS. See generally Mesa Operating Ltd. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 931
F.2d 318 (5thCir. 1991). Although Judge Brown indicated in Mesa Operatingthat he might find
the producer's position plausible, he correctly held that "we may reject [the government
position] only if the agency's interpretation is impermissible or unreasonable." Id. at 322-23
& nr.27-28. Mesa had tried to bootstrap DiamondShamrock by arguing that it must apply to
post as well as pre-production events, and that because the post-production costs occurred
after production, they were no more a payment "for production" than take-or-pay
prepayments. See id. at 322. Judge Brown turned Mesa down with a broad reading of the
"gross proceeds" on which the government could claim a share and did so without any visible
sign of shame or even recognition that he had violated that principle in Diamond Shamrock.
173. See Smith, supranote 19, at 514-16 (discussing states that separate "production" from
severance of gas in determining how much production is needed to hold a lease, or that
require payments on gas "sold" or "marketed" without requiring production); Kramer, supra
note 145, § 5.04[2]-[3], at 5-15 to 5-30, 5-35 to 5-36 (arguing that neither "production" nor
"sale" is as clear as might seem, and that "production" could include all benefits from lease
and that "sale" could occur before production); Lowe, supra note 155, at 553-55 (discussing
Oklahoma minority rule that "production" only "means merely a capability of gas production
(because the purpose of the lease is substantially performed when gas has been discovered
and the well prepared to produce)," as well as contrary majority rule).
What one sees is not necessarily what one gets with "production." Even Judge Brown
seems to have known that language was not a sufficient justification for Diamond Shamrock.
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Lease terms that require payment 30 days after production do tie
some payments to actual production, but they do not address the unusual
situation when the buyer defers taking gas.17 This is another way of asking
whether, if the parties separate production from payment, "produced and
sold" royalty language addresses the situation. None of the many take-orpay opinions has found a persuasive reason why this language
differentiates royalty owners from other interest owners who do benefit
when the buyer pays months before gas is produced (or if the gas never is
produced).
b. Diamond Shamrock Misconstruedthe Purposeof the Take-or Pay Contractand
of the Lease
The other bulwark of the royalty-exclusion courts is Diamond
Shamrock's quirky purpose analysis. One would have predicted that if
courts found purpose relevant, they would require shared benefits under
the mutual benefit principle. For example, the Frey and Klein courts'
purpose analysis led them to require sharing.175 How could it not be true
that "the lessor contributes the land and the lessee the capital and expertise
necessary to develop the minerals for the mutual benefit ofboth parties?" 76
That should have been particularly obvious in Diamond Shamrock, where
the court was to defer to MMS's mutual benefit interpretation.'"
Yet Judge Brown held that prepayments are payments for nonproduction, intended only to repay "the risks associated with development
production."1" He thought of royalty owners as undeserving free riders
who should not "reap the benefits, through royalty payments, without

He called "production" a "horse of many colors" that is used in the industry "in several
different but related senses." Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1165-66. Judge Brown admitted
the term can be used to refer to the products from a well or to the well. See id. at 1166.

Presumably a sense that language could not really resolve the dispute is why he leaned so
heavily on his purpose analysis.

174. For the same reason, in the event of a prepayment or settlement, the shut-in payment
that the lessee might otherwise owe to the royalty owners under the literal terms of the

lease-the payment to hold the lease when actual production gets curtailed, including for
market conditions, see WILLAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, at 1149, should not be due.

175. See supra notes 117-21, 124-30, 137-38 and accompanying text; see generally Lowe,
supranote 155, at 563 (courts looking beyond literal terms have tended to recognize implied
covenant to market); Lowe, supra note 68, at 240-43 (discussing Freyand Klein as cooperative
venture opinions, though later arguing that that theory need not lead to sharing of take-or-pay

royalties); Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson, 2 P.3d 320, 324 (Okla. 1996)
(urisdictions "finding for the royalty owners have [gone beyond contract language and]
adopted a broader 'economic benefit' test....").
176. See Frey IV, 603 So. 2d at 173.
177. See, e.g., Roye Realty, 2 P.3d at 329.
178. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1167.
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having to shoulder the associated risks of exploration, production and
development." 7 '
This off-the-cuff idea that take-or-pay payments are not payments
for gas is a prime example of why judges should not usurp fact
determinations. But for the deference we accord judges, this analysis would
be treated as a gaffe, a howler, a mistake bizarrely at odds with industry
practices. It is one of the problems of a precedent-based system of law that
once a decision this unfounded becomes identified with a case name, its
solidification into "precedent" gives it a respectability that is entirely
undeserved. Experienced oil and gas lawyers (those representing
producers, of course) could start pontificating about "the DiamondShamrock
case" and its royalty/exclusion principle as if it made some sense, all the
while knowing that the holding is preposterous. Producers are happy to
treat the opinion as one of great sagacity because it gives them a windfall:
suddenly here is judicial sanction for pocketing their royalty owners'
proceeds.s

179. See id. at 1167. As note 155 documents, DiamondShamrock's purpose analysis then was
adopted by court after court. One commentator has argued that the "inherent cooperativeness
and mutuality" of the lease cannot decide the cases because the lease is not a fiduciary
relationship, see Crowder, supra note 155, at 934, an irrelevant argument when the implied
covenant is a contract, not tort, duty.
180. The same excess deference is apparent in the way that the few courts that clearly held
that Diamond Shamrock was just wrong, on the most fundamental basis, struggled to avoid
saying so directly. When a judicial king wears no clothes, it can be as rare for peer judges as
for judicial subjects to point out the obvious as it is in the fable.
This lack-of-candor problem, not surprisingly, was acute when the opinions were in
the same jurisdiction. Thus Judge Reavley, who rejected the core underpinnings of Judge
Brown's opinion, see supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text, nonetheless went out of his
way to avoid saying directly that Judge Brown got it wrong, see supra note 118 (laboriously
trotting out three differences to spare Diamond Shamrock this embarrassment). But one can
trace the funny little judicial dance of politeness even in jurisdictions that had no legal need
for deference. The Louisiana Supreme Court, for instance, had no need to be polite to the Fifth
Circuit (after all, that court had asked it to interpret its own law!), yet it treated Diamond
Shamrock with kid gloves. Its reasoning was entirely at odds with Diamond Shamrock, but the
Court stated that "we do not deem prudent an excursion far beyond the bounds of the precise
question certified." Frey IV, 603 So. 2d at 171. It nominally based its opinion on Louisiana law.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text. In other words, it was not going to say just what
it thought of any other Fifth Circuit decision.. .like Diamond Shamrock. In Klein, the Eighth
Circuit was just as delicate in putting the differences between Diamond Shamrock and Frey in
the record, see Klein , 980 F.2d at 529-30, rather than simply saying that Frey was wrongly
decided. And see the exquisite, but implausible, "nexus" analysis that the Sixth Circuit in In
re Century Offshore Management claimed did not conflict with Babbitt, which after all is rotten
fruit off the DiamondShamrock tree.See In re Century Offshore Mgmt. Corp., 111 F.3d 443,44952 (6th Cir. 1997).
In Frey, concurring Judge Jones wanted to remind everyone that "we are not
attempting to overrule the Diamond Shamrock case," and that "[wle could not do so" under
rules about one panel not overturning another. See Frey Il, 943 F.2d at 588 (Jones, J.,
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Judge Brown made two basic mistakes in his purpose analysis. He
improperly narrowed the functions of take-or-pay contracts and he ignored
the lease. On the first point, the most that can be said for his risk-ofproduction theory is that repaying the production risk is among the gas
seller's hopes. The lessee obviously wants to repay its costs. But when it
enters a gas purchase agreement, its primary goal is to get as much as it can
for its gas. The buyer's purpose is centered entirely on reserves. The buyer
could care less about the seller's risk; it is trying to secure as much gas as
it can.
The central transaction in a take-or-pay contract is not a payment
for the risk of drilling wells. It is cash for gas. This purpose infuses every
part of the transaction: the title, the commitment of reserves and their
description, the measure of the obligation, the technical attachments about
gas quality and manner of production, many of the force majeure terms,
and the basis for paying royalty including the lengthy pricing terms that
dominate the contract.181

concurring). One author hassuggested thatjudge Jones's concurrence implies "remorse" over
Diamond Shamrock, see Kingsupranote 127, at 819-20; given Judge Jones's many pro-business
decisions, her concurrence is far likelier to have been an effort to preserve as much of the
producer favoring Diamond Shamrock as possible from the thrust of Judge Reavley's opinion.
Diamond Shamrock and its progeny seem such bad decisions that it is tempting to cast around
for extra-judicial factors that might explain the outcomes. In one of those historical quirks that
can define the path of the law, and certainly a factor that would have any Realist sit up and
take notice, it may be no accident that the earliest cases denying royalty owners a share of
production involved government leases and royalties. See, e.g., State v. Pennzoil, 752 P.2d 975
(Wyo. 1988); Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1993). Particularly in states like
Wyoming where government ownership is not necessarily popular, it does not take a tooheavy dose of skepticism to suspect that hostility to governmental royalty owners may have
driven the initial formulation of the law. Unfortunately, courts were unable to limit the
damage from their false start because they did not have any legally defensible way to give
ordinary private royalty owners the rewards they had taken from state and federal lessors
(who often have the broadest definitions of royalty value). As a result, courts transplanted the
principle grown in the governmenthothouse to the garden of nongovernmental royalties. The
exclusion of royalties has extended from government royalty owners to private royalty
owners with barely a blink. It is an interesting question whether these cases would have come
out the same way had the initial plaintiffs been more sympathetic victims, say, a First Baptist
Church or Kansas Baptist Convention.
181. Take-or-pay contracts are invariably titled "gas purchase agreement" or "gas sales
agreement." They are never called "production-expense reimbursementagreement," "drilling
cost repayment contract," or "risk defraying agreement." The standard buyer's obligation is
not tied to the cost of drilling. The contract price does not rise or fall with production costs,
nor do payments vary with the producer's success as it drills more wells. Lessees who drill
dry holes receive nothing for that risk under a take-or-pay contract Those who drill expensive
wells that cost more than the total revenues are not protected. Conversely, lessees who have
great success, so that their drilling cost is only a fraction of the take-or-pay payments, do not
find that their costs serve as a ceiling capping the payments due from the buyer. A take-or-pay
contract makes no adjustment for whether its revenues cover the seller's cost and risks.
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Even Judge Brown's take-or-pay purpose analysis, though, is not
the worst mistake in Diamond Shamrock and its progeny. That honor is
reserved for its conclusion that take-or-pay contracts should set the lease
obligation."s Even if take-or-pay payments purely compensate the risk of
production, royalty owners still have a right to production "free of costs."

Another fact that shows that a take-or-pay contract is centrally about gas reserves is
that the contracts ordinarily were not entered until at least one well had been drilled. The
seller would then dedicate the reserves it had found to the buyer. The exchange is a payment
for gas. Moreover, the formula for calculating the take-or-pay prepayment typically was a
measure of reserves-usually set by a gas deliverability test-multiplied by the contract price.
The starting point forbuyout and buy-down settlements invariably was a reservoir engineer's
report of the likely reserves, times the price; settlement talks would focus on how heavily
these figures should be discounted.
The effort to pretend that take-or-pay contracts are not basically about gas should
be no more successful than failed pipeline efforts to contend that their take-or-pay promises
did not encompass the falling market of the eighties. As the Oklahoma Supreme Court would
note in that context, "take-or-payprovisions permeate[) the entire contract," with their varied
price provisions to fix and limit the protection pipelines could hope to get against a drop in
the market. See Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc. 756 P.2d 1209,1213-14 (Okla. 1988). There is no
reason to believe the parties thought they were tying gas payments to cost or risk
reimbursement rather than reserves, but somehow forgot to say so, when references to the gas
reserves so permeate the contract.
The timing of prepayments helps disprove the risk-reward theory. Pipelines
stopped taking gas under contracts that had been in effect for some years. In many instances,
most or all of the wells had been drilled and the lessees and their partners had recouped their
well costs. The disputed prepayments came at the middle or end of the contract life, not in the
beginning when drilling costs still needed to be compensated. Payments often came when the
operator and interest owners were collecting nearly pure profit. The production risk at this
stage was minimal. DiamondShamrockhasdeprived many royalty owners of prepayments and
settlements in order to reward operators for risks that often did not need to be repaid.
As more proof that this risk-protection cannot be the purpose of the take-or-pay
contract, the industry does have contracts that tie payments for gas to drilling costs. As an
example, producers sometimes enter contracts with drilling companies in which costs are paid
only from a share of production. See Jane Romanov et al., An Overview of Sources of Capitaland
StructureinInvestments in Oil and Gas,34 R. MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 13-1,13-26 (1988). The operator
sometimes will guarantee payment, but at other times the driller may look solely to
production. There would not have been anything difficult in tying a gas purchase agreement
to the producer's costs--but take-or-pay contracts did not do so.
182. As one author has put it, "why should the purpose for which the lessee and the
pipeline enter into a gas contract dictate the terms of the relationship between the lessor and
the lessee?" King, supranote 127, at 821; see also Weaver, supra note 3, at 538-39 (criticizing
courts that ignore the way that gas contracts affect lease). That Texas state courts and other
jurisdictions applying the Texas Vela rule would make the mistake of letting a reading of the
take-or-pay contract trump the lease is particularly odd (putting aside for the moment the fact
that the take-or-pay reading is a misreading, too) because, as a later opinion rejecting Vela
pointed out, that rule is based on the independence of the lease obligation from the gas
purchase agreement. See Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334,1337-38 (La. 1982)
(quoting Vela as principle that lease royalty entitlement must be determined under lease,
independently from gas sales contract (citation omitted)).
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They are supposed to share in the revenue stream from the first
dollar-even when the lessee and its partners are just beginning to recoup
costs.1s3 In contrast, were royalties conditioned on drilling risk, the lease
would postpone royalties until "payout" when costs had been
reimbursed."' Yet no standard lease and no lease in the published cases ties
royalties to producer cost recoupment. The idea of limiting royalties to
drilling costs cannot be squared with the goal of establishing the royalty as
an interest free of costs.
c. Lessors Did Not Intend to Disclaim Take-or-PayPrepaymentsand Settlements
A frequently advanced reason for denying royalty owners their
share of take-or-pay payments is an inferential argument about specific
intent. This punitive argument runs that lessors must not have intended to
share prepayments and settlements, or else they would have inserted that
right in the lease."
Unfortunately for this argument, none of the cases denying sharing
has turned up even one occasion when lessors specifically discussed the
treatment of take-or-pay royalties, much less agreed that lessees could keep
the money. Judicial reasoning that lessors intended this result surely is
incorrect. Most lessors are inexperienced and have relatively small financial
stakes."s When lessors sign a lease, they may not even know if their lessee

183. If the fact that producers bore some risks not shared with royalty owners could defeat
the duty to share lease benefits with lessors, it "would also logically follow that 'all royalties
are unfair.'" White, supra note 155, at 669.
For a proper distinction between the allocation of risks in the take-or-pay contract
and lease obligations, see In re Century Offshore Mgmt Corp., Ill F.3d 443, 451 (6th Cir.
1997).
184. This suggestion is not fanciful. Farm-out agreements often postpone payments, or
vary revenue percentages, until payout, the "period required for a well to produce sufficient
oil or gas to reimburse the investment in the well." WILLIAMS &MEYERS, supra note 1,at 885.
Operating agreements have another sophisticated provision to tie payments to cost, the
"nonconsent" penalty. If some partners go nonconsent, giving notice that they will not pay
for a well, the "participating" parties get to recoup a multiple (often 300 percent or so) of the
costs before the others resume their revenue interests. See ANDREW DERMAN, THE NEW AND
IMPROVED 1989 Joiwr OPERATING AGREEMENT: A WORKING MANUAL 51-55 (1991) (discussing

customary non-consentpenalties). Had lessors and lessees intended to make royalty payments
contingent upon well risks and costs, they could have done so using language already
common and familiar in the industry.
185. See TransAmerican Natural Gas v. Finkelstein, 933 S.W.2d 591,598 (Tex. App. 1996);
Hurd Enters. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101,106 (Tex. App. 1992); Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Ref.
Co., 822 S.W.2d 153,160 (Tex. App. 1991); Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni, 806 S.W.2d 264,267-68 &
n.3 (Tex. App. 1991); State v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975,981-82 (Wyo. 1988); Crowder, supra
note 155, at 932-33.
186. See generally Ernest E. Smith, JointOperatingAgreement Jurisprudence,33 WASHBURN
L.J. 834, 839 (1994) (lessee "almost invariably in a superior bargaining position"), 851
(implying lessors will not have experience); accord, Gary Conine, Speculation, Prudent
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will drill a well, and they quite often won't know the gas purchaser or
terms of purchase. It would have taken extraordinary clairvoyance for
royalty owners, who assumed they would share proportionately in
whatever value the lessee could extract from the mineral interest, to divine
that they needed an express requirement to share payments for gas not
taken.
The timing of take-or-pay disputes makes the idea that royalty
owners intended to disclaim take-or-pay payments far-fetched. When
producers and pipelines entered these contracts in the seventies and early
eighties, it was a time of high prices and expectations."87 Virtually every
published take-or-pay opinion turns on a lease entered in this period of gas
shortage.ss It is hard to imagine why a royalty owner who assumed it

Operation,and the Economics of Oil and Gas Law, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 670,674 (1994) (few owners
of mineral rights "have the technical or financial capability of conducting, or are willing to
assume the risk of, such operations"); Hebert, supranote 111, at 6 ("lessee is almost always in
the unique position of having virtually all the knowledge and also the control regarding the
matters of the lease, e.g. drilling, completing, producing, marketing, developing and
exploring"); seegenerally Lowe, supranote 53, at 1-19 ("[T]he lease transaction occurs because
the owner of the mineral rights generally lacks the expertise and capital to develop them and
so transfers them to an oil company, which impliedly or expressly represents that it possesses
the talent and the money to develop them."); cf. Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Implied Covenants
In Oil and Gas Law Under FederalEnergy Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1473,1487 (1981)
(summarizing Professor Merrrill's work on implied covenants as follows: "the lessee/lessor
relationship is by its very nature tainted with unequal bargaining power."). Less attention
generally is paid to the smaller size of the royalty than to the lessors' relative inexperience;
but the royalty share is ordinarily one-eighth of production, and even this often gets carved
up into very small pieces. The smaller size can mean that even sophisticated royalty owners
who understand they have been cheated do not have enough at stake to justify the expense
of litigation.
187. See Medina et al, supranote 112, and accompanying text.
188. Looking at the contracts in the major published decisions, from the earliest decided
case first: There is no indication of when Pennzoil leased the state property in State v. Pennzoil
Co. The government issued the Mesa lease at issue in DiamondShamrock in 1973. See Diamond
Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1161. The opinion does not indicate when the government granted the
leases in the other Diamond Shamrock case. Mr. Frey gave Amoco its lease in 1975. See Frey I,
708 F. Supp. at 784. The initial lease entered before the forced integration in GerardBos was
made in 1976. See Gerard J.W. Bos & Co. v. Harkins & Co., 883 F.2d 379,380 (5th Cir. 1989).
The Bruni Mineral Trust executed its lease to Killam Oil Company, the one at stake in both
Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni and Hurd Enterprises v. Bruni, in 1974. See Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni, 806
S.W.2d at 265. The Mandell v. Hamman Oil lease was a 1978 lease. See Mandell v. Hamman Oil
& Refining Co., 822 S.W.2d at 156. Klein was a class action with about 3000 members, but
development of the field began in the 1950s, see Klein 1, 980 F.2d at 523, so the great majority
of leases should have been in existence before the late seventies. TransAmericanNatural Gas
v. Finkelsteinstemmed from a 1974 overriding royalty agreement. See TransAmericanNatural
Gas v. Finkelstein,933 S.W.2d at 593-94. Samedan became lessee under the Indian lease in 1979
in Independent Petroleum Association of America v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248,1254 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not give the date of the lease it emasculated in this key
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would share whatever the lessee found, and who issued its lease when
pipelines were buying all the gas they could lay their hands on, "intended"
to give up the right to take-or-pay payments.
d. Double Payments, Gas in the Ground:Two Trivial Arguments
Courts have used several other throw-away arguments to deprive
royalty owners of take-or-pay royalties. For instance, Judge Brown
purported to worry about "two royalty payments" on "one purchase of
gas."" 9 Yet the double payment problem would affect working interest

area of performance in Roye Realty v. Watson. Yates v. Powell was a declaratory judgment action
brought by one large producer and a trade association of oil and gas companies to invalidate
a New Mexico Commissioner of Public Lands' regulation that applied to over thirteen million
acres of state land held in trust for such beneficiaries as schools, see Harvey E. Yates Co. v.
Powell, 98 F.3d 1222,1226 (10th Cir. 1996), so there is no single date for the leases but most
surely would pre-date the last boom. In Alameda v. TransAmericanNatural Gas, the lease was
last assigned in 1982. See Alameda v. TransAmerican Natural Gas Co., 950 S.W.2d 93,95 n.3
(Tex. App. 1997). The Condra v. Quinoco lease came about in 1979. See Condra v. Quinoco
Petroleum, Inc., 954 S.W.2d 68,69 (Tex. App. 1997). The Fifth Circuit did not give the date of
the leases in Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine,but the trial court indicated that the leases in dispute
predated the early eighties downturn. See Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, 25 F. Supp.2d 1163,
1166 (N.D. Miss. 1996). The leaseholds in Westerman v. Rogers apparently predated the 1977
gas purchase agreements. See Westerman v. Rogers, 1 P.3d 228,229 (Colo. App. 1999). In EEX
Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior,the leases predated the 1969 gas contracts. See EEX Corp. v. U.S.
Dept. of Interior, 111 F. Supp.2d 24,25 (D.D.C. 2000).
Each of the identifiable leases was entered before or during the last boom, with its
common predictions of $10 per mcf of gas and $90 per barrel of oil. Sophisticated producers
may have understood the need to get protection against market decline (even if they did not
"expect" the market to fall). Only with gross unrealism, however, can judges suggest that the
average royalty owner in the boom years should have understood or seen any need to protect
itself from the risk that its lessee would, in spite of their shared interest, cut it out if the gas
buyer decided to make a prepayment but not take gas at the same time. Royalty owners had
no reason to expect their lessees to break the royalty bond. They surely had no reason to
expect courts to allow that to occur, nor would they expect to have to think about the minutia
of gas purchase agreements. Leases do not mention the terms of the gas purchase agreement,
much less technical payment concepts like "prepayments," "contract quantities," measures
of "deliverability," or "makeup." The great majority of royalty owners could not have told
a judge what those terms meant, either when they signed the lease or when they sued.
189. See Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1166; see also White, supra note 155, at 669-70
("Some of the most persuasive arguments against a royalty obligation are practical ones,"
discussing two-payment issue and claiming that "accounting will be even more complicated"
if refunds are needed after prices fall); Crowder, supra note 155, at 934.
Diamond Shamrock is an unsatisfying opinion on so many grounds that the doublepayment argument cannot head the list, but it deserves a firm footing on it. In his Olympian
detachment, Judge Brown did not mention how much money his ruling was taking from the
federal government and taxpayers. By not listing the very large amounts at stake, the court
deflected attention from the absurdity of letting this minor bookkeeping arrangement block
royalty payments. If it would cost the producers millions to figure out how to transfer a
second payment and if royalties were in the thousands, perhaps these parties would not have
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partners, too. If a buyer later takes prepaid gas at a higher price, the lessee
will have to cut a second check to those interest owners as well. The lessee
and its partners are thus saying that they cannot offer their royalty owners
a payment mechanism they would use for themselves. The lease does not
justify a double standard so customized to punish royalty owners.1"
Another weak argument is that the royalty owner is not losing
anything because its gas remains in the ground and can be sold later. To
take-or-pay lawyers, this argument resurrects with a vengeance an already
rejected pipeline position that producers suffered no injury when pipelines
refused to make gas prepayments because the gas stayed in the ground."'
In fact, whether the gas ultimately is taken pursuant to a prepayment or
later sold to some other buyer, the delay costs royalty owners the time
value of the prepayment. They suffer a real economic loss. They have to
wait for a hypothetical resumption of purchases while the present value of
their interest keeps falling. If the well is shut-in irretrievably, as in Gerard
Bos, the value may drop to nothing.192 Courts that had no trouble getting
intended to pass on a second payment. Yet common sense indicates that the opposite will be
true. The court has just blessed the redistribution of what are certain to be millions of dollars
from the government to oil and gas operators. Even if the sum were far less, it would be hard
to take seriously an objection that the possibility of one more bookkeeping measure per
month, which might cost the operator a few dollars monthly, could derail its obligation to
pass on royalty payments. If the objection were stated in its proper legal form-"Judge, we
can't afford to comply with our duties to give the royalty owners the same benefits from the
lease that we get," or, "But your honor, we can't afford to find these royalty owners the best
price possible"-summary judgmentfor the royalty owners would be likely.
190. Moreover, if buyers ultimately bought gas under a settled and renegotiated contract,
the royalty then due would in effect consist of two payments anyway: the lower current price
and the part of the earlier payment due on that gas. So there still would be two payments
(albeit at the same time), and this would not "present[] a problem." See Inre Century Offshore
Mgmt. Corp., 111 F.3d 443, 451 (6th Cir. 1997); for Judge Reavley's rejection of the two-check
argument in Frey, see supra note 119. As for the risk of nonrecoupable refunds, the lessee is
exposed to the same risk with working interest owners, for they too (or it too) might go into
bankruptcy.
191. Not only would producers lose the time value of money, but they could suffer other
injuries as well. In many fields, otherproducers will be draining the reservoir and the unlucky
seller whose gas is shut-in may never realize its loss. The issue is even more complicated
when some owners are shut-in and others are not or where a shut-in may damage the
reservoir and make resumption impossible. See, e.g., Valero Transmission v. Mitchell Energy,
743 S.W.2d 658, 665 (rex. App. 1987) (affirming temporary injunction upon evidence that
reservoir would be drained or "would probably suffer a permanent loss of gas from beneath
its leased tracts" if operator had to stop production, and operator might even lose eleven
leases).
192. See, e.g., Gerard J.W. Bos & Co. v. Harkins & Co., 883 F.2d 379,380-81 (5th Cir. 1989)
(royalty owner complaining after well in unit was shut down upon settlement of take-or-pay
dispute). Even if the gas was dedicated under a long-term contract and ultimately taken, the
royalty owners' true economic return might be cut by half, two-thirds, or more, all depending
on the discount rate and when the payment occurred. Where the gas ultimately is produced
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underlying economic values right for the lost time value of money in
producer/pipeline take-or-pay disputes and when dealing withsuspensed
royalties in Phillips v. Shutts 93 inexplicably carved out a special rule for
these royalty cases.
4. A Clear Mutual Benefit Rule Should Have Prevented This Take-or-Pay
Aberration
A clear enunciation of the mutual benefit covenant would have
made this diminution of the lease obligation much less likely. As part
II.A.1 showed, the two courts that respected the cooperative nature of the
lease understood that lessees must treat prepayments and settlements like

under a later contract, be it a renegotiated contract or released gas sold to a new buyer, the
price invariably is much lower. In that case, the royalty owner loses entirely the benefit of the
favorable take-or-pay contract, with its share of that benefit up for grabs between the operator
and its investing partners.
An odd public policy argument contends that paying royalties would lower the value
of gas payments to producers and so reduce the number of settlements, thus conflicting with
a federal goal of fostering settlement of pipeline/producer disputes. See White, supranote 155,
at 680-4. The author likened royalty payments to a tax on producers. See id. at 683. Yet if
federal policymakers could regulate leases, FERC could arbitrarily lower the royalty payment
to any level. Moreover, were there a federal policy to abrogate royalty agreements to further
a competitive gas market, surely FERC would have announced the policy in its numerous,
intricate deregulation orders and awaited the inevitable legal challenges.
It is hard to see how the Commission could reach behind take-or-pay contracts and
void the royalty agreements on which the take-or-pay contracts subsisted when FERC
repeatedly washed its hands of doing anything to take-or-pay contracts themselves. See, e.g.,
Order 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg.
42,408,42,423-24 (Oct. 18,1985) (codified in scattered sections of 18 C.F.R.) (refusing to void
take-or-pay contracts; holding that "In]either the legal nor the factual basis for potentially
voiding billions of dollars in freely negotiated contracts was made clear in the filings made
with the Commission," and that "[mjoreover, the Commission has sought to make it crystal
clear that nowhere in the final rules.. .has the Commission abrogated any contracts nor
created a regulatory framework predicated on any unilateral contract abrogation."); see also
Order 500-H, 54 Fed. Reg. 52,344, 52,365-70 (Dec. 21, 1989) (discussing reasons for leaving
renegotiation to private marketplace).
Moreover, we know that by the mid-nineties pipelines had been settling these
contracts for very low percentages. (White cited statistics of 10 cents on the dollar, see White,
supranote 155, at 665; FERC's own calculations were less than 20 cents on the dollar, see supra
note 113 and accompanying text.) So if anyone needed help, it was not the pipeline buyers.
On the other hand, if federal policy is to push for settlement at any cost, why not strike down
royalty agreements altogether and impose a free servitude on land owners, all in the name of
a federal policy favoring cheap gas? Such a rule would make no sense when the premise of
the lease is that the lessee's share of production is incentive enough for it to toil diligently for
the mutual benefit of all involved. For rejection of the argument that making lessees share
settlements with royalty owners will deter settlements, see In re Century Offshore Mgmt. Corp.,
111 F.3d at 452.
193. See supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text.
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other lease benefits. The Frey and Klein courts understood that cutting out
royalty owners is fundamentally contrary to the mutuality of a lease.
The damage caused by the take-or-pay majority may extend even
beyond take-or-pay disputes because the majority seems to reject the
Harrell "cooperative venture" theory. " What message does this send on
other issues? Do royalty-exclusion courts really mean that the typical lease
is not fundamentally an exchange of money from inexperienced parties
who give up their mineral interests to induce an experienced oil and gas
company to drill and share the fruits of the lease in return? How could the
idea that leases are not cooperative ventures ever square with cases like
FirstBaptist, with its strong statement of the lessee's duty not to structure
the lease for its benefit at lessors' expense, the division order cases that turn
on the rule against unjust enrichment, or the other cases analyzed in part
One interesting sign of the illegitimacy of the take-or-pay majority
came in the limitations and caveats with which the first royalty-exclusion
194. If courts truly believed that plain language compelled them to deny royalty owners
any take-or-pay sharing, they could say that they simply did not reach the nature of the lease.
Yet as Frey and Klein demonstrate, denying royalties is so contrary to the purpose of this
relationship that purpose arguments should be addressed. So an honest, complete decision
should require even courts that ultimately deny sharing in simple words to discuss the nature
of the lease. For instance, the Tenth Circuit considered and decided that New Mexico would
not adopt the "cooperative venture" approach in Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222,
1234-35 (10th Cir. 1996), though it also argued that Louisiana and Arkansas had different
statutes that might explain their positions on take-or-pay royalties, see id. at 1231-33. (The
Tenth Circuit was forced to analyze the Harrel position because the New Mexico
Commissioner of Public Lands, whose regulation it voided, had adopted the theory, see id. at
1231.) The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Roye Realty discussed both Frey and Klein and their
adoption of the Harrell rule at length, see Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson, 2 P.3d
320,324-27 (Okla. 1996),before siding with the no-royalty rule, and so rejected one of the most
obvious applications of the cooperative venture rule. A Texas intermediate court also
expressly rejected the Harrell rule. See Alameda v. TransAmerican Natural Gas Co., 950
S.W.2d 93,99 (Tex. App. 1997).
Part of the problem is that the Louisiana Supreme Court in Frey, the final Fifth
Circuit opinion, and the Eighth Circuit in Klein all gave some weight to state royalty statutes,
no doubt in part to minimize the appearance of conflict with Diamond Shamrock. Yet if the
lease truly is a cooperative venture, Diamond Shamrock becomes impossible to justify.
195. In an odd contrast with take-or-pay cases, Oklahoma, the other leading jurisdiction
to reject take-or-pay sharing, rejected the Texas market value rule precisely because of its
perception of the one-sidedness of Vela. The court noted that limiting royalties to a good-faith
long-term contract price is "the only interpretation that would operate fairly for producers,"
and that any other rule [i.e., Vela] would "penalize the producer who was forced into the
contract in large measure by his duty to the lessor." Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d
1269, 1274 (Okla. 1981) (in other words, because of the mutual purpose of the lease). So
Oklahoma has rejected the extreme linguistic analysis of Vela, but embraced ultra-literalism
in Roye and its take-or-pay rule. For a discussion of the relationship between these doctrines,
see John Lowe's analysis, discussed supra, note 155.
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courts surrounded their holdings. Initially, they did not support the broad
principle that has developed. This hedging fell away as the precedent took
on a life of its own.
At first, it seemed that while courts might not require lessees to
share recoupable payments-because the royalty owner ultimately would
get something when the buyer made up the gas-lessees would have to
pay royalties on nonrecoupable payments." s Many early commentators
assumed that this was a fair place to draw the line, too." But when the
exclusionary doctrine reached full throttle, courts casually rejected
passthrough even of nonrecoupable settlements, which therefore were lost
to royalty owners forever."s In a similar transition, it initially seemed that
courts would make lessees pay royalties at least on "amount realized"
leases, given the obvious fact that the lessee actually "realized" the take-orpay payment.1" This distinction was also tossed aside as courts
indiscriminately turned down royalty owners in such leases.'
As soon as the lease is viewed as a mutual endeavor, it becomes
striking how many benefits are not shared under the Diamond Shamrock
rule. The lessee and its partners enjoy the benefit of a payment "for"
production before production actually occurs, but royalty owners do not."
The lessee and its partners enjoy full protection against the risk of market
decline, but royalty owners suffer its full brunt. Working interest owners
who have no duty-to-market protection enjoy the operator's best efforts to
sell their gas anyway, but royalty owners who supposedly are protected by
that duty do not get even the price the operator secures. Working interest

196. See Hurd Enters. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101, 106 n.8 (Tex. App. 1992) (stating that
royalty owners might have to share nonrecoupable payments).
197. See generallypredictions by experienced industry authors at the end of note 155 supra.
198. See Williamson, 138 F.3d at 551; Yates, 98 F.3d at 1234;TransAmericanNaturalGas Corp.,
933 S.W.2d at 599.
199. The reading that amount-realized leases might better support royalty recovery was
encouraged by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Frey, where that court several times stated its
holding in terms of the "amount realized" lease. See Frey IV, 603 So. 2d at 178-80. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court breathed life into the difference by suggesting it as one distinction
with Frey in Roye Realty, 2 P.3d at 326, 328 n.8.
200. For instance, the Fifth Circuit in Williamson v. ElfAquitaine, Inc. kept royalty owners
from sharing settlement on a nonrecoupable take-or-pay obligation in spite of their amountrealized argument, see 138 F.3d at 550. Moreover, when royalty owners do not share even
under the accrual language in Diamond Shamrock or the proceeds "attributable to said
property" in Condra v. Quinoco Petroleum, Inc., 954 S.W.2d 68,71 (Tex. App. 1997), most courts
have stripped hapless royalty owners of every take-or-pay payment except for price-based
settlements.
201. To compound the fiction, when prepayment gas later is made up, even under a
proceeds lease, the court has to pretend that the "proceeds" have just been paid (when in fact
they may have been paid years before), while all other interest owners long ago received their
"proceeds."
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owners get a free loan, at the least, of the royalty proceeds, but royalty
owners have to sit by helplessly and hope the buyer ultimately takes the
gas.' Finally, the lessee and its partners may enter a buyout or buydown
that lets them divide the royalty share among themselves; however, the
royalty owner may not even have the right to see a record of this diverted
payment.2( The rule gives interest owners every reason to collude with the
202. The new division of spoils creates an interesting problem for the operator under the
Diamond Shamrock rule. If it does not share a prepayment with the royalty owners, does it
spend the money itself, put it in escrow, or share it with its working interest owners? If the
gas later is taken, where will it come up with the funds to pay the royalty owners if it has
already shared those proceeds with other interest owners? This rule imposes a risk of interest
owner bankruptcy on the royalty owner, the reverse of the insolvency problem Judge Brown
said he feared operators risked if they had to recoup payments from royalty owners and repay
the buyer that did not make-up the gas.
203. Given that courts routinely enter confidentiality agreements to protect legitimate
business secrets, and that lessors generally do not compete with lessees, it is hard to
understand lessees' refusal to even share their settlement documents and some courts'
approval for this stance. In Klein, for instance, the defendants hid their settlement from the
Arkansas Public Service Commission and so kept the news from royalty owners. See Klein I,
980 F.2d at 525. In Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, the lessee and buyer made their settlement
"confidential" and kept it from the lessors. See 138 F.3d at 548. In Roye Realty, the lessee and
buyer filed a motion to keep their "confidential" settlement from the royalty owners, though
the motion apparently was not "resolved." See 2 P.3d at 323. The defendants in Seeco v. Hales
kept their contract secret from Seeco's royalty owners. See supranote 106. Even in states where
the royalty owner only is entitled to share the price portion of a prepayment or settlement
(unless gas is taken), surely the royalty owner has a right to see all settlement documents to
make sure the lessee did not spurn a form of payment that it would have to share, in order
to bargain for a kind of payment that it no longer has to split with royalty interests.
How far an agent can structure its compensation to avoid forms that would have to
be shared is an issue that comes up in executive rights cases when a lessor sells the full right
to control lease decisions but keeps an interest in the proceeds. Ordinarily, it will share in the
royalty, but not in other payments like a bonus. Courts have had to devise a duty of good
faith, which some call fiduciary and some do not, to make sure that the executive uses its
exclusive control in the joint interest. For a sample of the executive fiduciary cases, see Manges
v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. 1984); Dearing, Inc. v. Spiller, 824 S.W.2d 728, 732, 734
(Tex. App. 1992); Donahue v. Bills, 305 S.E.2d 311, 312-13 (W. Va. 1983); Teas v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 178 F. Supp. 742,745,748-49 (N.D. Tex. 1959), rev'd in parton contract
grounds, 286 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1961). For the competing executive good faith (i.e.,
nonfiduciary) cases, see Pickens v. Hope, 764 S.W.2d 256,264 (Tex. App. 1988) (post-Manges
Texas lower court opinion refusing to follow Manges);seealsoPilcher v. Turner, 530 So. 2d 198,
200-02 (Ala. 1988); Schroeder v. Schroeder, 479 N.E.2d 391, 397-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
Louisiana imposed a good-faith duty by statute in 1975. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:109 (West.
2000). The lower good-faith duty has such staying power in part because of its endorsement
in the leading early article, Lee Jones, Non-ParticipatingRoyalty, 26 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1948); in
the most influential later article, Ernest E. Smith, Implications of a FiduciaryStandardof Conduct
for the Holder of the Executive Right, 64 TEX. L. REV. 371 (1985); and in Howard Williams'
seeming endorsement of this standard in his well-know article on the larger fiduciary issue,
Howard Williams, The FiduciaryPrinciplein the Law of Oil and Gas, 13 INST. ON OIL & GAS L.
& TAX'N 201, 239-52,242-43 (1962).
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buyer to accept prepayments or settlements that are lower than the full
contract amount, all at the royalty owners' expense. Such results cannot be
squared with a transaction designed to trade a mineral interest for a
proportionate share of whatever wealth the lessee can extract from the
earth.
B. The Absence of Tighter Controls May Have Facilitated the Posted
Price Problem
The posted price cases introduced in part II.B offer another
example of the damage done by the judicial failure to recognize the mutual
benefit covenant formally. The traditional, superficial view of posted prices
had been that they were a proxy for market value.' For a long time, public
information seemed to confirm this view; however, in litigation that lasted
through much of the nineties, it turned out that oil companies artificially
maintained low posted prices. They used those prices to compute royalties
and severance taxes, but routinely and systematically resold their oil for
more.
The truth began to get out after a three-state audit commissioned
by the states of Texas, Colorado, and New Mexico found that posted prices
were three percent to six percent below market prices.' Texas sued the
state's eight largest oil producers (Amoco, Chevron, Exxon, Marathon,
Mobil, Phillips, Shell, and Texaco) in 1994 in a case filed on behalf of the

Royalty owners are at least as vulnerable as a party who sells its executive right. They
too lose control over how their property will be developed. Yet the majority of courts have
blithely allowed them to be stripped of contracts that appropriated a major economic benefit,
the price valuation of the last boom years frozen into take-or-pay contracts, as if this should
be ofno concern. These cases are an inexplicable deviation from standard ofifield approaches.
They are written as if the royalty owner has done something wrong and must forfeit the evenhanded treatment one expects for parties in their situation.
204. See, e.g., Garfield v. True Oil Co., 667 F.2d 942,945-46 (10th Cir. 1982), a net profits
case. The Tenth Circuit held that the operator had no trust duty and that a sale of oil at the
posted price that was the "going price in the field" was appropriate, even if gatherers or first
purchasers resold the production at a higher price. See id. at 945-46. Even if such later resales
occurred, that the operator, True Oil, used the posted field price meant that it "thereby met
the good faith requirements." Id. at 946. This Tenth Circuit opinion rests on what we now
know was a pollyannaish view of posted prices. One hopes and expects that the court would
decide Garfielddifferently now that the way posted prices really work has become public. The
posted price litigation has exposed a network of sham sales designed to give posted prices the
appearance of being an independent market value. Yet major oil companies using this price
recorded millions of dollars of excess profits on their books because they consistently resold
oil for more.
205. See Laura Johannes, Suit May Mean Wide Increasesin Oil Fees, WALL STREET J., July 19,
1995, at T3.
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Texas General Land Office and a class of Texas royalty owners.' A wide
variety of copycat suits followed for royalty owners against other oil
companies and for working interest owners.'
The legal principles surrounding these cases were not fully fleshed
out because the cases settled in May 1999 after being consolidated in
federal court.' Yet the evidence developed before settlement showed how
oil companies used posted prices to skim extra profits from the royalty
interest. The victims were not just private royalty owners, but also state
and federal lessors.'
Sometimes the oil companies expropriated royalty values simply
by buying at the posted price and quickly reselling, often at the wellhead.
The transactions were more complex when the companies sold to an
affiliate or ran posted price purchases through a third party to give them
a veneer of legitimacy.21 Many of the sales disappeared into a complex web
of intercompany exchanges. The participants used "balancing" agreements
to match the trades and end up with the same number of barrels after the
" ' These exchanges made it much harder to track the value the
dust settled.21
companies realized on their sales.
The initial Texas royalty claim, which after consolidation became
the template for all royalty claims, focused on claims for breach of express

206. See Original Petition, Texas General Land Office on Behalf of the Permanent School
Fund of the State of Texas, Cause No. 95-08680, in the 345th District Court of Travis County,
Texas (July 14,1995) [hereinafter Posted Price Petition). This Texas posted price case is one of
many consolidated in the MDL 1206 proceeding settled in federal court in Corpus Christi. See
infra note 208.
207. For a list of the fifteen federal cases consolidated in the MDL proceeding, see In re
Lease Oil Antitrust Litig.,186 F.R.D. 403,408 n.3 (S.D. Tex. 1999). The working interest cases
raised antitrust as well as common-law claims.
208. The last major hearing for approval of the settlement of private claims came in April
1999; the court's order approving the settlement is dated May 10, 1999. In re Lease Oil, 186
F.R.D. at 403. The settlement was appealed by a handful of objectors, but those objections
were settled on appeal just before oral arguments.
209. There is an ongoing posted price qui tam lawsuit over federal leases. See generally
United States ex. rel. Johnson v. Shell, 33 F. Supp.2d 528 (E.D. Tex. 1999). The MDL classaction settlement excluded state government entities, In re Lease Oil, 186 F.R.D. at 414, though
the Texas General Land Office was an original plaintiff in the Texas lawsuit and has settled.
Some states, like Louisiana, now are pursuing posted price claims for state lands and
severance taxes on their own.
210. For instance, Judge Jack's settlement order in the MDL litigation described a
convoluted transaction in which an operator sells to an independent "transporter," who
moves the oil to a "Trading Center" but then resells the oil to the operator, who finally gets
to resell the oil in an "arm's length" sale at a true market price. See In re Lease Oil, 186 F.R.D.
at 413 n.15.
211. See id. (describing allegations of "overall balance" agreements).

Fall 20011

THE MUTUAL BENEFIT IMPLIED COVENANT

lease terms and of the duty to market.212 But the essence of the claims had
little to do with lease terms and whether they dictated market value or
proceeds royalties. Nor did the claims really match the test of the duty to
market-that the royalty owners prove that the oil company did not get the
best price available in some absolute sense. Surveying market prices could
be one way to prove posted price damage, but the gravamen of the
complaint was that the companies were not sharing the price they actually
were receiving. It was only because of the complexity of inter-company
balancing (which disguised the values actually received) that this loss
might need to be estimated by overall market value.
Had the courts already fleshed out the mutual benefit principle, the
legal issues could have been simplified. The basic allegation was that the
defendants arranged an accounting and trading system to receive higher
prices than those on which they paid royalties. The legal argument was that
this self-aggrandizement is inconsistent with a relationship designed to
share all benefits from the property. The lessee is not to take a separate
benefit, an extra cut of the revenues, from the volume of oil attributable to
the royalty interest. Nor is it to earn some other benefit from the lease and
not share part with its lessors.
Oil companies can argue, of course, that because the posted price
cases settled, they are not an admission that anything was wrong with
posted prices," 3 but the royalty claims settled for an average of 53 cents per
dollar of overcharge, not the kind of money paid out on frivolous or
dubious claims.214 The overall sums were large-roughly $190 million, 70
percent of which went to the royalty plaintiffs.215

212.

The first two counts were for breach of express contract and breach of implied

covenants. See Posted Price Petition, supra note 206, §§ 28-33.
213. The defendants argued that the initial price paid on the lease, the one they most often
used to compute royalties, was in fact the market value, and that the higher price paid for

transactions further away were for "value-adding functions." See In re Lease Oil, 186 F.R.D. at
410. In fairness, when the court described the plaintiffs' allegations in more detail, she was

careful to describe them as still allegations, not "a finding of fact for any purpose." Id. at 413
& n.15.
214. See id.
at 423. The recovery for working interest owners, who had sued primarily on
antitrust claims, was much less, 3 to 13 cents on the dollar. See id. Working interest owners
recovered less due to a number of factors. Perhaps the biggest problem was that they had
relied primarily on difficult-to-prove antitrust claims, instead of alleging that the operator
marketing production under the JOA is a fiduciary, see supranote 74 and accompanying text.
The court was skeptical aboutJOA claims because working interest plaintiffs only raised them
at the final fairness hearing, see In re Lease Oil, 186 F.R.D. at 416 n.21, and working interest
claimants had not demonstrated that these arguments had merit, see id. at 426-27 & n.36.
215. The Global Settlement that covered most parties came to $164.2 million; another
seven settlements totaled roughly $25 million. See id. at 414-15. The 30 percent not paid to
royalty owners went to the working interest plaintiffs.
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No implied covenant can prevent problems like these posted price
shenanigans, but it can increase the risk by imposing a clearer penalty for
cheating. The fact that so many of the largest oil companies in the United
States participated in this wide-ranging scheme to underpay royalties is
powerful evidence that existing implied covenants do not sufficiently
establish the lessee's obligations.
C. Similar Problems May Exist in the Deregulated Gas Market
A new wave of royalty litigation in the deregulated natural gas
industry bids to unearth problems similar to the posted price disputes.
Many of the problems stem from the deregulation of the gas market
described in part II.B.2 ' Government mandated "unbundling" has
encouraged large interstate pipelines to try to push profits downstream
and away from the well. The companies then argue that they do not have
to share any profits they make by trading and marketing with royalty
owners because the profits are a return for their downstream risk, and not
payments for "production."
The royalty owner, of course, only leases to an oil company
because it believes that the lessee has special expertise in locating
production and arranging its sale. Very few royalty owners take their
production in kind, even when they have the right to do so.2"7 If the lessee
believes that marketing production downstream (instead of at the well) will
produce the best price, the royalty owners expect it to share the fruits of
that professional judgment and the resulting marketing effort with them.
The issue that results can look exactly like the oil posted price cases. For
instance, in the Meridianv. Altheide1 s national class action discussed in part
I.B, one of the claims was that Meridian settled its royalties using indices
of average prices for large pools of gas, but that its trading company
routinely and consistently sold the gas for more, often right at the
wellhead, keeping millions of dollars for itself. Its gas indices were no
better than oil's posted prices. In a statewide Texas class, royalty owners
for the largest gas producer in Texas, Union Pacific Resources Company
(UPRC), have made similar claims. Allegedly, UPRC pays royalty owners
based on indices that understate the price it ordinarily receives for the

216. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
217. Taking in kind is even less likely with natural gas than with oil. Gas is sold through
pipelines and small quantities can be harder to sell than with oil, where small quantities can
be stored intanks and from time to time trucked to buyers. Even with oil, where the standard
lease includes a right to take in kind, see 3 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OFOIL AND
GAS § 39.1(a), at .263-64 (1989), royalty owners generally do not exercise the right and the
operator ordinarily assumes that it also will sell the royalty owner's production.
218. No. 92-026182 (113d Dist. Ct. Harris County, Texas).

Fall 2001]

THE MUTUAL BENEFIT IMPLIED COVENANT

865

gas.2" 9 Another class has sued Exxon in an effort to certify a national class
over Exxon's allegedly underpaying dry gas and liquids royalties, and the
same issues now are appearing in federal qui tam litigation. Some of these
cases also challenge cost deductions on natural gas liquids.
Although couched under the duty to market or something based
on lease terms, the true issue is again the narrower mutual benefit issue.
These cases rarely claim that a higher price was available than the price the
lessee actually received when it or its affiliate resold the gas. Nor do they
seek a full review of market values. The royalty owners are not contesting
the operator's marketing diligence. They just want equal treatment by
sharing the price received, directly or indirectly.
Nor should these royalty owners need to prove that the price the
lessee ultimately did receive in third-party sales was the comparable
market value in the field. What they are saying is that diligence in getting
the best price requires at least the efforts that their own lessee thought best
for its own production; presumably it did act prudently in getting the price
it did; but it has to share that price. The lessee got a separate benefit and
should have to disgorge the portion attributable to its royalty owners'
share. The royalty bargain that trades mineral interests for capital and
experience is supposed to include the lessee's marketing expertise, too.
Companies can incur separate expenses marketing oil or gas
downstream. One area that will be heavily litigated is whether lessees are
entitled to the reasonable, actual cost of downstream marketing, at least in
states where they can deduct the actual cost of certain post-production
expenses.2 But the lessee should not be able to deprive the royalty owners
of the same price that it receives in its own marketing. If it realizes a better
price by shifting the marketing focus from the wellhead to a distant, netbacked sale, so should its royalty owners. Clear enunciation of the mutual
benefit covenant would point much more clearly to the fair, efficient

219.

See Plaintiffs' First Amended Motion for Class Certification and Brief in Support,

Neinast v. UPRC, No. 32040, at 6-9 (21st Dist. Tex. June 15,1999). The author served as an
expert on class certification in this case. The court of appeals recently reversed the class

certification. See UPRC v. Neinast, 2001 WL 1098140 (rex. Ct. App. 1ist Dist.] 2001).
220. See First Amended Complaint, Stirman v. Exxon, No. SA99CA0763 (W.D. Tex. Dec.
10, 1999); for the general qui tam complaint, see Third Amended Complaint, United States ex

rel. Harold Wright v. Chevron, No. 9-98CV30 (E.D. Tex. June 13,2000).
Another large group of qui tam cases claiming that major oil companies producing

natural gas have systematically undermeasured the volume of natural gas received, and so
underpaid royalties, originally were filed in a consolidated complaint in Washington, D.C.,
see United States ex rel. Jack Grynberg v. Alaska Pipeline Co., (D. D.C. Apr. 17, 1995). That

court dismissed this mismeasurement complaint for improper joinder in February 1997, and
the relator then sued the dozens of companies individually. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Mobil, No. 97-D-1543 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 1998).
221. See generally supra note 68.
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resolution of these gas price cases and would suggest that, at most, these
companies could deduct their actual, reasonable cost of certain postproduction services.
IV. THE MUTUAL BENEFIT COVENANT MEETS THE
STANDARDS FOR RECOGNIZING A NEW IMPLIED COVENANT
The mutual benefit implied covenant satisfies the requirements for
a new implied covenant. Courts impose implied covenants to fill out the
parties' intent or when "necessary" to make the lease effective.' The
mutual benefit covenant satisfies either standard. It is what the parties
would have intended had they addressed the issue, and it is necessary to
effectuate the lease. Adopting this rule will clarify a number of areas of law
and enhance efficiency by making leases more transparent carriers of the
mutual goal of maximizing shared production.
This covenant can be labeled positively as a mutual benefit
covenant, or negatively as a covenant against appropriating separate
benefits from the lease. If taken broadly, these labels are mirror images: if
lease benefits are to be mutual, a lessee has no business taking them
separately. Moreover, deciding which benefits are mutual will decide, in
the same breath, which benefits the lessee cannot take separately. "Mutual"
222. The question of whether implied covenants are factual duties or imposed as a matter
of law has a long pedigree in royalty law. The authority most associated with the view that
implied covenants are duties implied by law is Professor Merrill; the dean of the Question-ofFact School is A.A. Walker, see A.A. Walker, The Nature of the Property InterestsCreated by an
Oil and GasLease in Texas, 11 TEX. L.REV. 399 (1933). For some background, see Eugene Kuntz,
ProfessorMerrill'sContributionto Oil and GasLaw, 25 OKLA.L. REV. 484,487 (1972) (siding with
Professor Merrill's view; implied covenant doctrine "has at its base something more
fundamental than the intention of the particular parties....The doctrine is one of general
application that is designed to determine what constitutes fair and reasonable dealing
between any lessor and his lessee...."); Patrick Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to
Explore, Develop, andMarket underMineral Leases, 27 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAx'N 177,193-98
(siding with Merrill as having the "most tenable position"); Patrick Martin, Implied Covenants
in Oil and Gas Leases-Past,Present & Future, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 639, 640 (1994) ("candor
requires us to acknowledge that implied covenants are judicial creations, just as we are all
now legal realists who will admit that courts often make law rather than merely find it" and
covenants actually are just courts making lessees "conform to some standard of fair dealing").
Martin's position might sound like one that would sustain strong implied covenants, but what
he gives with one hand he takes away with the other by urging courts to apply a test of
subjective good faith, see Martin, A Modern Look, supra,at 198-205, a test that allegedly would
leave room for courts to accommodate public interest concerns. Yet such a standard would
give great deference to lessees and let them defend even gross errors of judgment on the
ground that they erred in good faith. See Bruce Kramer &Chris Pearson, The ImpliedMarketing
Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases: Some Needed Changesfor the 80s, 46 LA. L. REV. 787, 820 (1986).
The test would become whether the jury liked and trusted the lessee, rather than whether it
made much effort to act in the lessors' interests as well as its own.
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benefit is a better label, however, because it has stronger connotations of
the cooperative nature of the lease.
A. A Rule Against Profiteering on the Royalty Interest Is Necessary to
Effectuate the Purpose of the Lease
The current list of implied covenants, with its general "reasonably
prudent operator" standard' and roughly five specific covenants,' is by
no means exhaustive. The Texas Supreme Court gave consideration to a
new covenant just two years ago in HECI Exploration Co. v. NEEL.' s
Though the court rejected that effort to create a duty to notify royalty
owners of plans to sue a neighbor for drainage,' it considered the
proposed covenant without any hint that the law is stuck at today's
covenants.'

223. The "great majority" of jurisdictions use the prudent-operator test. See 5 WILLIAMS
&MEYERS, supra note 11, § 806.3, at 36; JOHN LOWE,OILANDGAS LAW 306-09 (1988) (prudent
operator standard underlies all implied covenants, and generally requires good faith,
competence, and due regard to lessors' interests). A minority once applied a test of subjective
good faith, see 5 WILUIAMS& MEYERS, supranote 11, § 806.2, at 33, butit is "doubtful that these
states would follow the good faith standard today." Id. at 34.
224. The five covenants are the covenants to explore undeveloped property, to develop
whatever reserves are located, to protect against drainage, to "manage and administer," and
to market. Williams and Meyers list six covenants, five specific ones and one catchall
obligation. The specific duties are to drill an exploratory well, protect against drainage,
reasonably develop, explore further, and market; the general duty is to use reasonable care
and due diligence in all operations including drilling producing, and marketing. See 5
WILLIAMS& MEYERS, supranote 11, § 804, at 28.1 to 28.2. The duty to manage and administer
has tended to be a catch-all provision to cover "acts or omissions not comprehended by the
more specific implied covenants," id. § 861, at 424.1, but this duty sounds very much like the
general reasonable prudence standard for all implied covenants. Williams and Meyers cite
quite similar categorizations by Professors Merrill, Walker, and Summers. See id. § 804, at 2627.
For John Lowe's list, see LOWE, supra note 223, at 309-10. Lowe agrees that the
covenant of diligent and prudent operation (which sounds like the general standard of
reasonable prudence) "overlaps several of the other implied covenants," all of which "may
be seen as applications of the reasonable prudent operator standard." See id. at 343-44. This
Article discusses the mutual benefit covenant as a sixth implied covenant because it is the
sixth specific covenant, as distinguished from this one general duty.
The covenant to explore has become less important because modem leases allow the
lessee to pay "delay payments" as a substitute for production if it does not drill an initial well.
See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supranote 1, at 28.1 (covenant to drill exploratory well "no longer
has importance" because of modem lease terms); accord, LOWE, supranote 223, at 310.
225. 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998).
226, See id. at 889-91.
227. Cf. Hebert, supra note 111, at 12 (claiming that many lessees "look at this 'list'
[implied covenants applicable under Louisiana's Mineral Code] as an exclusive one and as
defining what a reasonable and prudent operator is. Instead, however, a lessee should look
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The HECI court articulated the standard reasons courts use to

imply covenants. One reason is that a term was "so clearly within the
contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express
it." s The other is that an added term is necessary "to effectuate the full

to the general rule or obligation and view these specific enumerated ones as merely
illustrative examples thereof.").
This Article does not address another possibility, namely, that the industry should
restructure the royalty relationship from scratch. David Pierce has argued that the dominance
of form contracts and the rule of precedent has given standard leases a life they may not
deserve; and that private interests might be better protected if both sides shared some risks
of drilling, while the public interest might fare better with less development-oriented
standards than today's implied covenants. See generally David Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and
Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 445 (1987). Pierce has campaigned for amendments to standard leases;
he elsewhere has proposed to solve pricing disputes by shifting royalties to index-based
clauses, see Pierce, supra note 68, at 806-09. For concurrence that implied covenants may
accentuate lessor rights and development at the expense of public interests, including
environmental ones, see Martin, A Modem Look, supra note 222, at 202-13.
It is unlikely that the industry will discard a contract that has allowed such
widespread development, or landowners one that is so generally familiar. It certainly is hard
to picture the average royalty owner's committing to pay a share of drilling costs even if the
result is a dry hole. Not only would they need significantly more compensation to justify this
new risk, but it would change the cost-free rationale of the royalty with which all sides of the
industry seem comfortable. One can imply from Pierce's writing that he might agree that
royalty owners need more protection, as argued here, from his argument that leases are
"industry-generated" forms that have endured-that both sides have been willing to keep
using-because of "the willingness of courts to take what they perceive to be an unfair
contract and make it fair through creative interpretation." Pierce, supra, at 453. "The interest
which courts identify for protection is the lessor's expectation of royalty." Id. at 469 (citation
omitted). A mutual benefit implied covenant would clarify and strengthen the major underground principle to which courts return again and again to give lessors necessary protection.
228. HECI, 982 S.W.2d at 883,889. Dual phrasings of the source for these duties go back
to the earliest roots of implied covenants. The foundational Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140
F. 801, 811 (8th Cir. 1905), one of the first articulations of the implied covenant of
development by then-Judge Van Devanter, described (1) covenants that were "reasonably
calculated to effectuate the controlling intention of the parties as manifested in the lease," and
(2) the more objective "[w]hatever is necessary to the accomplishment of that which is
expressly contracted...." See also Danciger Oil & Refining Co. v. Powell, 154 S.W.2d 632,635
(Tex. 1941) (covenant "must rest entirely on the presumed intention of the parties as gathered
from the terms as actually expressed in the written instrument itself" or "it must appear that
it is necessary to infer such a covenant in order to effectuate the full purpose of the contract
as a whole as gathered from the written instrument").
Brewster has been read as an intent case, see, e.g., Kramer & Pearson, supranote 222,
at 790, but this reading ignores the fact that both factual language of intent and the "necessity"
language of judicial implication coexist in the opinion. One of Brewster's notable features is
that the intent analysis hewed much closer to the parties' actual intent than the average
implied covenant case (see for instance the detailed discussion of lease terms and of the
history of the lease, 140 F. at 806-08). Once an implied covenant makes its way into law, courts
will impose it without looking this hard at the particular intent of the individual contract,
unless, that is, there are conflicting lease provisions.
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purpose of the lease."2'
Both standards partake of the amorphous, uncertain language
often seen in discretionary standards. It certainly cannot be true that
covenants are only efforts to reach a party's actual, subjective, but
unexpressed intent. Most royalty owners are inexperienced. They rarely
think about how many wells the lessee ultimately will drill, if the lessee
will avoid drainage, how the lessee will administer accounts, or of the
many possible ways the lessee might cheat them. When disputes do arise,
lessors often had not considered the specific issue. So it can be a fiction that
the terms were so obvious that "the parties deemed it unnecessary to
express it."'
Another factual explanation for implied covenants is that the future
of an oil and gas operation is so uncertain that the parties cannot predict
every eventuality." This cannot explain the lack of a given implied
covenant, though, because they are also general rules of law. Anyone with
grounding in the industry can foresee that it will be helpful to have a
general provision about drainage, exploration and development,
administration, marketing, and mutual benefits.

The fact that the implied covenants have become well-established
makes it even harder to rely on actual intent deduced from contract
language. The covenants change the parties' reasonable expectations. They
make it at least marginally more likely that some royalty owners will have
thought about some of their rights. At the same time, the existence of

The two phrasings of the factual and legal justification for implied covenants overlap.
The more a protection seems "necessary" for the lease, the more likely that parties assumed
they had this protection even without expressing it. The more willing a court to find the
parties must have intended a term, the more likely it is to think the term is "necessary" for
protecting some lease purpose. For one example of how these distinctions can break down,
see Weaver, supra note 3, at 497-502 (analyzing what she calls the Texas implied-in-fact
standard but admitting that "leading cases still often discuss fair dealing and good faith in
language reminiscent of the equity model").
229. HECI, 982 S.W.2d at 883.
230. See id. at 888.
231. Cf. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 810 (8th Cir. 1905) (parties could not
specify drilling program ("the number of wells to be drilled, as to when the wells, other than
the first, should be drilled, or as to the rate at which the production therefrom should proceed,
because these matters would depend in large measure upon future conditions, which could
not be anticipated with certainty, such as the extent to which oil and gas, one or both, could
be produced from the premises") because of uncertainty prior to dng which is why they
needed some covenant of reasonable development); Conine, supra note 186, at 675 (arguing
that the lease is silent on many "operational" issues because it is executed before "reliable"
reserve information is available, "making it impossible for the parties to anticipate the nature,
potential or timing of operations"); id. at 711 (parties lack information to negotiate "sales price
for an outright transfer"); Hebert, supra note 111, at 5 (lessee and lessor cannot determine in
advance how lease should be operated in future); Weaver, supranote 186, at 1485.
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implied protection increases the odds that royalty owners will not see the
need to document their rights (because they expect courts to protect them
anyway). 2
The other reason for implying covenants is to "effectuate the
purpose" of the lease.' Though this rationale comes with a standard
disclaimer that courts should not use implied covenants "just to make the
contract fair,"' the covenants are inseparable from a judicial sense that
some pure-contract results would be unfair. So these cautions have to be
taken with a grain of salt. Courts indeed should not use implied covenants
to change contract terms, for instance to cushion a low price in a rising
market or cap an agreement to pay maximum lawful prices in a depressed
market, but the idea that the parties would have stated an unspoken term
if they thought it "necessary," or that a term is "necessary" to a contract's
purpose, is indistinguishable from a judgment that it would be unfair to
enforce a contract without the added term. Perhaps a better description of
this rationale is that courts will elaborate contract rights when necessary to
implement general contract purposes. They should not imply covenants
just to make an individual contract fair, but they can and will intervene to
make a class of contracts fair.
The mutual benefit covenant should satisfy either the intent or
necessity test. It is hard to imagine a lease in which the lessor agreed that
the lessee can take a separate benefit and did not have to share all lease
values.' That is one of the facts of life for lessees. Expressed or not, the
mutual benefit duty is almost certain to match the actual intent and
understanding of the lessor and to be a precondition for its willingness to
lease. As the examples in the text show, the covenant is necessary to
effectuate the lease. This shared interest is the royalty owners' protection
and guarantee that the lessee will act in the mutual interest, rather then
detour for private gain.
A mutual benefit covenant fits squarely into existing royalty law.
The rule can be characterized as this industry's version of unjust
enrichment. Underlying it is the understanding that the lease embodies a

232. Inlndep. Petroleum Ass'n. ofAm. v. Armstrong,91 F. Supp.2d 117,127-28 (D.D.C. 2000),
one district court discounted duty-to-market arguments under federal leases because it could
not find language describing the duty in the lease. Yet implied covenants add protection that
is not written into the lease but are to be given equal weight with the written terms; requiring
unwritten rights to be written ignores the theory behind providing implied protection in the
first place.
233. See HECI, 982 S.W.2d at 883,888.
234. See id. at 889.
235. The implausible alternative would be lessors who say, "Sure, we agreed that the
lessee could make money off our interest, even in ways not disclosed to us." Before holding
a lessor to such an abnormal understanding, courts should demand it be in writing.
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mutual, shared venture to develop the property that the royalty owners
turned over to the lessee (regardless of whether courts have formally
adopted the "cooperative venture" theory). The rule is based on the
economic reality that when the lessor contributes the lease in exchange for
the lessee's capital, know-how, and efforts, both contributions are essential
ingredients in an oilfield project. A covenant against profiting off the
royalty owners' share is "necessary" to effectuate the joint project.
B. A Rule Against Separate Benefits Will Clarify Several Areas of Oil
and Gas Law
Recognizing an implied covenant barring lessees from taking
separate or added benefits from the revenue stream will clarify a number
of areas in oil and gas law that today betray confusion or worse. The takeor-pay/royalty cases present one such area. Those cases foundered on
simple questions of "plain meaning." The pretense that leases really dealt
with the situation was a convenient excuse for not deciding the real issue.
Courts generally do put plain meaning analysis at the top of their
interpretative hierarchy. If the words of a contract or statute are "clear,"
courts generally will not look to purpose, legislative history, the parties'
interactions, or other factors.' But whether particular words are clear is a
question that only can be posed in the context of the question asked. Here
that question necessarily looks to the parties' relationship. Do terms like
"production" control the outcome in the very unusual circumstance when
payment occurs before production and the buyer may not even take the
gas? To argue that words alone resolve this issue is to trivialize the problem
in advance.
This exaltation of plain meaning should not have survived a clear
mutual benefit rule. It is impossible to square the fundamental exchange of
property for exploration and development with ajudicial diminution under
which an unexpected delay, postponement, or even extinction of
production can deprive the royalty owner of proceeds that in fact are paid
and that every other interest owner receives. At a minimum, courts imbued
with a mutual benefit approach, and wary of lessee aggrandizement,

236. The written words of a contract cast a long shadow on subsequent disputes. When
interpreting a contract term, the "express terms" take precedence over extrinsic evidence of
things like course of performance or course of dealing. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTs § 203(b) (1981). Evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements and talks are
not admissible if they contradict express terms in an integrated agreement. See id. § 215.
Moreover, every word is to be given effect. See id. § 203(a). It is an old rule of oil and gas law
that if a lease deals expressly with an area, courts will not enforce an implied covenant set up
in opposition to the contract language. See supra note 3.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

would begin their analysis closer to Frey and Klein than to Diamond
Shamrock and State v. Pennzoil.
Every legal generation has its bad mistakes, decisions inexplicable
to later generations. So it is that a society reared on Brown v. Board of
Educationlooks back with wonder at Plessy v. Ferguson and the separatebut-equal doctrine, and the post-New Deal world looks back smugly at
Lochner's cramped, myopic contract clause analysis. An industry and
generation of lawyers raised on a mutual benefit covenant, one with roots
embedded in mainstream oil and gas doctrines, will look back at the takeor-pay cases and shake their heads. They will wonder how courts could
have gone so far wrong.
Straightforward acknowledgement of a mutual benefit covenant,
one inchoate today and not yet fully surfaced in judicial consciousness,
would have spared much of the muddle in the division order cases. The
covenant should have blocked the tortuous zigzag from First Baptist to
Exxon v. Middleton with its confident assertion that division orders can
amend leases, through the brief moment of clarity represented by Gavenda
v. Strata Energy, Inc. and its prohibition on amendments that only benefited
the lessee, 7 the descent again into the bog of Cabot Corporation v. Brown,
that later broad amendment case,' and the final resurrection on solid
ground almost a decade later in HeritageResources, Inc. v. Nations Bank.2N
The governing principle of these cases is fairly straightforward: the lessee
cannot use a document that confirms title to siphon off a share of the
royalty owner's income stream. That rule would not have been open to
doubt under a clear covenant against separate benefits.
A mutual benefit covenant will crystallize the guiding principle of
the affiliate cases. The principle is not that a lessee can gouge its royalty
owners through a separate affiliate as long as it observes corporate
formalities, but not if the affiliate is an alter ego. The affiliate cases run the
risk of getting off track every time they put much weight on alter ego
technicalities.'u The rule against separate benefits largely dispenses with
the details of corporate structure. It offers a much simpler principle: a
lessee cannot extract an extra profit just by shifting certain services into

237. The division order progression from First Baptist to Gavenda is discussed at supra
notes 19-47 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 41.
239. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
240. For instance, even though the lower court got it right in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. 1984), affd in part, revd in part, No. C-3768,1987 WL 47847
(Tex. Dec. 15,1987), opinion withdrawn by 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988), its consideration of alter
ego issues, see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text, increased the risk of error. Had it
found TXO and its affiliated Delhi pipeline truly separate, its concern with corporate
relationships could have betrayed it into a different result.
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separate legal entities. It does not matter whether it does this to keep too
much of the revenue or to charge excessive costs. This bar does not turn
upon whether the affiliate is housed in a separate building, has its own
employees, holds directors' meetings, has a separate letterhead, or any
number of other corporate formalities.2"'
Lessees will argue that making them share their gain on services
robs them of the incentive to perform those services themselves. That
argument could apply to every service, even every ordinary production
service. The argument slights the point of the lease. A lessee puts its skill
at the royalty owner's service in return for a mineral interest. As far as the
leased property, a lessee has a much closer relationship with the lessor than
any vendor. The lease represents the lessee's commitment that the incentive
embedded in its mineral interest is reward enough for it to develop the
lease aggressively and in good faith. A lessee might say it would cut off its
nose to spite its face and never enter the marketing business unless allowed
to profit off the royalty owners, but its duty to market is an integral part of
its overall promise to find and produce mineral assets for the lessor
without such extra cash compensation.
A covenant against separate benefits would cast in a clearer,
though harsher, light another area of the law that, along with the take-orpay cases, should come to be viewed as one of this generation's oil and gas
mistakes. This is the Vela principle that lessees under market value leases
must pay royalties at higher prices than they receive if they commit the gas
to long-term contracts, but market prices rise above the contract level. 2
The Oklahoma Supreme Court illustrated how this rule can lead to
ridiculous results in Tara Petroleum,where the lessor would have received

241. Control issues still may be relevant where the controlled company is not owned by
the lessee, directly or indirectly, but the royalty owners argue that the lessee nonetheless
exercises actual control. Here there must be some attention to corporate formalities, or royalty
owners could claim that even third-parties with whom the lessee does business are de facto
affiliates. In cases about apparently unrelated companies, the courts will want proof of
control. For example, consider the lack of evidence supporting allegations of common control
among not-obviously-related parties that led the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Tara Petroleum
to dismiss the middle man allegations, 630 P.2d at 1275, or the lack of evidence about the
Stevens' interest in Arkla that brought the same result in Hillardv. Stevens, 637 S.W.2d 581,
584 (Ark. 1982).
242. In addition to Texas cases like Vela and Exxon v. Middleton, see Imperial Colliery Co.
v. OXY USA, Inc., 912 F.2d 696,700 (4th Cir. 1990) (interpreting West Virginia law); Piney
Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 236 (5th Cir. 1984) (interpreting
Mississippi law); Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 664 P.2d 1335, 1339-40 (Kan. 1983); Lightcap
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 P.2d 1, 11 (Kan.); Mont. Power Co. v. Kravik, 586 P.2d 298, 302-03
(Mont. 1978); West v. Alpar Res., Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484,487 (N.D. 1980).
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almost half the revenue stream, four times its nominal royalty share, if paid
by current market value.243

Refusing to let the lessee hide behind a long-term contract can
make sense if the contract was with an affiliate, which itself was reselling
the gas at a higher price. This may have been the concern, though the Texas
Supreme Court did not articulate it as such, in Vela and Exxon v.
Middleton.' In a recent case enforcing the "reverse-Vela" rule, that Court
has again confirmed that it will not let Vela shield self-dealing."4 In general,
the mutual benefit should be as mutual for the lessee as the lessor. If the
lessee enters a gas purchase agreement in good faith and gets the best price
it can, it is not fair to transmute the lease into a price guarantee for the
lessor while putting all the market risk on the lessee. Under Vela, one side
is taking a separate benefit from the other. This time it is the lessor who
exploits the relationship. 6

243. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
244. See the discussion by Chief Justice Curtiss Brown in the intermediate opinion in Exxon
Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App. 1978), affd in part, rev'd in part, 613 S.W.2d 240
(Tex. 1981), discussed in supra note 57.
A lessee might respond that it entered a long-term contract with its affiliate to shift
certain market risks to an unrelated company, and that its affiliate was doing no more than
what any third-party buyer would have done under an independent contract entered at the
same time. This begs the question of why the lessee wanted to keep the market risk within its
corporate family but shift it to another arm of that body. Sometimes such decisions can be
motivated by tax or other "neutral" motivations. In one area of the law, antitrust cases, courts
have provided companies some immunity. See Copperweld Corp. v. Interdependence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752(1984) (rejecting intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine for antitrust lawsuits).
But the history of fleecing royalty owners through affiliate devices is sufficiently strong that
affiliate cases do not merit the Copperweld shield from liability.
245. Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368,373-74 (Tex. 2001), discussed in note 16,

supra.
246. The underlying argument, which the Texas Supreme Court blessed in Vela, is that
accepting a long-term contract price as the "market" price impermissibly removes any
difference between "proceeds" and "market value" leases. See Vela,429S.W.2d at871 (parties
contracted for market-value price; they "might have agreed that the royalty.. .would be a
fractional part of the amount realized," but they did not). Yet this linguistic dilemma should
hardly settle the issue. Those two price terms already are equated in the short run, as a shortterm spot price would equalize values under market value and proceeds leases. Giving them
the same meaning over the longer term would not truly render the difference in language
superfluous. Other differences would persist, for instance, certain different interpretations on
post-production costs.
In Vela states where the operator can be liable for more than the contract price if the
market rises, it is only logical that it should not have to share the benefit of its contract if the
relative market price falls. See Lowe, supranote 68, at 259. This is the "reverse-Vela" problem,
the situation where the Texas Supreme Court recently followed Vela in this circumstance in
Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001). Even if courts do have to treat the
price effects of market value and proceeds leases as the same in Vela and reverse-Vela
situations, frank acknowledgement of the mutuality of the lease shows that among two
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It is not only the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Tara Petroleumthat
recognized that the Vela rule is incompatible with the mutual nature of the
lease. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed in Henry v. Ballard & Cordell
CorpY Treating the lease as a cooperative venture, with the lease

evils-the often absurd result of the Vela rule versus the generally undesirable result of
arriving at the same royalty value under two different descriptions of value-the injury
caused by Vela is the greater evil.
One could argue that Vela's injustice to the lessee in a rising market might be
balanced out in a falling market, where the lessee might pay less to royalty owners than it
received. Over time, even if the rule distorts the royalty relationship, the distortions might
average out, but there are many problems with this position. There is no reason to expect the
excesses on the lessee side and those on the lessor side to end up in a self-canceling
equilibrium. Why should two wrongs always balance each other? Courts appropriately shy
away from the principle that two wrongs make a right. Moreover, a rule under which both
lessor and lessee almost always get a different share of the revenue stream than the agreedupon percentage has to be looked at with great suspicion. Such a result ignores the most
fundamental, mutual purpose of the lease.
Thomas Harrell has pointed out that one flaw in Vela is that few people thought
differences in lease price terms were much more than "particularized expressions by different
draftsmen of the basic idea that the gas produced would be sold by the lessee for the best
price he could get...." Thomas Harrell, Recent Developments in NonregulatoryOil and Gas Law,
31 INS. ON OIL &GAS L. & TAX'N 327, 341 (1980). In addition, by insisting that gas is "sold"
only when delivered, the court removed the volume or quantity of gas committed from the
value calculus. See id. at 331-32. Vela poses a dilemma for lessor and lessee alike. Say a very
high long-term contract price is available, but naturally it requires a gas commitment. Should
the lessee commit the gas, or must it sell only at some lower spot market price because the
future spot price might rise above this good contract price and it has to keep its production
free in case that happens? The good long-term price is only available to sellers who are willing
to tie their reserves to the contract's pricing mechanisms. Surely lessors cannot both insist that
they get today's best long-term contract price (which will force the lessee to commit their
reserves) but also any higher spot price that happens to come along (even though the lessee
bound to a long-term contract cannot sell in the spot market without breaching its contract.)
The smart lessee stuck in Vela jurisdictions should make its royalty owners choose which
contract they prefer if a good long-term opportunity arises.
For a sample of contemporaneous criticism of the Vela rule, see authorities cited in
Henry v. Ballard & CordellCorp., 418 So. 2d 1334,1338 n.8 (La. 1982).
247. 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982); accord, Hillard v. Stephens, 637 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Ark.
1982). These cases stand on the cooperative venture ground. "The cooperative venture
principle stated in Henry was an important, if unstated, premise for Tarav. Hughey and Hillard
v. Stephens." Lowe, supra note 68, at 235. Ballard is a particularly important cooperative
venture opinion because the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the rule to protect the lessee,
not the lessor. At issue was whether a lessee who enters a gas purchase contract in good faith
and at arm's length, indeed one that was "quite favorable" when entered, Ballard,418 So. 2d
at 1336, would have to pay royalties on more than the prices it received if market prices rose.
The court believed that any such rule would ignore the practical realities of the oil and gas
industry, particularly given the cooperative nature of a lease, and the lessee's need to enter
a long-term contract. See id. at 1337-39.
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documenting the proportionate division of benefits, the Court saw no
reason to punish the lessee/operator for its good faith gas sales decision3
This new covenant's deeper insight could further improve results
in less well-known disputes. Consider Pritchettv. Forest Oil Corp., a case
blessing an operator's dissemination of incomplete, misleading information
to a royalty owner who was thinking of selling her interest. 49 The plaintiff
owned 200 acres in a voluntarily pooled unit. In the spring of 1971, the
plaintiff offered to sell 50 acres to the operator at $1000 an acre. The
operator countered at less than a third of her price. The plaintiff's son, a
geophysicist, repeatedly called seeking geologic information on the
property.' When her son tried "to determine the facts concerning the
porosity of the formation,""1 the defendant did not tell him about fluid loss
that suggested the well soon would become much more valuable.' 2 After
the plaintiff sold her acreage, the well indeed did turn into a better
producer.
In most circles, this would be pretty straightforward fraud, but a
Texas court of appeals decided that Forest Oil had no duty to the
unfortunate Pritchett. The court seemed to believe that royalty owners are
not equal partners in the venture. Twice it referred, without explanation of
the point's relevance, to the fact that royalty owners do not pay the cost of
production.' "[I]t is an entirely different matter when the lessor or royalty
interest owner, who is not charged with the cost of production, attempts to
inquire of the producer information entirely foreign to any legitimate

248. CitingThomas Harrell's article, see supra note 98, the court reminded readers that this
cooperative venture was the exchange of land for the capital and expertise of the lessee
"necessary to develop the minerals for the mutual benefit of both parties." See Ballard,418 So.
2d at 1338. The lease set the "division" of the resulting "economic benefits," the fractional
share the royalty owners were to get. See id. When the discovery was made, there only was
one "economically feasible market for the gas," the long-term contract the lessee actually
entered. Nothing in this mutual exchange suggested that courts should punish a lessee as long
as it acted in good faith. See id. at 1340.
249. 535 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App. 1976).
250. See id. at 709. The son told the operator's employees that "he never wanted any
information that was not being made public, but that he wanted all information that they felt
was permissible to give him." Id.
251. Id.
252. The withheld information "would have been valuable...in determining porosities."
Id.
253. Pritchett had also cited the lead unit-fiduciary case. See id. at 710 (Young v. West
Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, discussed in note 62 supra). The court summarily dismissed
Pritchett's authorities because they did not deal with what it saw as the governing issue,
which the court narrowed into hairsplitting minutiae: "Inleither do they ever state that a
fiduciary duty is owed by a unit operator regarding the giving of drilling information to a
royalty owner who has no interest in the cost of production." Id. The court might as well have
noted that the plaintiffs did not all have the same name.
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interest."2' So the court let Forest Oil keep the property it repurchased by
subterfuge. This reward for concealment permitted an unjustified
appropriation of value belonging to the royalty owner.ss
Making formal and conscious the principle that lessees must
develop leases for mutual benefit and not take separate benefits from the
lessor's interest would bring greater precision to a number of areas of oil
and gas law. This new covenant would give a much more tangible,
integrated sense of this economic relationship. Accepting this principle
formally will facilitate the development of oil and gas law.
C. The Mutuality of Lease Interests Furthers Efficiency
American courts deciding commercial cases have elevated
economic efficiency to the dominant judicial policy concern in recent
decades.2' Private contracts govern the disposition of most assets,
including mineral rights, in the United States. A society that allocates its
primary assets through market exchange puts a very high value on
efficiency. 7
Markets have several structural advantages in societies sufficiently
stable for their citizens to trust that contracts will be enforced and property
values protected. Markets promote freedom because each consumer and
producer can pursue its self-interest without government interference.'

254. Id. (emphasis added).
255. One should not have to think twice to realize the flaw in the court's position. Why
is a royalty owner's right to truthful information an "entirely different matter" than other
investors' rights? How does a royalty owner's bearing or not bearing the direct costs of
production (and by contributing acreage, royalty owners do bear what would be viewed as
a direct cost but for the ideology of royalty exclusion) reduce its right to be treated honestly?
Why is someone who gives up valuable acreage less protected that someone who donates
cash? Why is a royalty owner asking the lessee about its property's reserve value when it is
negotiating with that lessee to sell its interest invading an area "entirelyforeignto any legitimate
interest"? Why didn't Pritchett have a right to the truth? The court provided no reason for
denying royalty owners a share of the value in the mutual property.
256. Even in oil and gas law, "economic considerations have been used to identify and
correct inefficiencies embedded in early court decisions on oil and gas issues." Conine, supra
note 186, at 671. In the cited article, Conine shows how economic concepts are built into
standards for handling exploration, development, and drainage, with a few suggestions for
change.
257. For the general argument that the legal tools necessary for market trading were
significant factors in the development of modem economies, see DOUGLASS C. NORTi,
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE THROUGH TIME 1-23 (1993).

258. The classic defenses of markets as protectors of freedom are FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
ROADTO SERFDOM (1944);FRIEDRICH A. HAYEr,THEFATALCONCEIT: THE ERRORSOFSOCIALISM
(1988); MILTON FREIDMAN, CAPITAuSM ANt FREEDOM (1962).
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They increase welfare by facilitating mutually beneficial exchanges.'
Leaving the disposition of major resources in private hands, with profits
and gains going to owners, is a strong incentive to innovation.m The social
consensus on allocating so many resources by private negotiation rather
than government dictate in theory allows quick, flexible allocation without
the barriers imposed by command economies or those run by custom,
status, or hierarchy. 1
Yet neither the promotion of freedom and efficiency nor concerns
with flexible resource allocation tells courts where to allocate values
between lessees and lessors. Private exchange should let parties determine
how they value resources, not abstractly, but in concrete practice. The
requisite freedom of economic choice requires that contracts be reliable
conveyors of preferences when a bargain is reached; it does not say which
party should win or determine the level of prices.22 Returns to innovation,
similarly, require that the agreed-upon profits inure to the innovator but

259. The intuitive explanation for the way exchanges increase at least one side's utility,
and in most cases both, can be shown in a two-dimensional space by the Edgeworth box
diagram. See BRIANR. BINGER&ELIZABETHHOFFMANMICROECONOMICSWmICALCULUS 176-

79 (1988).
260. For the ceaseless transforming effects of the capitalist endeavor, see JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (1942). Even a small increase in

innovation may, over time, produce a very large-scale advantage in levels of output and
living standards. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law as Industrial Policy: Should Judgesand
Juries Make It?, in ANITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 31 (Thomas M. Jorde &
David J.Teece eds., 1992) ('At least since Schumpeter wrote nearly fifty years ago, innovation
has been thought to contribute far more to our well-being than keeping prices closer to costs
through competition.").
261. Hayek argued that critical knowledge for a changing economic system is knowledge
of "particular circumstances of time and place," instead of aggregate statistical knowledge
that might be easy to gather for central planners. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 521 (1945). He believed that the price mechanism could
communicate the right signals quickly and efficiently so that people would "move in the right
direction" even without a full understanding of what changes were shifting prices or why. See
id. at 526-27.
Part of the market's precision is that the price mechanism sends accurate signals of
the true marginal cost of using a resource. For these signals to be appropriate, they must
reflect the values that resource owners put on their assets; the marginal "cost" of oil and gas
properties is heavily set by the prices landowners charge for their mineral interest.
262. The inability of economics to say how much different factors of production "should"
get paid in an absolute sense is both a strength and a weakness. As is perhaps most
graphically shown by economists' refusal to compare utilities, so that they cannot even say
that a dollar is more important to a starving man than to a millionaire, this version of
neutrality lets economics masquerade as pure science without value judgments even if
following these dictates creates the harshest ordering of society.
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cannot decide the division of profits between joint investors like lessors and
lessees.'
Economics does shed light on the balance of rights in the royalty
relationship in one way.2' Economic theory points to the importance of
maintaining joint dependence upon the flow of production as an agencyenforcing mechanism. Many agents, including lessees, provide services
whose measure and results are heavily within their professional control.
This presents a challenge for principals, including lessors: how can royalty
owners judge their lessees' performance?' If the lessee fails, can lessors
distinguish innocent failures from those born of fraud and deception?
Vigorous exchanges of value that allow the development of professional
expertise will occur in market societies only if principals can trust their
agents to serve the principals' interests as well as their own.
One solution to the agency problem is to link both sides' incentives
as closely as possible, so that even an agent acting in blind self-interest will
serve the principal as well.' The industry has adopted this solution in the
lease. Courts assume a commonality of interests and that the joint return
from mineral production will ensure fair development of the property.267

263. Leaving all returns to the lessee, for instance, would increase its incentive to develop
a property but give lessors no reason to ever lease their mineral interests in the first place.
264. Another economic concept that lurks behind all implied covenants is market power.
Though that issue is beyond the scope of this Article, the consensus that royalty owners are
less experienced and have smaller stakes than lessees in general is a coded way of saying that
there is a severe imbalance of power between these two oilfield groups.
265. The complexity of expert services increases the range of necessary discretion allowed
to an agent and can make supervision and control "very costly if not impossible" and,
accordingly, the principal more vulnerable to the agent. See generally DIETRICHRUESCHEAEYEF,
POWER AND THE DIVISION OF LABOUR 108 (1986). The expert can be "dangerous" to its client
or principal because of the difficulty in controlling its work. See id. at 109.
266. The classic early theoretical sketch is Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The
Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J.FIN. ECON.
305 (1976); see also Steve Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal'sProblem, 63 AM.
ECON. REV. 134 (1973); Michael Spence & Richard Zeckhauser, Insurance, Information, and
IndividualAction, 61 AM. ECON. REv. 380 (1971).
267. Hence the economic significance of the rule that courts generally defer to the lessee's
judgment on the assumption that its interests coincide with the lessor's. See 5 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 11, § 856.3, at 411-12 (courts give "greatest possible leeway" to lessee
because their interests ordinarily coincide with lessors; but if interests "diverge and the lessee
lacks incentive to market gas, closer supervision of his business judgment will be necessary");
Lowe, supranote 53, at 1-20 ("Evidence of self-dealing by the lessee, as was involved in Hagen,
or other conflict of interest between the lessor and the lessee, is likely to have the practical
effect of substantially lightening the lessor's burden."). The presumption of common ground
is in all but words an assumption that a structure in which both parties are to derive their
return from their share of the same productive stream gives them exactly the same interest in
finding and developing oil and gas, rather than giving the opera tor an incentive to help itself
to the lessor's pie. The widely varied disputes discussed in this Article suggest that the
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The policing mechanism that protects this mutuality is shared dependence
upon production. If the lessee cannot earn any gain that is not shared with
the lessors, it should serve their interests as faithfully as its own by trying
to maximize its profits. This mutuality is a precondition of the lease
exchange. It lets royalty owners who often have little or no experience and
lack interests large enough to justify effective monitoring nonetheless count
on the lessee to protect them. The rule that courts increase their scrutiny of
lessees when their interests diverge from lessors' recognizes the importance
of this shared economic incentive.'
D. Royalty Owners Have Relatively Little Contract Protection, Another
Reason They Need Implied Protection
Another reason royalty owners need the mutual benefit covenant
is that they have so little contract protection.'s Leases have a relatively
simple price term and no detailed provisions on how costs are to be
allocated. Whatever its cause, the rudimentary level of detail suggests the
need for more extra-contract protection. In contrast, most joint equity

presumed identity of interests is as often myth as reality. Gary Conine has suggested that the
reason courts had to develop the reasonablyprudent operator test is that the interests of lessor
and lessee were "too disparate." See Conine, supra note 186, at 711.
268. For the same reason, this is why the actual-cost basis and shared reliance upon
production is so important to working interest owners underJOA investments. Profits are not
to come from services provided to the partners, so interests should not be at odds, or so the
theory goes. See generally Ernest E. Smith, Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operatorto
Nonoperators,Investors, and OtherInterest Owners,32 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 12-1,12-20,1221 (1986) (in general discussion of operator duties, claiming that "Is]elf interest of the party
with the executive or managerial responsibility may be trusted to protect the interests of nonexecutive and nonmanaging parties").
269. The generality of lease language is striking. See, e.g., A.W. Walker, supra note 222, at
399 ("One of the most distinctive features of oil and gas leases is the almost total absence in
the ordinary type of lease of express clauses protecting the royalty interest of the lessor."),
cited with approval,Kramer & Pearson, supra note 222, at 788-89 & n.12; cf. Lowe, supra note 68,
at 229 ("Typical lease royalty clauses are simply too general to help define the royalty
obligations."). If leases are not detailed enough, one can naturally ask why parties do not just
write more specific contracts. Cf. Pierce, supra note 68, at 786-833 (suggesting various
improvements, from author's perspective). Given the differences in sophistication and
resources between lessees and lessors, the result of an industry-rewritten lease is likely to be
an unfair contract biased toward lessees. (Consider, for instance, Pierce's suggestion that one
change be making clear that the "royalty-triggering event should be gas flowing through the
valves at the wellhead." Id, at 817. This would have legitimated lessee profiteering from takeor-pay royalties.) When even the more experienced nonoperators have to suffer the broad
disclaimers of responsibility in today's JOA, see infra note 270, there is little reason to think
that industry-wide renegotiation of leases would produce fairer outcomes. That will not be
likely until royalty owners organize and begin to use the pressure of their numbers to balance
the larger economic interests and power that lessees enjoy as a group.
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investments proceed under one or another form of the Joint Operating
Agreement with its Copas accounting attachment. The Copas form has
detailed accounting terms, including extensive audit provisions, that put
the project on an actual cost basis.27
Given the inexperience and lack of resources of the average lessor,
it would be unrealistic to expect them to employ even the same care as a
working interest owner. Even if their experience and sophistication were
not an issue, not many royalty owners have the money to commission a
revenue or cost audit. Moreover, given the small size of many royalty
interests, even wealthy royalty owners can find that the cost of auditing a
large operating company (which predictably will resist providing
information and make the process unnecessarily expensive) exceeds the
likely return.
Royalty owners need more protection. Leases contain a price term
-almost always a "market value/market price," an "amount realized/proceeds" clause, a two-pronged combination of those two standards, or, in
some older leases, a fixed price term-but generally no explanation of what
these standards mean. Leases almost never say a word about the operator's
use of affiliates. They do not explicitly address the use of indices or resales
through trading affiliates and say nothing about costs. Royalty owners
have a strong need for the clarification of a mutual benefit covenant.
V. IT IS TIME TO LET THE MUTUAL BENEFIT COVENANT
SURFACE
Because the royalty owner does enjoy many rights, express and
implied, it is not customary to think about how much it gives up when it
270. "It has always been the intent of the Operating Agreement that the Operator should
not make a profit or conversely suffer a loss just by the fact that he is the Operator of the joint
operations." JOLLY& BUCK, supra note 78, at 108; see also id. at 203; accord, C.M. Kennedy, Joint
Venture Accounting, A La Copas--1962, 1964 NATL INST. PETROLEUM LANDMEN 159 (1991) ("It
is a well established principle in our industry that an operator is not supposed to profit from
the operation, at the expense of his co-venturers."). For details of this actual-cost basis, see
McArthur, supra note 78, § II.A., at 117-33.
Ifstronger contract protectionbrought with it the disclaimers and exculpatory clauses
and Copas claims limitation that have marred the operator-friendly JOA in recent years,
royalty owners are better off than with a detailed "industry" contract. JOA Article VII says
that the parties do not intend to form a partnership or other fiduciary relationship. See 1989
JOA, supranote 73, art. VII. Article V.A. provides that the operator will perform in a "good
and workmanlike manner" and that it will not be liable except for "gross negligence or willful
misconduct." See id. at art. V.A. For a case showing how far courts can go with the
disclaimers,see Stine v. Marathon Oil Co., 976 F.2d 254,259-61 (5th Cir. 1992). Copas provides
that all joint account bills will be conclusively "presumed to be true and correct" unless
challenged within two years of the end of the bill's calendar year. See 1984 Copas, article 1.4;
1995 Copas, article I.4.A.
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signs a lease. Yet the royalty owner cedes full control over the mineral
development of its property. The standard arrangement puts a landowner's
economic fate in the hands of the lessee. The lessee or its assignee will
make all key development decisions, including when to drill, where to drill,
and who else will invest in the project. It makes the technical decisions that
can so alter the outcome, including decisions with very long-term
environmental effects that may only become apparent after operations are
long over," When production does occur, the royalty owner becomes even
more dependent. The operator has full control over the contract that fixes
the price paid for production. To these structural features must be added
the lower sophistication of royalty owners, the relatively small size of their
stake in a given well, and the generally smaller scope of their total
holdings, so often limited to one or two wells.
With this backdrop, it is little surprise that courts have recognized
a mutual dependence in which the lessee is charged to act for the lessors.
It is no surprise to see this principle emerging from First Baptist; from the
elaboration of Texas division order cases; from various affiliate cases; from
such lead cases as Alexander v. Amoco and Phillips v. Shutts; and to find it
ensconced in the Louisiana Mineral Code. The idea that the lessee cannot
feather its nest by soiling the royalty owner's is a fundamental principle of
oil and gas law and, as such, has been acknowledged by a wide array of
existing cases.
Royalty law is in transition because while many cases recognize the
lessee's fundamental duty to treat lessors with equal fairness and not to
diminish their interest, the law has yet to elevate that principle to the same
level as, say, its protections against drainage and the duty to market.
Though courts may often get this principle right, they can cause spectacular
damage when they do not. The take-or-pay failures are Exhibit A to the
damage caused. The posted price problem is not far behind. The new wave
of natural gas liquids and gas price and cost litigation threatens to unearth
on the gas side problems much like the posted price disputes.

271. "Typically, lessees make decisions which directly impact the lessor's interests without
any input from the lessor." Pierce, supra note 227, at 462; Pierce, supra note 68, at 826 ("lessor
is, to a large extent, at the mercy of the lessee when it comes to the machinations of the
marketplace"). In the standard equity venture, these are all decisions on which all equity
investors, operator included, get to vote. In many operations, however, the nonoperators will
have little or no technical expertise and will follow the operator's advice. They will figure that
it has no incentive to complete a well or drill a subsequent well unless the well will produce
in paying quantities. (For examples of many of the ways that operators may try to improve
on these pure incentives, see John Burritt McArthur, A Twelve-Step Program for Copas to
Strengthen Oil and Gas Accounting Protections, 49 SMU L. REV. 1447 (1996)). Even active
nonoperators have to rely heavily on information the operator generates during the drilling
in making well decisions.
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A clear mutual benefit rule should over time clarify other areas of
the law as well. It can remove affiliate cases from the possible confusion of
alter ego and corporate-veil principles. The rule should force courts in
jurisdictions following Vela to think again about the arbitrary division of
lessor and lessee interests represented by that rule.
Lessor and lessee share the same hope of making valuable
discoveries, but their interests diverge sharply and fundamentally in many
routine aspects of an oilfield project. The disputes discussed in this Article
all arose because of divergent incentives. Yet oil and gas companies only
secure leases in the first place because landowners believe they will be
treated fairly and share whatever happens with the lessee. Lessors trade
their property for the lessee's experience, skill, and financial investment.
Building a stronger relationship by adding this clear implied
covenant protection is not just a benefit for lessors. The lease is designed to
let oil and gas companies take the risks of exploration without having to
pay much for the land. The standard American lease lets oil companies
explore and develop "with a minimal capital outlay because the major
compensation to the landowner will be paid out of production from the
land, if and when production is obtained."' The near universal use of
leases in the development of American oil and gas fields shows that
operators and lessees as well as landowners prefer the mutuality of this
allocation of risk. It is time for implied covenant law to install a mutual
benefit principle and recognize that both sides of the lease are to share in
whatever happens next. Both oil and gas law and the larger body of natural
resources law of which it is a part will benefit from finally acknowledging
this key covenant that courts routinely enforce. Formal recognition of this
legal right should prevent some of the errors that can occur when it
remains unacknowledged, a risk demonstrated all too well by the take-orpay royalty cases.

272.

Pierce, supra note 227, at 447.

